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THESIS ABSTRACT
Privatization and Its Role in the
Reconstruction of Lebanon
by
Sami A. BOUSTANY
Submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Civil Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1992
The objective of this thesis is to examine the role of privatization
techniques and private sector's capital in the reconstruction of Lebanon.
The methodology followed to fulfill this objective has three stages. First,
the concept of privatization is described. The definition, rationale, and
purposes of privatization are exposed, and the adequate general policy,
economic, and regulatory frameworks to sustain private investment in
reconstruction and development are investigated. Second, techniques and
methods of privatization are discussed. Special emphasis is given to methods
of ownership and peripheral privatization, and Project Finance models. The
experience of the United Kingdom in ownership privatization, and the
experiences of Turkey and Pakistan in attracting private capital for
infrastructure projects, using Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Build-
Operate-Own (BOO) schemes, are exposed. Third, applications and problems
of privatization programs worldwide are discussed. Examples are drawn from
the experiences of many developing countries in privatizing public services and
development projects. Thorough consideration is given to the cases of Mexico
and Argentina in particular, and empirical evidence of private sector
superiority in public services provision is provided. In addition, different
problems facing privatization programs are discussed. Special emphasis is
given to political and unions opposition, inhospitable investment environments,
weak regulatory structures, and under-developed capital markets.
Finally, the prospects for privatization in Lebanon are investigated.
Proposals for privatizing the Lebanese electricity and PTT systems are
exposed. The role of the Lebanese private sector in mega-reconstruction
projects is also examined. In conclusion, the difficulties likely to arise and
discourage private sector's involvement in reconstruction are discussed.
Recommendations for practical steps that can be implemented today to lessen
the impact of those difficulties, and encourage private investment in Lebanon
are given.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Fred Moavenzadeh, Professor of Civil Engineering
and Director of the Center for Construction Research and
Education at M.I.T.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Objective
The objective of this thesis is to examine the role of privatization
techniques and private sector's capital in the reconstruction of Lebanon. This
study is driven by the current economic realities prevailing in Lebanon. First,
the Lebanese public sector lacks of enough financial resources to undertake a
large-scale reconstruction of the country. Indeed, since late 1983, soaring
public indebtedness and limited public revenues characterize the poor situation
of the Lebanese Treasury.
Second, Arab and international support to Lebanon's reconstruction is
slow and likely to be very limited. The establishment of the long-awaited Arab
Fund for the Reconstruction of Lebanon, which was initially scheduled for
September 1990, was suspended after the Iraki invasion of Kuwait on August
2, 1990 [El-Khalil 91]. Furthermore, the magnitude of the economic difficulties
prevailing in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is diverting the
EEC's and United States' financial support away from Lebanon. In those times
of worldwide economic recession, international funds for reconstruction and
development are scarce and driven by urgent priorities. Unfortunately,
Lebanon is not on the list of urgent priorities of industrial nations.
These realities converge today making the Lebanese private sector the
most likely source of finance for reconstruction. Indeed, the amount of private
capital in hands of the domestic private sector and Lebanese abroad is
important. Deposits of the domestic private sector in Lebanese commercial
banks were estimated in September 1991 to amount to 4,543 billion Lebanese
pounds [ComLevant-c 91], or the equivalent of U.S.$4.2 billion approximately.
Lebanese abroad (i.e., the Lebanese diaspora) are even more resourceful. In a
lecture at Harvard University on March 30, 1992, Dr. Khalil Makkawi,
Lebanese ambassador to the United Nations, estimated the amount of private
capital in hands of Lebanese individuals and institutions abroad to U.S.$40
billion approximately [Makkawi 92]. This compares with a Lebanese Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of U.S.$2.85 billion in 1991 and U.S.$2.137 billion in
1990 [Sanan 91].
Therefore, it is rational to believe and support the idea of a large-scale
private sector's participation in the reconstruction program. The estimated
costs of such a program are indeed overwhelming -about U.S.$50 billion-
nevertheless, the Lebanese private sector has the resources and expertise to
be the driving force in reconstruction. What is missing is the incentives and
confidence in investing for positive returns in the Lebanese economy, and this
thesis will provide some insights to encourage private investments in the
reconstruction of Lebanon.
1.2 Thesis Organization
Following Chapter 1, in which the objective and organization of this
thesis are described, Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the concept of
privatization. The definition, rationale, and purposes of privatization are
exposed. In addition, the general policy, economic, and regulatory frameworks
to encourage privatization and private investment in reconstruction and
development are examined.
Chapter 3 investigates the techniques and methods of privatization.
Public-private cooperation schemes, techniques of ownership and peripheral
privatization, and project finance models are examined. Special emphasis is
given to the experience of the United Kingdom in ownership privatization, and
the experiences of Turkey and Pakistan in attracting private capital for
infrastructure projects using BOT and BOO schemes.
In Chapter 4, applications and problems of privatization are examined.
Applications focus on privatization of public services (electricity, water supply,
telecommunications, and public transportation). Examples from several
developing countries in privatizing public services and mega-development
projects are provided. The experiences of Latin American countries -especially
Mexico and Argentina- are particularly investigated. In addition, empirical
evidence of private sector superiority in public services provision is provided.
Finally, different problems facing privatization programs worldwide are
examined. Special emphasis is given to political opposition, unions opposition,
inhospitable investment environments, weak regulatory structures, and under-
developed capital markets.
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the past and present economic
situation in Lebanon. The structure of the Lebanese economy before the start
of the war, and the structural difficulties facing the economy today are
examined.
Chapter 6 deals with the issue of privatization in Lebanon. First, the
potential of the Lebanese private sector is described. Second, prospects for
privatization in Lebanon are discussed. Proposals for privatizing the Lebanese
electricity and PTT systems are provided, and the role of the Lebanese private
sector in mega-reconstruction projects is examined. Third, the difficulties likely
to face private sector's investments in the reconstruction of Lebanon are
investigated. Recommendations for practical steps that can be implemented
today to lessen or eliminate the impact of those difficulties, and encourage
private investment in Lebanon are given.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis and evaluates the chances of success of
a large-scale private sector participation in the reconstruction of Lebanon.
Chapter 2
Privatization
2.1 Definition
Privatization is a comparatively new word. It made no significant
appearance in political or economic literature before 1979. It is a new word
because it is a new thing. Despite that novelty, it rapidly became one of the
most important facts of the eighties, spreading outward from Great Britain to
affect more than one hundred countries throughout the world.
Privatization can be defined in several ways. At the broadest level, it refers
to the introduction of market forces in the economy, and incrementally placing
key decisions about resource use and disposition under non-governmental
control. At the strict level, privatization refers to the conversion of Public
Enterprises (PEs) into corporate form, followed by transfer of ownership to the
private sector [Pirie 88]. Transfer may be through sales, free distribution, or
other means.
Although the principal objective of privatization is the enhancement of the
private sector's influence and impact on the economy, the state's role does not
disappear. As Sundquist [Sundquist 84] defines it :
"In true privatization, the government's role is only reduced; it does not
disappear. And what is relinquished may be the easiest part of the whole
job -the doing. The conceiving, planning, goal-setting, standard-setting,
performance monitoring, evaluating, and correcting all remain with the
government. If these are done badly, the public interest suffers, and so,
usually does the private sector. This is why privatization is not panacea
for government incompetence."
2.2 The Rationale of Privatization
In many countries, through a variety of measures which included
nationalization and establishement of new public enterprises, the public sector
came to dominate almost all aspects of economic life. This reality is especially
true for developing and Third-World countries, including many Arab countries.
Short [Short 84] estimates that, worldwide, at the beginning of the eighties,
PEs accounted, on average, for 10% of GDP at factor cost. Public enterprises
have been important in industrial nonsocialist countries as well as in centrally
planned and developing countries. For example, the United Kingdom's public
sector (prior to 1979) accounted for 10.2% of GDP, had 55 billion British
Pounds in turnover, and employed 1.75 million people. In France, after the
1981 nationalizations, PEs employed 16.6% of all French salaried workers
(excluding the agricultural sector) and contributed 17.2% of value added (again
outside agriculture), and 33.5% of Gross Fixed Capital (GFC) formation [De
Chalendar 84].
In developing countries, the reliance on public sector's enterprises to achieve
socioeconomic goals has been even greater than in industrial countries. Their
contributions are significant; for example :
* In value added in manufacturing, in a great many cases exceeding 50% of
national totals.
* In total investment, averaging 25% in what appears to be a representative
sample of 14 developing countries [Nair 88].
* In shares of utilization of developing countries' credit systems (at a rough
estimate, averaging 30% of domestic and 20% of total foreign debt).
* In nonagricultural employment, averaging about 15% in developing countries
versus 4% in nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) [Nellis 89].
Table 2-1 shows the contribution of public sector's enterprises of selected
industrial and developing countries.
Initially, the dominance of the public sector was thought to make a positive
contribution to the cause of development and modernization. The experience
of the last twenty to twenty-five years seems to point in the opposite direction.
It was found that with few exceptions, the public sector incurs substantial
losses, contributes significantly to budget deficits, earns exceedingly low, even
negative rates of return, and has a negative impact on the balance of
payments. In addition, there is evidence that pattern of investment in the
public sector is at variance with considerations of comparative advantage.
Therefore, privatization would certainly reduce the burden on the national
budget, eliminate a major source of waste and inflation, and make a positive
contribution to the balance of payments position [El-Naggar 89].
The rationale of privatization can be divided into three fundamental
reasons:
* Macro Factors
* Loss of Comparative Advantage
* Poor Performance by the Public Sector
2.2.1 Macro Factors
(1) Foreign Capital
The first of these macro factors refers essentially to the government's
decision to attract foreign capital so as to avail of the technology and the
investment opportunities that it provides. In the process, the overall proportion
of private holding in the economy might increase, assuming that the foreign
capital is private.
(2) Investment Promotion
An interesting connection between macro investment needs and
privatization can be derived from an investment promotion cause. For a time,
the private sector in developing and Arab countries, whose savings went up
enormously, did not find "open doors" to absorb its savings capacity and
therefore moved towards increased consumption or speculation or investment
abroad. This, some governments realised was a lost opportunity. Privatization
could thus be the way of catching private savings for public investments
[Ramanadham 87].
(3) Public Expenditures
Closely related to the preceding consideration is the compulsion experienced
by many governments to curtail public expenditures as a matter of overall
economic and budgeting policy. Often, agreements with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for example, have included limitations on government
expenditures. The area open for private investment, including foreign capital
not borrowed or guaranteed necessarily by the government, expands in such
a situation.
2.2.2 Comparative Advantage
This ought to be the main plank on which the case for privatization should
rest. What is implied is that, when an enterprise loses its comparative
advantage in a given sector of activity by being a public enterprise, there is a
case for its privatization [Ramanadham 87].
An easy segment under this head is that of enterprises whose "original
purpose" has been achieved and which should be discontinued. Two difficult
problems, however, need to be added in the context of the original purpose:
how easy is it to determine whether it is achieved; more basically, is the
original purpose valid today ? Solutions are, no doubt, easier in a mixed
economy than in a predominantly public-enterprise oriented economy.
Moreover, gradual diminutions in market imperfections and changes in
economic strategy, weaken the comparative advantages of public enterprises.
2.2.3 Poor Performance
The most powerful factor underlying thoughts favoring privatization seems
to lie in the poor results recorded by the public sector across the board. It
seems that social returns realised under government ownership are outweighed
by the lowness of financial returns. Low productivity and rates of return on
public enterprises' investments are favoring the need for privatization through
the "discipline" of the markets.
There are a number of surveys of the comparative performance of public and
private industries. Overall, where private and public sectors undertake similar
activities, the private sector more often shows higher profits, lower costs, and
greater efficiency [Kay 87].
However, in assessing the impact of privatization on performance, it is
important to distinguish the effect of privatization as such -the process of
transferring the ownership of assets to the private sector- from the effects of
deregulation or liberalization -the removal of statutory restrictions on
competition. Private industry performs at its best in competitive environments,
where there is pressure from consumers on prices and products, and pressure
from the capital market on costs and investment. Where competition is limited,
the need to respond to consumer needs is less urgent, and there is less
accountability for costs or for investment plans, because expenditures can be
recovered from consumers, and those who provide finance are confident of the
industry's capacity to repay.
Therefore, the greatest prospect of gains in efficiency would arise where
competition and privatization can be introduced simultaneously [Kay 87]. The
difficulties of introducing competition into traditional public sector industries
are, however, a good deal greater than appears at first sight. The first and
most obvious problem is that many of public sector's enterprises are "natural"
monopolies -i.e. industries where it is technically impossible, or obviously
inefficient, to have provision by more than one firm [Kay 871- as with gas,
electricity, water, telephones, etc. Or they are industries where there are
apparent substantial benefits from coordination -as with most transport
industries. It is often these arguments which provided the rationale for public
ownership in the first place. Nevertheless, where competition and privatization
are feasible, we do notice indeed gains in efficiency and productivity [Kay 87].
Therefore, sometimes competition and privatization are not feasible, and
cannot be implemented simultaneously. This case arises especially at the
outset of privatization, when we are considering the privatization of large
public monopolies which enjoyed an unchallenged monopoly for decades and
have built large production, marketing, and distribution systems. Even if
competition is encouraged to challenge the monopolistic position of large
privatized enterprises, we notice that no real competition is introduced despites
government efforts to facilitate the entry of small and large competitors. An
example can be drawn from the privatization of British Telecom (BT) in 1984.
The British government realized very well that privatizing British Telecom
would simply mean transferring a public monopoly from the hands of the state
to the hands of private investors. Despite those difficulties, the government
tried to enhance competition and encouraged Mercury, the only British firm
capable to enter the telecommunications field with a certain success, to
compete with British Telecom. Furthermore, Mercury was given access to BT's
international network in return for very low access fees paid to BT. However,
until today, we do not notice real competition in British telecommunications
and BT's market share is stable and even increasing over time. A similar case
can be found in American telecommunications where American Telephone &
Telegraph (AT&T) is enjoying a quasi-monopoly in the American market. Some
relatively new telecom companies like MCI, which was established in the early
seventies, are beginning to grasp market share from AT&T; but the dominant
position of AT&T is still unchallenged in American telecomunications.
However despite the absence of competition, evidence can be found
suggesting that regulated private monopolies are more efficient than public
monopolies. An extensive 1979 study sponsored by the US General Accounting
Office (USGAO) which compared 95 publicly owned hydro-electric plants and
47 regulated privately owned plants in the United States, showed that the cost
per kilowatt-hour was 21% higher, on average, for the public than for the
comparable private plants [USGAO 79]. That is, regulated private firms tend
to be more cost-efficient than firms owned and operated by government. The
logic of this evidence turns principally on differences in the incentives and
opportunities of public versus private sector managers. Benefits accruing to
managers of public firms are less closely related to the future profitability of
the firm than benefits flowing to managers of regulated, private firms.
Consequently, managers of public firms have a greater opportunity to
maximize their own utility. Operationally, the public manager allocates more
of his resources to enhancing the probability of his survival. He keeps the
firm's employees happy by purchasing more labor and capital than is
necessary, giving rise to the notion that public firms tend to less cost-efficient
than private firms [Ross 88].
This evidence about private sector superiority can also be confirmed
today in the U.K., where regulated privatized enterprises like British Telecom
are more efficient in the post-privatization period that they were in the pre-
privatization period. The U.K.'s Financial Secretary to the Treasury argued in
a notorious speech in 1985 that "where competition is impractical, privatization
policies have been now been developed to such an extent that regulated private
ownership is necessary and still preferable to nationalization" [Moore 851. The
arguments behind Moore's statement will be discussed thoroughly in the
paragraph related to the regulatory framework of privatization exposed later
in this chapter.
Total Factor Productivity changes of British industries in the period
1968-78 (pre-privatization) and the period 1979-85 (post-privatization) are
shown in Table 2-2. Those industries include privatized mega-enterprises (e.g.
British Telecom), or nationalized industries which have experienced senior
management changes introducing a more commercial, abrasive, and profit-
oriented management style (e.g. British Rail, British Steel, the Post Office, and
British Coal).
Figure 2-1 shows the rationale of privatization considering Macro Factors,
Comparative Advantage, and Poor Performance by the public sector. The most
widely cited arguments in favor of public enterprises' privatization are shown
in Table 2-3.
Furthermore, there has been a confluence of several "big picture" trends
over the last ten years that have encouraged privatization in infrastructure
and public utilities projects [Pandis 92]:
* There is an increasing realization on the part of many governments world-
wide that they should not own and/or operate certain types of infrastruc-
ture facilities.
* There is an increasing need to rehabilitate, replace, or build new public
facilities to meet population growth. Yet at the same time, there is a de-
creasing amount of government funds available to finance these facilities,
and a decreasing tolerance among taxpayers to increase taxes.
* The overall cost of private finance for privatization of infrastructure projects
is decreasing, to a point where it may have become competitive with the
overall cost of public finance. Especially in the case where a public/private
partnership is implemented allowing the use of government financial backing
and sources, the costs get very low.
* The number of successful privatization projects is increasing. This raises the
confidence of the public and private sectors in using the approach.
* New environmental regulations, new technologies, and new standards have
emerged, which have increased projects' required expertise and qualifica-
tions. The resulting increases in construction and operating costs enhance
the likelihood of private sector's participation in design, execution, and
finance.
2.3 Prelude to Privatization
2.3.1 General Policy Framework
It is necessary to formulate an explicit general policy for the development
of privatization, identifying the criteria of choice, setting priorities, drawing up
a program and a timetable.
The wide breadth of possible choices suggests the need for a general policy
on privatization. The first stage in developing a policy would be to define the
government's "aim of purpose": Why is privatization being considered ? What
are its hoped-for consequences ? What are the benefits to the public and
private sectors ? What are the benefits to the national economy as a whole ?
A General Policy Framework for privatization might be organized as follows:
* Objectives of Privatization
* Means of Privatization
* Conditions for Success
2.3.1.1 Objectives of Privatization
Do governments operate by principles or objectives ? This is not a question
of semantics but a serious attempt to find an approach to formulate an
overview of privatization [El-Naggar 89]. Which are easier to identify, are
operational, and can better help in policy formulation -objectives or principles?
Moreover, one can imagine a case or an example in which there is a conflict
between principles and objectives. In considering the principle of economic
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efficiency, which can mean
* an increase in output from existing inputs (which means a reduction
in per unit cost);
* a reduction in inputs required to produce existing outputs (which also
means a reduction in per unit cost); or
* an improvement in quality of output, including reduced waiting lists,
or some combinations of all three,
the objective of the government may be the availability of certain necessary
goods (for example, bread, edible oil, sugar, or soap). Privatization can make
such goods more easily available to all consumers, but costs may rise by a
certain margin (for example 10 percent).
Costs in the public sector are often artificially low -by not including all costs
or by using book values instead of market prices or replacement values.
However, if the costs of the public sector are lower, the government should not
privatize because the principle of economic efficiency is breached; even the
private sector can make the necessary goods available to all consumers in all
parts of the country, at higher but reasonable prices.
It is clear from the above discussion that it is simpler, more realistic, and
more operational to think in terms of objectives rather than principles. The
most widely mentioned objectives of privatization policies are :
* Reducing the burden on the national budget, and eliminating a major source
of waste, inefficient expenditures, and inflation. And consequently, making
a positive contribution to the balance of payments position.
* Utilizing private resources for investment promotion by catching private
savings for public investments, and curtailing public expenditures.
* Attracting foreign private capital is a possible objective of privatization.
Transfer of foreign technology and know-how is also a major goal.
2.3.1.2 Means of Privatization
Again, as part of a systematic framework, the general policy should provide
a comprehensive treatment of the means of privatization; because the success
of privatization or of its objectives depends to a large extent on the means
adopted to achieve it. Different means of privatization include: Public sales,
private placements, deregulation and fostering competition, employees and/or
management participation plans, and debt/equity swaps.
2.3.1.3 Conditions for Success
It is equally important for policymaking that the conditions for the success
of privatization be discussed. Such an analysis is necessary in a policy
overview, because it tries to answer a crucial question: Can any country
attempt privatization and can it succeed ? Here is a summary of some of the
conditions for success of privatization :
* The creation of an economic environment that is hospitable to private owner-
ship. This involves especially the review of taxation and property rules.
* The establishment of public information to help "sell" privatization to the
public, and to private investors.
* The formulation of a plan of privatization that is executed by well-trained
specialists.
* The clear definition of targets and objectives of privatization can reduce
risks and enhance success.
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* The selection of techniques and strategies that will maximize the support of
the political constituency.
* The preparation of public enterprises and utilities for privatization is a
necessary condition for success, especially if it does not involve large public
investments. Here the question may be: Why invest to dispose of them ? The
reason is that the sale price may be even higher. Even if it is not, the high
running costs, which are wasted year after year, can definitely compensate
for such investment in the long run.
Figure 2.2 shows the General Policy Framework for discussion of
privatization considering ideology, economic objectives, and social targets.
Lance Marston [Marston 87] identifies 14 necessary steps to be considered by
governments in preparing, implementing, and monitoring end results of
privatization. These steps are shown in Table 2-4. The institutional
development of privatization is shown in Table 2-5.
2.3.2 Macroeconomic Framework
As a prelude to the privatization process, it is necessary to establish an
adequate macroeconomic environment, that will foster and sustain the private
sector's participation in the process. Macroeconomic reform is thus an essential
prerequisite to successful privatization. Privatization can only achieve its ends
if the marketplace is a stable, unfettered, economic system [Cardoso 911. The
characteristics of an hospitable macroeconomic environment are :
* Minimum inflation rates, through fiscal restraint and cautious monetary
policy to stabilize the price system. A fiscal restraint policy must include
the scaling down, and eventually, the elimination of subsidies to the public
sector.
* Trade liberalization that reduces the distortions born of trade policy, and
pressures all firms producing traded goods to make more efficient use of the
resources they deploy. An open trading policy generally includes: low tariffs
on imports and exports to keep local producers competitive and push them
to seek market abroad; elimination of quotas; and ending licensing of trading
firms.
* Liberalizing currency controls and keeping the exchange rate realistic. The
stabilization of the domestic curency exchange rate versus hard currencies
is a necessary step to encourage medium and long-term planning by the
domestic private sector.
* Reactivating capital inflows through a favorable climate for foreign invest-
ment. The removal of the legal barriers to attract foreign capital are
especially important for developing countries willing to take advantage
of the technological know-how of foreign enterprises. Here also, minimum
inflation, stable exchange rates, and positive real interest rates are neces-
sary factors to attract foreign capital.
By way of example, we can cite the latest macroeconomic stabilization
policies of Latin American countries, which are embarking in ambitious
privatization programs. Those policies have recorded a tangible success until
now. The buzzwords are "sustained, non-inflationary, export-led growth".
Bolivia recorded a 3.5% GDP growth in 1991 with total investment up 5.5%,
and inflation at 18% per year (it was 20,000% a few years ago). Argentina
expects to achieve a GDP rise in 1992 of 2-3% in real terms with investment
up by 10%. By August 1991, inflation in Argentina had sunk to only 1.3% a
month [Economist 91]. Recent macroeconomic performances of selected Latin
American countries are shown in Table 2-6.
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2.3.3 Regulatory Framework
It is widely believed that privatization cannot work without a stable and
efficient regulatory environment to encourage private sector's participation.
Although deregulation is sometimes needed to foster privatization (this
argument will be discussed thoroughly in the following paragraph), it is still
necessary to install a clear regulatory framework in developing economies at
the outset of their privatization experiences. The rules of the game must be
clear enough to instil sufficient confidence that privatization will not be
reversed, halted, or subject to bureaucratic meddling. Furthermore, antitrust
rules, economic and social regulation, will enhance the competitive
environment necessary to the success of privatization, and will prevent
monopolistic practices by large private holdings that are likely to monopolize
privatized markets in developing economies due to the significant distortions
in revenue distribution, and the concentration of wealth in few private "hands".
The case for regulation most strongly appears in the privatization of
"natural" monopolies -such as electricity, water, telecommunications, real
estate holdings, and large infrastructure projects- where new private owners
are entrusted with monopoly powers. A regulatory framework must be in place
to prevent privatized concerns from exploiting this monopolistic position.
Therefore, the absence of competition or substantial competition in the natural
monopolies sector should not stand in the way of privatization. The solution is
regulation. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury
defended in 1985 the case for regulation in privatizing natural monopolies. He
observed: "Where competition is impractical, privatization policies have now
been developed to such an extent that regulated private ownership of natural
monopolies is necessary and still preferable to nationalization" [Moore 85]. It
is therefore clear that when privatizing public utilities and mega-projects,
regulatory aspects will be paramount. New regulatory regimes are needed to
define the price structure of the privately-owned public utility or mega-project.
For example, electricity could be priced according to its marginal cost, and oil
according to its import parity. Those pricing rules could be determined by
government regulatory laws, making their modification difficult.
Another argument in favor of regulation is that the government has to
ensure that privatization is made to private consortia with the capacity to
attract capital, management, and technology. Adequate regulation should be
enacted to ensure that the bidding conditions are appropriate, that
unacceptable bidders are sorted out according to qualitative criteria before
public auctioning, that the valuation of assets is realistic, that reliable
information on financial markets is given due consideration when establishing
the financial conditions, that the regulatory framework for the
postprivatization period will be consistent with the current experiences of other
countries, and finally, that recognized international industry experts and
financial advisers are consulted [Cardoso 91]. Therefore, regulation must
encroach on many areas: price, quality of service, freedom of access, fairness,
and financial rewards (magnitude of profits and rates of return).
Regulation may take a "self-regulatory" form or it may be imposed by
departments of state or by bodies especially created by government which are
"external" to the industry which is being regulated. The system of regulation
may also lie between these two limiting cases [Breyer 82].
Self-regulation is a phenomenon with many facets. There are self-imposed
group codes of conduct which are sometimes a form of consumer protection. At
the extreme such codes may be devised by private firms without any
involvment on the part of the official regulatory commissions or for that matter
the consumer.
External regulation is exerted by a wide variety of bodies such as
government departments, but more often agencies which enjoy a degree of
independence from government such as commissions, boards, corporations,
executives, and of course, courts.
The three major types of regulation are :
* Antitrust Laws
* Economic Regulation
* Social Regulation
2.3.3.1 Antitrust Laws
Antitrust is a type of regulation which forces businessmen to compete.
Typically, it is a policy which addresses itself to phenomena such as monopoly,
dominant firms, mergers, and restrictive business practices [Swann 88].
Antitrust regulation is concerned with the enhancement of competition and the
prevention of prohibitive pricing, excessive barriers to entry in face of new
competitors, limited access, and consolidated market power.
In practice, national systems worldwide differ in at least two ways. Firstly,
the range of antitrust phenomena covered by the legislation varies from
country to country. Secondly, the stances vary. The United States for example
takes a per se view of many restrictive business practices. That is to say "they
are in and of themselves illegal, and no mitigating arguments will be admitted
in defense" [Breyer 82]. In the United Kingdom and Germany, on the other
hand, the approach tend to be that dominant agreements are contrary to the
public interest or prohibited, but exemptions are provided for. In other
countries yet a different approach is adopted. The law is neither against nor
for such practices but judges them on their merits. Finally, I mention that the
impact of Antitrust Regulation depends partly on the severity of its sanctions
and these also vary. Thus in the U.S., treble damages and incarcerations have
been possible penalties for those who transgressed antitrust laws, whereas the
U.K., for instance, has taken a more lenient line [Swann 88].
2.3.3.2 Economic Regulation
We have seen that Antitrust is a form of regulation which is appropriate
where competition is feasible. But there are some industries where it is alleged
that competition is simply not feasible. This is generally agreed to be the case
where natural monopoly conditions exist -where therefore it is more efficient
if only one firm serves the market. However, if despite Antitrust Laws the
force of competition has to be suspended, supply being left in the hands of a
monopolist (e.g., privatizing the electricity supply industry and transferring
ownership to one group of investors through a private placement), then it is
essential that the consumer and small firms be protected against exploitation.
This is where economic regulation comes in. Typically, economic regulation
refers to the imposition of controls over prices, entry, exit, output and volume
in particular industries. The regulator may control the level and structure of
prices. Prices may be fixed, may be subject to a "floor" or "ceiling", or may only
be allowed to fluctuate within prescribed upper and lower limits. Regulatory
authorities may merely recommend prices. Then again firms may be required
to file prices with the regulatory authority which has the power to refuse
approval [Breyer 82]. Controls could also be imposed on entry -often through
the agency of licensing. Even if a firm is allowed to enter, it may nevertheless
be restricted as to the markets in which it may operate. The entry of foreign
firms may also be absolutely precluded in some "strategic" industries. Control
may be placed on exit -as when a railway wishes to close a line. Output may
also me controlled (e.g., the number of flights on a particular route may be
limited). It is not untypical for firms subject to regulation to be exempted in
some degree from normal antitrust rules. In respect of some antitrust
phenomena, such as mergers, control may be assumed by the regulatory
authority. Table 2-7 shows the scope of federal economic regulation in the
United States.
2.3.3.3 Social Regulation
Social regulation takes in matters such as the protection of the consumer,
the protection of the environment, the imposition of occupational safety and
health standards, and affirmative action (i.e., equal rights in employment and
opportunity as between sexes and racial groups). Unlike economic regulation,
such social regulation, or what some economists call "new style" regulation,
often applies across the economy and not to specific industries. Typically, it
takes the form of the provision of information -unit pricing, product control
labelling-, prescription of standards -work safety, permitted levels of pollution,
permitted contents, product testing-, and rights of redress -consumer rights in
relation to deception, defective goods, and product-related injury [Swann 88].
Industries which are subject to competition and also industries which operate
under a system of economic regulation may nevertheless fail in some degree.
Such failures may be concerned with externalities (e.g., pollution), the
difficulties faced by consumers in respect of information and safety, the
possibility of injury and death at the workplace and the problem of
discrimination in access to jobs. The major social regulatory agencies in the
United States are shown in Table 2-8.
2.3.4 The Case for Deregulation
2.3.4.1 Deregulation Identified
Strictly interpreted deregulation refers to the removal of all regulation. But
practically, this is an improbable development. In practice, when we use the
word deregulation we are employing a term which encompasses (a) differing
degrees of deregulation and (b) a variety of possible changes in the way in
which regulation operates [Swann 88]. All this can best be described as
regulatory reform.
Regulatory reform may take the form of total economic deregulation -i.e. the
whole panoply of controls over price, entry, exit, the range of business which
firms may engage in, may be removed and the industry left to be disciplined
by competition and the forces of the marketplace. But economic deregulation
may also take the form of a partial removal of restrictions. Thus fixed price
may be replaced not by free prices but by prices which can fluctuate within
limits. Quantitative licensing which may rigidly restrict the number of
entrants, may be replaced by qualitative licenses which stipulate that anyone
may enter provided they meet certain, perhaps quite low, standards of
professional competence and financial strength. The latter is partial
deregulation in the sense that the overall scheme of control is rendered
somewhat more flexible.
2.3.4.2 When and Where Deregulation Is Needed ?
In paragraph 2.3.3, I exposed the arguments in favor of a clear and stable
regulatory framework as a prelude to privatization. I argued that the case for
regulation in privatization most strongly appears in privatizing natural
monopolies in industrial or developing countries; and in the privatization of
any industry in developing or Less-Developed Countries (LDCs), where we
notice significant distortions in the distribution of income among the various
classes of the population, resulting in the concentration of private wealth with
few individuals, the mass of the population earning very low incomes.
In my discussion of the rationale of privatization, I concluded that private
industry performs at its best in a competitive environment, where there is
pressure from consumers on prices and products, and pressure from the capital
market on costs and investment. Theoretically, a competitive environment can
best be achieved by introducing deregulation and liberalization policies. At this
point, it seems that we have reached a paradox : "A clear regulatory
framework is needed to instil private sector's confidence in the privatization
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process, while a competitive and deregulated environment enhances private
sector's efficiency !".
The answer to this contradiction is very objective and depends largely on
the context in which privatization is implemented. Establishing a privatization
program in post-socialism economies previously guided by central planning
policies, should be accompanied by a deregulation program to promote or
install competition and free-markets orientation. On the other hand,
privatizing natural monopolies in mixed-economies, where a strong private
sector already exist, must be accompanied by clear regulatory policies to
prevent monopolistic practices and excessive returns to the private sector.
Therefore, the choice of a regulation policy versus a deregulation orientation
to accompany privatization depends : (1) on the nature of the economy in which
privatization is implemented (free-market, mixed, or post-socialism economy);
(2) on the type and scale of the industry or activity to be privatized (natural
monopolies versus already competitive and/or fragmented industries); and, (3)
on the strength of the private sector and the degree of private wealth
distribution among different classes of the population (industrial countries'
form of wealth distribution versus private wealth held by few induviduals as
is the case in developing countries and LDCs).
Finally, I argue that although regulation is an important step at the outset
of the privatization process, it should be followed at the medium term, and in
all circumstances and contexts described before, by a deregulation policy in
order to foster competition and encourage the entry of new competitors
challenging the dominant position of private monopolies or oligopolies. Because
in the absence of a deregulation policy, what privatization would accomplish
is solely the transfer of a monopolistic power fom the hands of the state to the
hand of select and powerful private investors.
Major economic deregulation policies in the United States from 1975 to 1987
are shown in Table 2-9.
2.4 Forms of Privatization
The concept of privatization can be divided into two broad categories: Micro-
privatization and Macro-privatization. Furthermore, each of these two
categories can be broken up to encompass two forms of privatization :
* Micro-Privatization:
* Privatization of Ownership
" Privatization of Operations or Peripheral
Privatization
* Macro-Privatization:
* Incremental Privatization
* Stimulated Privatization
The gradual subdivision of the concept of privatization into these different
forms is shown in Figure 2.3.
2.4.1 Micro-Privatization
Micro-privatization is privatization at the enterprise level, which refers to
the introduction of private sector's participation in the ownership or operation
of public enterprises.
2.4.1.1 Privatization of Ownership
Privatization of ownership in the public sector envisage, on the whole, a
reduced public shareholding proportion in one way or another. It comes to the
zero level when an enterprise is denationalized (i.e. transferred totally to the
private sector), and could also encompass a loss of a majority shareholding
position (51% in most cases) to the private sector [Ramanadham 87].
In considering ownership privatization, it is useful to distinguish between
domestic private capital and foreign private capital let into a public enterprise.
Foreign capital might be zealously welcomed in some countries and it might
be totally interdicted or restricted to certain "ceiling" limitations in other
countries. Pre-privatization legislation plays an important role here in
modelling the adequate lequal and economic framework to encourage foreign
capital participation in the privatization process.
2.4.1.2 Peripheral Privatization
Peripheral privatization or privatization of operations refers to the
contracting out of some or all operations and/or services of a public sector
institution to the private sector [Glade 91].
Generally, peripheral privatization takes place as a "preparatory phase" to
ownership privatization. Through the initial participation of the private sector
in the operations of the public enterprise, the subsequent ownership
privatization of the same enterprise is significantly facilitated. Private sector's
investors would have had the opportunity to gain an "insider" look at the
organizational structure, facilities, operations, and eventually the defficiencies
and modernization requirements of the public enterprise.
Peripheral privatization is of significance in a unique sense in the context
of developing countries. Ownership changes in developing countries, especially
of the extreme kind -i.e. denationalization-, are not "politically" easy; yet
substantive elements of privatization can be introduced in the organizational
structure and operating criteria of the public enterprise. Therefore, operations
privatization or "contracting out" has begun to assume importance in
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developing countries in a special way. Public enterprises are encouraged to
promote ancillary units with which they enter into contractual relations for the
supply of inputs, production of goods, or provision of services. In this way, the
operational activities that public enterprises could have themselves undertaken
are partly or completely shed to private units.
Public agencies can contract with a variety of organizations to supply or
produce goods that they do not want to provide in-house. Most commonly an
agency will contract with a private firm or individual, but it may also contract
out to voluntary or cooperative organizations, or even in some cases to other
public sector agencies.
Although the public sector generally contracts out for goods, the focus of
many governments recently, has been on the increased contracting out of
services [Ascher 87]. Service provision is labor-intensive and therefore the
more natural target for a government determined to reduce manpower levels
and improve managerial efficiency.
Three different modes of public service provision can be outlined:
"regulated", "grant" and "contracted" [Ascher 87]. Under a regulated mode, the
state is involved in planning, but not in financing or producing a service;
zoning enforcement is a good example of this type of activity. Under a grant
mode, the state provides financial support for an activity, but does not plan or
produce it; form support, student grant, or legal aid systems fall into this
category. Finally, under a contract mode, the state plays a financial and
planning role but does not produce the service itself; building maintenance,
road construction, and different types of infrastructure projects have
traditionally been provided via such contractual arrangements. In a contract
mode, the process by which private contracts are usually awarded is known as
"competitive tendering". The most common form of competitive tendering
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involves private contractors competing against one another either for contracts
that had previously been in private hands and expired (for example, catering
concessions at sporting events) or for contracts that had not previously existed
(for example, contracts for building motorways and highways) [Ascher 87].
What are then the major arguments for using private sources to supply
government services ? Private supply will lead to lower government costs for
at least five reasons [DeHoog 84] :
* Competition for contracts would help to reveal the true costs of production
and eliminate waste, since contracts would be awarded to those offering the
most or best quality services at the least cost level.
* Substitution of the profit motive for budget maximization and empire-
building would help to limit public budget growth in particular, and
government growth, in general, in the long run.
* Economies of scale (i.e., lower per unit costs) could be realized in some
jurisdictions through the reduction of overhead, start-up costs, or high
personnel costs by spreading supply over a large number of units or other
agencies (e.g., contracting for specialized medical services).
* High personnel costs would be reduced, primarily due to avoiding public
employee unions and public personnel controls (e.g., civil service rules).
* Greater flexibility in the use of personnel and equipment would be achieved
for short-term projects, part-time work, specialized needs, or new problems
-without a commitment to sustaining a bloated bureaucracy.
2.4.2 Macro-Privatization
Macro-privatization relies on the fact that the proportion of private
investment in the national economy will expand as a sequel to new government
policies on investment and entrepreneurship by the private sector
[Ramanadham 87]. The micro changes cited in the preceding paragraphs
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themselves culminate in changes at the macro level, unless for every micro
change increasing the private proportion of ownership in some case, there are
offsetting developments which raise the public share of ownership in other
enterprises or bring into being new enterprises under full or majority
ownership.
In the context of Macro-Privatization, we notice policies of Incremental
Privatization and Stimulated Privatization.
2.4.2.1 Incremental Privatization
Incremental privatization is based on the argument that instead of
privatizing existing public sector enterprises, which raises a number of thorny
problems, the goals of privatization could be achieved by a policy of active and
persistent encouragement of the private sector [El-Naggar 89].
The logic of the argument can be stated as follows. The economy of any
country is more or less growing over time. If additional growth is year in year
out, dominated by private sector activity, the overall character of the economy
will eventually shift from public to private with no need for a specific, formal
privatization program. Stated in terms of marginal and average shares, "if the
private sector is persistently dominant at the margin, it is bound to become
dominant on the average of the whole economy given a sufficient lapse of time"
[El-Naggar 89].
2.4.2.2 Stimulated Privatization
Stimulated privatization is a dynamic form of incremental privatization. In
incremental privatization, the government does not ameliorate or increase its
holdings in the economy, letting the private sector engross the lion's share in
the domestic growth. It is a static process. Moreover, the success of an
incremental privatization policy is closely tied to the existence of a strong
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private sector at the outset of the privatization process. In general, post-
socialism and developing economies cannot satisfy this necessary condition.
Therefore, a stimulated privatization policy is more suited to countries
dominated by public enterprise, which try to embark in a privatization
program. It is however a dynamic process, which requires an important
contribution from the government in stimulating privatization by reforming the
domestic legal and economic frameworks, and removing the regulations and
restrictions which prevent the private sector from growing, entering into
certain fields, and competing on equal terms with the public sector.
Table 2-1: The Contribution of Public Enterprises of
Selected Industrial and Developing
Countries
(A) (B)
Output: Investment:
Percentage Percentage
Country Period Share of GDP Share of GFCF
Australia 1978-79 9.4 19.2
France 1982 6.5 12.5
Germany, F.R. 1978-79 10.2 10.8
Italy 1978 7.5 16.4
Japan 1978-81 - 11.2
Portugal 1978-80 - 33.2
Sweden 1978-80 - 15.3
United Kingdom 1982 11.2 17.1
United States 1978- 4.4
Industrial
Countries:
Average 1973-77 9.6 11.1
Brazil 1980 - 22.8
Chile 1978-80 13.0 12.9
India 1978 10.3 33.7
Korea, South 1978-80 - 22.8
Mexico 1978 7.4 29.4
Taiwan 1978-80 13.5 32.4
Developing
Countries:
Average 1973-77 8.6 27.0
Notes: * Column A represents the contribution of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) made by public enterprises.
* Column B represents the portion of Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(GFCF) required to generate Column A.
* Period Averages are weighted averages of GDP and GFCF, expressed
in U.S. dollars.
Sources: [Short 84] and [World Bank 86]
Table 2-2: U.K. Public Sector:
Total Factor Productivity Changes
(Percent per annum)
British Rail
British Steel
Post Office
British Telecom,
British Coal
Electricity
British Gas
National Bus
British Airways
All U.K. Manufacturing 1.7 n.a.
Notes: 1. British Telecom experienced huge investment expenditures in
the period 1982-85.
2. Figures in brackets are for labor productivity where total factor
productivity is not available
Source: [Kay 87]
1968-78 1979-85
(0.8)2
-2.5
(-1.3)
5.2
-1.4
0.7
(8.5)
-1.4
5.5
2.8
12.9
1.9
0.5
0.0
1.4
1.2
0.1
4.8
Table 2-3: Seven Arguments in Favor of PEs' Privatization
1. Privatization rolls back the frontiers of the state and subjects the
enterprise to the market and the resultant competition will enhance
individual choice and freedom.
2. The market discipline will lead to greater economic efficiency and
effectiveness.
3. It will reduce the pressure on state finances for investments.
4. It will free the government from the incubus of loss-making enterprises.
5. It will free ministers to concentrate on important policy formulation and
implementation.
6. It would lead to genuine public ownership as the shares will be offered
to and bought by the public.
7. It will lead to more realistic levels of wages by breaking up powerful
public sector unions
Source: [Rao 88]
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Table 2-4: Fourteen Steps of Privatization of Public Enterprises
Phase I - Institutional Development
1. Organize for privatization
2. Assess political situation
3. Create private sector coalitions
4. Develop strategies and guidelines
Phase II - Selecting Targets
5. Policy review
6. Organizational survey
7. Business evaluation
8. Strategic analysis
Phase III - Privatization Transfer
9. Estimate value
10. Issue conditions and solicitation for transfer
11. Evaluate and select successful bidder
12. Negotiate and execute transfer
Phase IV - Monitoring End Results
13. Establish regulatory and oversight mechanism
14. Monitor performance
Source: [Marston 87]
Table 2-5: Institutional Development in Privatization
Steps Issues
1. Organize for Privatization
Initiatives
2. Assess Poltical Situation
3. Create Private Sector
Coalitions
4. Develop Program Strategies
and Guidelines
* Government vs. non-government
* Define policy and program roles
* Inter-governmental relations
* Legal barriers
* Economic constraints
* Employment dislocations
* Other political costs/benefits
* Strengths/weaknesses of coalitions
* Educating the public
* Create/strengthen privatization coalitions
* Develop tactics to blunt opposition
* Incremental vs. wholesale approach
* Increase incentives (taxes, loans)
* Reduce disincentives (deregulation)
Source: [Marston 87]
Table 2-6: Macroeconomic Performances of Selected
Latin American Countries
Real GDP: Consumer Prices:
(% change on year earlier) (% increase on year earlier)
Country 1988 1989 1990 1989 1990 1991
Argentina -2.7 -4.4 -1.5 3195 2315 115
Brazil -0.1 3.2 -4.6 1287 2928 387
Chile 7.4 10.0 2.1 17 26 24
Colombia 4.1 3.6 4.2 26 29 31
Mexico 1.3 3.1 3.9 20 27 22
Venezuela 5.8 -8.7 5.2 84 41 34
Source: [Economist 91]
Table 2-7: Scope of Federal Economic Regulation
in the United States
Enactment Date
of First Named
Body Regulatory Body(ies) Regulatory Role
1863 Comptroller of the
Currency, Federal Reserve
Board (1913), Federal
Deposit Insurance
Corporation (1933),
Federal Home Loan Board
(1933), and Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (1934)
Interstate Commerce
Commission
Federal Reserve
Board and Securities
and Exchange Commission
(1934)
United States Shipping
Board (ultimately repla-
ced in 1961 by the inde-
pendent Federal Maritime
Commission)
Federal Power Commission
(replaced in 1977 by the
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission in the D.O.E.)
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Supervision of
banking and other
deposit-taking
institutions and
provision of
insurance for
depositors, etc.
Control over rates,
entry and exit in
railways, road
haulage, buses, in-
land waterways and
other related ac-
tivities
Control of margin
requirements in
security dealing,
supervision of
security dealing on
stock exchanges and
supervision of public
utility holding com-
panies
Control of rates and
service frequency of
trans-ocean freight
shipments
Regulation of well-
head price of natu-
ral gas and wholesale
price of electricity
1887
1913
1916
1920
1927 Federal Radio Commission
(replaced in 1934 by the
Federal Communications
Commission)
Civil Aeronautics
Authority (replaced in
1940 by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board)
National Credit Union
Share Insurance Fund
Securities Investor
Protection Corporation
Source: [Swann 88]
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Regulation of price
of telephone and tele-
graph service. Control
of entry into the
above telecommunica-
tions activities and
into T.V. and radio
broadcasting. Remit
also extends to inter-
national telecom.
Control over entry,
exit, rates and mer-
gers in air transport,
both passenger and
freight. Remit also
extended to interna-
tional operations
although fares, parti-
cularly in early years,
were agreed in IATA.
Provision of insu-
rance facilities in
respect of credit
unions
Provision of insu-
rance to protect
investors dealing
with brokers on
stock exchanges
1938
1970
1970
Table 2-8: New Social Regulatory Agencies
in the United States
Year
Established Agency Location Regulatory Role
1964 Equal
Employment and
Opportunity
Commission
(EEOC)
Environmental
Protection
Agency (EPA)
National
Highway
Administration
Consumer
Product Safety
Commission
Occupational
Safety and
Health
Administration
(OSHA)
Independent
Executive
branch
Executive
branch
Independent
Executive
branch
Source: [Swann 88]
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Investigation of
charges of job
discrimination.
Equal Pay and
Civil Acts were
passed in 1963 and
1964 respectively
The enforcement of
environmental potec-
tion. A series of acts
was passed between
1965 and 1972 dea-
ling with air, water,
and noise pollution
and automobile emis-
sions
Setting of motor
vehicle safety and
fuel economy stan-
dards
Setting of consumer
product safety
standards
Setting and enfor-
cing of workers'
health and safety
regulations
1970
1970
1972
1973
Table 2-9: Economic Deregulation in the
United States from 1975 to 1987
(key deregulatory initiatives and statutes)
1975 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): abolition of minimum
brokerage commissions on New York Stock Exchange. Securities
Amendments Acts: development nationally of interlinked
competitive securities markets.
1976 Railroad Revitalisation and Reform Act: increased rate setting
freedom for railways.
1977 Air Cargo Deregulation Act: progressive entry and rate
deregulation.
1978 Air Passenger Deregulation Act: progressive and ultimately total
deregulation of rates and entry.
1978 National Gas Policy Act: gradual decontrol of gas prices focussing
mainly on newly discovered gas.
1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: electricity wheeling and
inter-connection power granted to FERC. Requirement to consider
rate structure reform -e.g. electricity.
1979 FCC: radio programme content rules dropped.
1980 Motor Carrier Act: increased entry and rate freedom and reduced
role for rate fixing bureaux.
1980 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act:
equalisation of reserve requirements among all financial
institutions offering similar types of deposits; phasing out of
limitations on deposit interest rates; easing of restrictions on
the permitted range of lending activities.
1981 Decontrol of Crude Oil and Refined Petroleum Products (Executive
Order): complete lifting of crude oil price controls.
1982 AT&T divestiture consent decree.
1981 Bus Regulatory Reform Act: entry and exit conditions eased, zones
of rate freedom established and role of rate bureaux reduced.
1982
1984
1984
1985
1986 and
1987
US-European discussions leading to introduction of zones of rate
freedom on North Atlantic air routes.
FCC: complete deregulation of rate and service regulation of
satellites.
Cable Telecommunications Act: virtual completion of deregulation
of cable TV.
Supreme Court ruling on inter-state banking pacts. Agreements
between states, whereby a bank in one state may be controlled via
the shareholding of a bank in another state, were upheld even if
New York banks were specifically excluded from benefiting from
such an arrangement.
FRB and court ruling eroding restrictions contained in Glass-
Steagall Act. Proxmire-Garn bill to repeal Act introduced in
US Congress in 1987.
Source: [Swann 88]
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Figure 2.1: The Rationale of Privatization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Source: [ Ramanadham 87 ]
Figure 2.2: General Framework of Privatization
Framework for Discussion of Privatization
Ideology
The Economy
The Community
Denationalisation * Share in Means of Production
Removal of Subsidies * Increasing in Savings
Reducing the Welfare State
Redistribution of Property
Cost Orientation
Increasing Efficiency
Promoting Competition
Free Enterorise Economy
* Responsibilities of the State
* Productivity and Private Production
Source : [ Hammer 89 ]
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Figure 2.3: The Concept of Privatization
Source: [ Ramanadham 87 ]
Chapter 3
Techniques and
Methods of Privatization
3.1 Introduction
As we have seen in Chapter 2, privatization can be defined and applied
in several ways. Depending on its needs and economic structure, each country
will try to model a privatization format -and consequently adequate
privatization techniques- that best achieves its own objectives.
Privatization in industrial countries like France and the United
Kingdom, where the public sector constitutes a large segment of the
manufacturing and services industries, means primarily the transfer of
ownership of these Public Enterprises (PEs) to the private sector.
On the other hand, privatization in countries like the United States,
where the presence of the public sector in manufacturing and services is
almost non-existent, means primarily the promotion of the private sector's role
in developing, financing and executing large infrastructure facilities in regions
and states where the local government cannot undertake such megaprojects
without the financial and technical support of the private sector.
Privatization in mixed economies, which is the case of most developing
countries, means both the transfer of ownership of the domestic PEs to the
private sector, and the promotion of the private sector's role in developing and
financing large infrastructure projects. A mixture of the privatization formats
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of the United Kingdom and France, on one hand, and the privatization format
of the United States, on the other hand, will thus be implemented in
developing countries.
Finally, privatization in post-communism economies, like East European
countries, means the introduction of free-market principles in the forces of the
economy, and the development of a strong domestic private sector from scratch
basically knowing that the State was until recently the sole active player at
both the macro and micro-economic levels.
For the purpose of this thesis, I will solely focus in this chapter on the
methods and techniques related to: (1) Privatization of existing Public
Enterprises with a special emphasis on the British model; and, (2) the use of
the private sector in developing, financing and executing infrastructure
projects. A special emphasis will be placed on the U.S. model in the study of
the Project Finance technique, and on the Turkish and Pakistani cases in the
analysis of the Build-Operate and Transfer (BOT) and Build-Operate and Own
(BOO) financing schemes which were first implemented in those countries in
the mid-eighties.
3.2 Privatization of Public Enterprises
As mentioned in chapter 2, privatization of PEs can be accomplished
through a "Privatization of Ownership" policy, or a "Peripheral Privatization"
(i.e., Privatization of Operations) policy. The techniques and methods related
to each of these formats are discussed thoroughly in the following paragraphs.
3.2.1 Techniques of Ownership Privatization
The privatization of ownership of Public Enterprises can be
accomplished using three methods :
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* Public sale of shares
* Private Placement of shares
* ESOP plans or selling to workforce and management
3.2.1.1 Public Sale of Shares
A public sale of shares or "Public Flotation" is the most widely used and
most direct privatization method. It is based on the sale of shares in the Public
Enterprise directly to the public through domestic and international stock
exchanges.
Clearly a public flotation method is most suitable in the first instance
for operations in which a product or service is produced. Activities involving
state regulation and supervision cannot be easily privatized in the same way
[Pirie 88]. The investors are most likely to invest in privatized entities
producing a good or service they are familiar with, and which have an
independent, although government-sponsored, executive body (e.g., British
Telecom, British Airways, Rolls Royce, and Jaguar Cars) than those activities
relying extensively on government supervision and control (e.g., the U.K's Post
Office or Ports Authority).
Here, it should be emphasized that a public flotation method for
ownership privatization cannot succeed without the existence of an efficient
domestic capital market. Although, a substantial part of the issue could be sold
using international investment bankers through international stock exchanges,
the existence of a developed local stock exchange is primordial. The domestic
stock exchange will be the "dynamo" in the successful execution of the sale.
The public flotation method of privatization was the primary method in
transferring the ownership of a large number of British PEs to the private
sector beginning in 1979 when the Thatcher government came to power. Like
the United States, Japan, and France, the United Kingdom has developed a
very large and efficient capital market domestically. The availability of a large
pool of private resources which could be mobilized almost immediatly through
London's Stock Exchange (LSE) was the main factor behind the success of the
British experience of privatization. Furthermore, the British investors, like
their American or Japanese counterparts, fully understand the principles
governing the functioning of a capital market; and the number of individual
British shareholders as a percent of the total population in the U.K. is among
the highest in the world. Table 3.1 shows the ratios of individual shareholders
as percent of total population in selected industrial and developing countries.
We notice that this ratio is a high as 19.6% in the U.S. or 15.2% in the U.K.,
and as low as 0.3% and 0.2% in Mexico and Argentina respectively [Gill 89].
Table 3.2 shows the date of sale and proceeds from the privatization of
British enterprises using the public flotation method. The total proceeds of
privatization by year since the outset of the British program in 1979 are shown
in Table 3.3. Here, It should be noted also that sales involving more than one
million British pounds (British Telecom and British Gas) were carried out
simultaneously through London's Stock Exchange and other major
international exchanges in North America (New York and Toronto), in East
Asia (Tokyo and Hong Kong), and Australia (Sydney). British Gas' public
flotation with total proceeds of 5,090 million British pounds was the largest
ever public flotation in the world -the "sale of the century" as many financial
observers labelled it; and British Telecom's flotation with proceeds of 4,090
million British pounds was the second largest and most successful public
flotation worldwide (100% of the shares offered were sold in the first day of the
sale) [Walters 89].
Another feature of the U.K. experience is that the British government
tended to sell PEs' shares in the stock exchanges at discounted prices that
allow the original buyers hefty gains. The purpose of this initial fixed-price
"underpricing" was twofold: (1) Underpricing increases the chance of success
of the sale, knowing that the initial gains realized in the first days of the
flotation will induce investors to participate in future flotations. Indeed, in a
number of circumstances shares have been "oversubscribed" by investors
feeling the opportunity to buy at a discount and to realize early gains (e.g.,
British Telecom and British Airways flotations); (2) The popular support for
the privatization program is enhanced when investors -especially small
investors- realize early gains. Therefore, politically, the Conservative
government would increase its support base among middle class voters, which
generally stood on the side of the Labour Party. Table 3.4 shows the amount
of initial discounts applied to the British public flotations following the fixed-
price offering method.
However, this "underpricing" phenomenon led to numerous accusations
the the government was "selling the family silver" cheaply [Vernon 88]. Indeed.
a comparison of the prices established in the market immediatly after flotation
with the fixed prices at which the shares were offered for sale shows "a level
of discount high by the standards of comparable private sector flotations" [Kay
86].
Between September 1983 and June 1984, the British government
responded to these accusations by offering shares by tender (i.e., auction)
rather than at a fixed price. The result was that, in a number of cases, offers
were "undersubscribed" -for example, Britoil (35% of shares were applied for
in November 1982), Cable & Wireless (70% in December 1983), and Enterprise
Oil (73% in June 1984) [Kay 861. Since July 1984, however, the British
government again offered shares at fixed prices, and the market price after the
offer soared. Thus, Rolls Royce was sold on May 20, 1987, for 1.4 billion
pounds, and a day later, frantic dealings in London's Stock Echange has raised
the price by 70% to a value of 2.3 billion pounds [Vernon 88].
Finally, in the context of the public flotation method, I point out that it
is possible to sell the whole of the PE's ownership (100% of the shares), and it
is sometimes appropriate to offer for sale only a proportion of the ownership.
In this case, instead of offering 100% of the ownership for sale, the government
offer a smaller percentage, often 51%.
From the government's point of view, keeping a 49% stake in the
ownership of the privatized PE, can be a very effective method of gaining value
for money when releasing government assets. A state enterprise with an
unhappy performance record behind it, might not command a high selling price
at the beginning. By selling a percentage -especially a controlling percentage-
the state transfers it to the private sector even when it retains a significant
holding. As the disciplines of the private sector assert their effect on the
operation, it may become more cost-effective and more profitable. Therefore,
the value of the remaining state's share may increase, and could be sold for a
higher price [Pirie 88].
3.2.1.2 Private Placement of Shares
In countries where an efficient domestic capital market does not exist,
making the application of the public sale method non-feasible, it could be
appropriate to privatize the ownersip of the PE by offering the sale of the
shares to a group of domestic and/or foreign buyers. This method is generally
known as a "Private Placement of shares".
Thus, in a private placement, the government engages in direct
negotiations with a number of potential buyers selected following different
criteria of financial soundness, technical, and marketing ability. The
candidates are then invited either to submit bids, or to participate in a
government-sponsored auction, where the highest auctioner wins the sale.
Also, in a private placement, the government can either offer for sale
100% of the shares or 51% of the shares, keeping a 49% participation in the
privatized enterprise. The government will thus continue to have an ownership
interest in the enterprise, without controlling its operations and day-to-day
decision-making process. The government will generally apoint a private
auditor to control its interest, and to supervise the profits distribution at the
end of each exercise.
Finally, I mention that in the case of a private placement, local groups
of private investors are encouraged to form joint-ventures with foreign
concerns, in order to strenghten the terms of their final bid. Foreign
participation in the privatization of PEs in developing countries is much
needed. Technological know-how, access to international financial markets,
expansion of the products' market base, and an increase in operational
efficiency are some of the major reasons for which a foreign participation is
sought. Other reasons include: the development of local labour skills and
increase in the number of qualified workers, better access to raw materials
markets, better access to international consumers markets, and the
improvement of the local Research and Development (R&D) expertise.
3.2.1.3 Selling to the Workforce or Management
In cases where the employees opposition to the privatization of a PE is
intense, it may be appropriate to sell the enterprise as a complete entity or
part of the ownership to management, to the workforce, or to both. The obvious
merit from the government's point of view is that this will secure the co-
operation of labour and management, and facilitate the execution of the
ownership transfer transaction.
This method is also appropriate for privatizing PEs where independent
private buyers might doubt their ability to achieve full-hearted co-operation
from the employees under private management. If offered a stake in the
ownership of the privatized enterprise, the employees, as owners, will have an
excellent motivation to do what is required to facilitate the transfer process.
Generally, Employees Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are established,
and constitute a trust fund for employees' shares. Shares are transferred to the
account of each employee depending on its seniority (number of years in
service) and the amount of accumulated pension benefits the employee is
entitled to receive. In Argentina, for example, a plan entitled "Program of
Shared Property" was announced in 1985. The plan permitted Argentinian
employees to participate in the purchase of the privatized enterprise. Seniority
and salary would determine the level at which an employee could participate,
and payment would be generated by a lien on the shares. Once the shares were
paid for, an employee could dispose of them at will. Until that time, however,
the shares would be managed collectively through a shareholders' organization
[Glade 91].
Finally, I mention that in countries where private pension funds are
non-existent at the outset of the privatization program, it is necessary to
privatize the pension system first before embarking in a full-scale privatization
program, even if the methods of sale used to privatize PEs do not include
selling to workforce or management. Because, employees must be encouraged
to buy shares in privatized enterprises through their pension funds. In this
way, the pool of investors is significantly increased, and will not encompass
solely a limited number of wealthy individuals. An example could be drawn
from Chile, which established a "Capitalismo Popular" policy in the early
seventies to encourage small investors to participate in the privatization
program. Before the launching of the Chilean privatization program in the
mid-seventies under the presidency of General Pinochet, the domestic pension
system was privatized, and a whole set of regulations and policies were
enacted to encourage the participation of small investors in the ownership of
privatized enterprises [Glade 91].
3.2.2. Techniques of Peripheral Privatization
The most effective method for accomplishing peripheral privatization or
privatization of operations is the "contracting out" of public sector's operations
to the private sector. Recently, governments are increasingly relying on a new
method of peripheral privatization: Leasing. In the following paragraphs, a
thorough description of the "contracting out" and "leasing" methods is provided.
3.2.2.1 The Contracting Out of Public Sector Operations
3.2.2.1.1 Definition
The term contracting out is defined as "the situation in which one
organization contracts with another for the provision of a particular good or
service" [Ascher 87].
The commercial reasons for contracting out the provision of a service or
good which could otherwise be provided "in-house" vary, but generally include:
cost effectiveness, lack of in-house expertise, the need to reduce overheads,
greater administrative convenience, and the need for increased flexibilty to
respond to changes in market conditions, financial support, or technological
requirements [Ascher 87].
In the private sector, contracting out is a common practice, where
private enterprises contract out with other enterprises which can provide the
good or service more effectively. In-house operations are restricted to those
activities that the firm can perform effectively and at a lower -or comparable
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cost- than that of any other performer.
Contracting out is less common but frequent in the public sector, where
public enterprises and agencies contract with a variety of organizations to
supply products that they cannot or do not want to provide in-house. Most
commonly an agency will contract with a private firm or individual, but it may
also contract out to voluntary or cooperative organizations, or to other public
sector agencies. The product provided externally may be required to maintain
internal operations (for example, computers to process employees' pay, or
window cleaning cleaning services); alternatively, it may contribute directly to
meeting external output obligations (for example, the purchase of linen or the
use of agency nurses by the U.S.' NHS). Although the public sector regularly
contracts out for both goods and services, the focus of the public sector's recent
interest is exclusively on the increased contracting out of services [Ascher 87].
Service provision is labor-intensive and therefore more natural target for a
government determined to reduce manpower levels and improve managerial
efficiency.
3.2.2.1.2 The Case for Contracting Out
What are the arguments in favor of contracting for public services ? The
most extensively cited argument is that "the competitive marketplace produces
goods and services efficiently, whereas monopolies, whether public or private,
tend toward both inefficiency and unresponsiveness" [DeHoog 84]. Since in
most program and service areas, government agencies are service monopolies,
the personnel are likely to behave in ways that promote their own interests at
the expense of the interests of efficiency and the consumer/citizen. It is argued
that public bureaucracies are inefficient and expensive burdens because
bureaucrats use their monopoly of information vis-a-vis the legislature to
maximize their bureaus' budgets -a goal that, if achieved, is most likely to
increase their personal rewards. Consequently, bureaus tend to produce too
much output, exceeding the point at which benefits equal costs, thus leading
to larger budgets, the inefficient use of public funds, and bigger government
[DeHoog 84].
Currently, the basic perspective of economists who study the supply side
of public services is to encourage governments to explore alternative methods
of service delivery and to use private sctor mechanisms for services usually
provided by the state or local municipalities. For the production of mainly
private goods (those that are highly divisible and packageable) that the public
sector has traditionally provided, governments could try to return both the
financing and production of such services to the private sector entirely (e.g.,
garbage collection). Or governments could provide vouchers to the consumers
thus subsidizing the consumer rather than the supplier of a service and
thereby giving the consumer/citizen the opportunity for choice among various
agents (e.g., education) [DeHoog 84].
The essential role of the government agency or enterprise who contracts
out the delivery of goods or services, would be to perform a "watchdog"
function. Not only would it deal with revenue gathering or budget allocations
and the transfer of payments to the delivery agent, but the government unit
would also choose the agents, continue to monitor and evaluate their
performance, and engage in long-range planning.
3.2.2.2 Leasing the Enterprises' Assets
Under a "leasing" arrangement, the private operators -the lessees-
undertake to run all or part of the enterprises, and lease the physical
installations from the government -the lessor- for specified lengths of time in
return for paying predetermined fees. The government retains ownership of the
physical assets, thus leaving it free to pursue any of the other options when
the leases expire [Bergeron 91]. Thus, leasing is a method of privatization that
permits a government to avoid making the drastic departure from the status
quo entailed by an outright sale of a PE, while leaving it free tu pursue a wide
range of options in the future, including divestiture, which might become
attractive once a PE has been turned around.
In most leasing cases in privatization, lessees bring in their own
management and engineering teams to operate the leased assets. Therefore,
leasing can bring new skills to the organization -technical and managerial-
that allow the available assets to be utilized more fully. Leasing may also be
the means for providing a PE with greater managerial autonomy. At the same
time, leasing may be preferable to outright privatization -that is selling 100%
or 51% of the PE's equity to the private sector- because it keeps several options
open for the government down the road. If the PE's performance improves
under private management, the PE can be sold later for a more attractive price
than when it is deep waters. Alternatively, the government might decide to
keep the firm under state ownership after it has been turned around. However,
this alternative is highly unlikely for a government who has firmly commited
himself to privatization.
Leasing may also be preferable to the liquidation of a public enterprise
for several reasons. Among the principal advantages is that some, if not all,
jobs can be preserved, and the government can also avoid the political costs
associated with closure and layoffs. Another advantage is that the government
can postpone the embarassingly big write-off that will accompany liquidation
of the company. Such a write-off is also likely to be required under outright
privatization because the troubled PE could only be sold for only a fraction of
its book value.
In negotiating a leasing arrangement, the government must make sure
that the agreement is sufficiently attractive to the private party, and yet does
not give away the store from the country's standpoint. Given the political and
economic uncertainties entailed in lease arrangements with PEs in developing
countries, private entrepreneurs are likely to seek high and quick returns on
their investment. They are likely to demand attractive prices, protection from
imports, and special privileges with regard to taxes and duties or government
regulations; to offer very low fees or rents for the use of a PE's expensive
assets; and to ask that these matters be guaranteed to some extent via formal
agreements. One possible way to avoid conceding too many benefits to the
private party is to structure lease agreements so that they contain a
mechanism to review the agreement within a reasonable period of time (say
five years). At that time, the government could use the venture's actual
experience (and profitability) in the previous five years to renegotiate the
pricing formula so that the extent of protection might be lowered and a greater
part of the benefits passed to the consumers through lower prices for example.
An interesting element in leasing arrangements with foreign parties is
the eventual requirement that a percentage of the company's equity (the
lessee's operating company) be sold to domestic investors over a specified
period of time [Bergeron 911. Generally, this percentage is about a third or half
of the operating company's equity. This mechanism will ensure that if the
venture turned out to be a financial success, at least some part of the surplus
would go to domestic investors rather than all of it go to the foreign investor.
Table 3.6 shows the methods of privatization used in privatizing selected
British enterprises and agencies. The methods followed to privatize public
enterprises in developing countries of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa,
Asia, the Pacific region, North Africa, and the Middle East, are shown in Table
3.7. We notice that while the "Public Sale of Shares" method was the primary
method used to privatize British PEs, this method was not very popular in a
number of privatizing developing countries. Contracting Out and Leasing
schemes, and Private Placements of Shares were indeed the popular options
in developing nations. The main reason for this difference in the choice of the
appropriate method of privatization is due, as mentioned earlier in this
chapter, to the lack of efficient capital markets and experienced financial
intermediaries in developing countries.
3.3. Privatization in Infrastructure Projects
Back in 1985, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, when talking to Tony
Caelho, former U.S. House Majority Whip, made an astute comparison between
the economies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union :
"There is a lot of talk about how you folks do not really believe that I am
prepared to abide by the arms control treaty agreements, so let me tell
you why you should believe me and why I intend to:
I cannot afford this military buildup. While we are building our military,
we are not involved in the real war. That is an economic war. The
countries that we defeated in the last world war are the ones that are
fighting that war and winning that war.
Now, you have in your country a word you call 'infrastructure'. We have
no infrastructure here. I need highways, bridges, air facilities, but I also
need hospitals, schools, housing. To build my infrastructure, it will cost
me $3 trillion. I do not have $3 trillion.
Everybody in the world knows that you in the United States have the
best infrastructure in the world. Just to repair what you have, though,
it will cost you $3 trillion. You do not have $3 trillion either.
So we both need to cut back on this arms race and start paying attention
to economics and infrastructure. Or we both fall to Germany and Japan
in the economic war."
President Mikhael Gorbachev, 1985.
Source: [Reinhardt 91]
If Gorbachev's numbers are real, what about the investment needs in all
the countries in between, especially LDCs and developing countries ? Mexico,
Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Hungary,
and Sri Lanka, for example. For them and others, inadequate transportation,
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power supplies, and usable water are often the limiting factors on economic
growth.
The infrastructure problem is no longer access to technology or
expertise. The problem is lack of long-term investment capital for public sector
projects [Reinhardt 91]. Today, every government has a wish list of critical
needs that will not be met unless financing can be arranged. The amounts
needed are enormous. The amounts available are not. This reality has created
the need and an opportunity for private sector financial engineering, risk
assumption and technical expertise to play a larger role in the provision of
public-purpose infrastructure facilities.
The contribution so far from privately developed infrastructure is limited
to a few projects worldwide. Among them are the Channel Tunnel rail link
between England and France, Turkey's Bosphorus Bridge, Pakistan's Hab
River electric power project, Shenzen China's super-highway, Kuala Lumpur's
North-South Expressway and perhaps a dozen more.
Renewed interest among the international development banks,
investment houses and governments suggests that the potential contribution
may be much greater. After years of cost overruns and change orders on 100%
publicly funded projects, many development experts are seeking the efficiencies
made possible by centralizing the management of complex infrastructure
projects in the hands of private sector experts who, as investors, are wholly or
partially at risk for the economic performance of their product [Grant 91]. The
possibility of creating large construction projects and making higher than
normal profits over a long term is pulling strategic private partners together
to attempt to bridge the gap between public and private interests. These
consortia frequently include international technology suppliers, large
contractors, domestic private investors, project finance bankers, real estate
developers, and facility operators. The product or service provided can be
highways, bridges, mass transit systems, water and sewer systems, electric
power stations, basically any type of project than "can be substantially
supported directly by user fees or through service contracts with governments
or other public agencies" [Reinhardt 91].
Private management control and operations of infrastructure projects
usually takes the form of a concession granted by government to a private
consortium that finances new or expanded public-purpose facilities on a
nonrecourse or limited-recourse basis. In its purest form, this type of financing
means that lenders cannot get their money back from the individual private
project sponsors or the host government [Reinhardt 91]. This financing scheme
is called Project Finance and is extensively applied in the United States for
financing power plants and other industrial projects (see Table 3-8).
Internationally, Project Finance usually includes support from home-
country export credit guarantee agencies, government-operated political risk
insurance pools, and from bilateral and multilateral financial institutions such
as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the InterAmerican
Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the new European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
A particular form of Project Finance is a scheme where the project
company operates and may own the facility for a period of time in order to pay
off the project debt and to provide a return for equity investors. At the end of
the concession period, the project company transfers ownership and/or
management control of the project to the host government. In the early
eighties, Turkey's prime minister named this arrangement Build-Operate and
Transfer (BOT). That name and its various derivatives have stuck [Grant 91].
In the following paragraphs of this chapter, I will thoroughly investigate
the structure of both the Project Finance and BOT financing techniques. The
types of risks inherent in those techniques are exposed, and the allocation of
these risks to those parties best able to manage them is examined. The
purpose of the BOT financing scheme is discussed in the cases of both
developed and developing nations. Examples are drawn primarily from France
and the experiences of Turkey and Pakistan which were the first developing
countries to apply BOT for financing infrastructure facilities.
3.3.1 Project Finance Technique
3.3.1.1 Definition
In recent years, private sector ownership and operation of traditional public
works projects have emerged as growing trends and legitimate options for
financing needed infrastructure facilities worldwide. Public and private leaders
are increasingly relying on a new privatization technique to help meet
infrastructure needs: the "Project Finance" technique.
Project Finance can be defined most explicitly as follows: "Project Finance
is a technique of funding a project based solely on the cash flows that the
project is expected to generate" [Beidleman 90].
Generally, this financing technique is most appropriate for projects with
high capital requirements, large and complex risks, and a consequent inability
to raise sufficient funds from conventional sources [Beidleman 90].
Furthermore, as traditional sources of public financing are constrained by
budget deficits while the demand for new infrastructure projects and
improvements of existing infrastructure is increasing, the privatization "fever"
in public works which relies on using the skills and resources of the private
sector to replace public sector enterprises, has generated additional interest in
Project Finance.
To qualify as a Project Finance, a venture must be capable of standing alone
as a completely independent entity, and its nature must be such that it has a
clearly definable conclusion [Kensinger 88]. The investors must receive cash
flows from the project as they are generated. The legal entity set up to
establish the project must have a finite life, so it cannot outlive its original
purpose. Any creditors, furthermore, must have claims to the assets and cash
flows of only the project itself, with no recourse to other assets of owners
(except to the extent that any of the owners have other contractual obligations
to the project) [Kensinger 88].
In 1987 and 1988, 83 Project Finance transactions in the United States
have been announced in the Wall Street Journal. Those transaction closings
represented almost $13 billion worth of new project financings [Kensinger 88].
For a breakdown of such financings by category, see Table 3.8.
3.3.1.2 Allocating Risks in Project Finance
Allocating the various types of risk to those participants best able to
manage them is the key ingredient that makes Project Finance so successful
in large-project undertakings [Beidleman 90]. This requires skill in identifying
the areas of risk at all stages of a project, allocating each risk component to
the appropriate participant, and arranging the many guarantees and
undertakings necessary to cover each component of risk.
Each project phase -development, construction, and operation- has distinct
financial considerations, sets of participants, and associated risks.
3.3.1.2.1 Development Phase
The development phase in Project Finance requires tenacity, since technical,
financial, and environmental studies may take from eighteen months to three
years to complete. Because funding is essentially equity-based and venture
capital at this stage, commercial and investment banks are reluctant to provide
seed money [Beidleman 90]. Developers and contractors, usually in consortium,
take an equity position at this stage. This may be tied to sale of equipment or
to their respective interests being served. However, often sponsors with
expertise in a particular industry, such as resource development for instance,
retain equity participation until the facility is up and running, because doing
so gives them a competitive edge in future deals [Kensinger 88]. It is also not
unusual for financial advisors to provide their services on a "success fee" basis,
thus taking some of the risk that the project may not get off the ground.
The risks associated with this stage and the contractual arrangements that
can allocate these risks to the appropriate participants include the following:
3.3.1.2.1.1 Technology Risk
A new technology may not prove economically or structurally viable, or
regulations regarding its use may change. Projects sponsors assume this risk
in general through their equity participation.
3.3.1.2.1.2 Credit Risk
This has to do with the creditworthiness of an individual sponsor, the
project as a whole, or (as in the case of a power plant project) a utility
company [Beidleman 90]. Credit is often enhanced through "letters of credit"
issued on behalf of developers by small to medium-sized merchant banks or by
commercial banks. By allocating credit risk away from the sponsor, these credit
enhancements ensure that the lenders need not rely solely on an individual
sponsor's creditworthiness. In other situations, prestigious rating agencies (e.g.,
Standard and Poors in the U.S.) rate Project Finance projects based mainly on
the credit strength of the sponsoring consortium.
3.3.1.2.1.3 Bid Risk
All projects involve the risk of not being launched successfully or
undertaken at all. This risk is generally assumed by project sponsors, as well
as by financial advisors who provide their services on a "success fee" basis.
3.3.1.2.2 Construction Phase
Interruptions at any point during construction may delay the revenue flow
and hence jeopardize completion of the project and timely repayment of its
debt. Moreover, in energy and mineral-processing projects, there is a further
risk that legislative or regulatory changes will affect a particular technological
or environmental aspect of the project, thus interrupting or delaying
construction work.
Construction-phase risks can be categorized and allocated in the
following ways :
3.3.1.2.2.1 Completion Risk
The trend in Project Finance is to assign the risk that the project may
never reach the operating stage to the engineering and construction (E&C)
contractors. The contractors, in turn, allocate segments of completion risk to
equipment and material suppliers [Beidleman 90]. Project sponsors often prefer
a "turnkey" arrangement in which the primary E&C contractor assumes
responsibility for completion of the entire project, but these are difficult to
obtain in general. Typically, contractors do give some form of completion
guarantee that specifies a time frame and a rate of minimum operating
efficiency. These guarantees do not normally expire when construction is
complete, but rather terminate after a period sufficient to ensure that the
project will perform as represented. It is also common to use performance
incentives (e.g., additional payment to labor or construction management, CM,
for work completed before the contractual deadline) [Kensinger 88].
3.3.1.2.2.2 Cost Overrun Risk
Any cost overrun must ultimately be borne by the sponsor or contractor,
but it may be funded by lenders or by precommited cost overrun financing
[Beidleman 90]. While a fixed-price contract may not be available at the start
of a project, such an arrangement may be negotiated later if sub-contractor
bids can be obtained on that basis. Sometimes cost overrun risks can be
covered by providing price escalation clauses in off-take contracts. They are
thus borne by the contractor. Some projects also use "Completion Bonds" issued
by indemnity and insurance companies.
3.3.1.2.2.3 Sponsor's Performance Risk
A sponsor may not meet quality standards or deadlines by failing to
provide specified goods or services on schedule. Like completion risk,
performance risk can delay a project, or even cause it to fail. Completion and
performance guarantees help to cover this risk, as do strategic alliances with
reputable firms, with a respectable track-record in the field of Project Finance.
3.3.1.2.2.4. Political Risk
Included here are legislative or regulatory changes that occur during
project construction (particularly tax laws and environmental regulations), as
well as the possibility that governments will disallow repatriation of funds.
Political risk is associated largely with public sector projects in both domestic
and international projects. It is one of the major hurdle in face of large-scale
application of the Project Finance technique in developing countries and LDCs.
Countries with a substantial background of nationalizations and central-
planning policies (e.g., Chile, Egypt, Syria, and East-European countries), must
deploy important efforts in promoting their adherence to free-market and
privatization concepts, in order to attract foreign Project Finance sponsors and
investors.
Political risks are so difficult to control and therefore to allocate that
some developers deliberately avoid public sector projects. Many developers
involved in public sector transportation work will not consider a project unless
strong political backing and commitment, expectations of high traffic flow, and
a pressing public need are present [Beidleman 90]. Domestic political risks
may be mitigated if the relevant political body demonstrates commitment by
providing tax-exempt financing. Joint-venturing with an experienced partner
also helps to mitigate political risk (e.g., the participation of the World Bank
or an equally respected institution). Finally, organizations like the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the United States, provide
expropriation insurance to help alleviate foreign political risk for American
companies.
3.3.1.2.3 Operation Phase
Once the project has been successfully completed, the financing terms
for the debt portion of the capital can normally be more favorably negotiated.
Some of the risks have been resolved, since the project is now operational. The
following risks remain, however :
3.3.1.2.3.1 Cost Overrun Risk
Labor or material used during operation of the completed facility, such
as fuel in traditional power plants, may turn out to be more expensive than
anticipated. Contractual arrangements similar to those described for managing
the cost overrun risk during the construction phase, including price escalation
clauses in the off-take contracts, are sometimes appropriate. In energy projects,
for example, it is common to tie the price of power to current fuel prices in the
contracts. In pipeline and refinery projects, the facility owner sometimes agrees
to provide both the input and output at a price differential sufficient to cover
all operating costs and debt repayment [Beidleman 90].
3.3.1.2.3.2 Sponsor's Performance Risk
Operations and maintenance contractors may not meet quality
standards. Like any other performance risk, this one is borne by the operations
contractor.
3.3.1.2.3.3 Liability Risk
The risk of death or injury on the operating facility may be allocated to
the national or local government involved. Private insurance companies can
also cover this risk.
3.3.1.2.3.4 Equity Resale Risk
Contractors and other sponsors may not be able to sell their share in a
project upon its completion because the secondary market (i.e., resale market)
for sponsor equity positions can be very limited. The International Finance
Corporation (IFC) has recently considered implementing an insurance program
whereby the IFC would purchase equity positions from sponsors and issue
notes in its name [Beidleman 90].
Because of this limited secondary market, some sponsors prefer to use
a "subordinated" loan for project capital -one that support senior borrowings
for third-party lenders. As debt, the borrowed amount will eventually be
repaid, and typically the subordination is limited to specific senior third-party
78
loans. The sponsor lender can preserve the advantage of an equity stock
position through stock warrants or stock conversion rights under the
subordinated loan agreement [Kensington 881.
3.3.1.2.3.5 Off-take Risk
The risk that the project may not meet revenue projections because of
market prices changes occurs in all types of projects. It is referred to as the
steam sale risk in cogeneration plants (simultaneous generation of electric and
thermic power), the toll revenue risk in transportation projects, the resale price
risk in industrial projects, the resource risk in mining and oil development
projects, and generally, the overall economic risk of the project. Off-take
agreements may guarantee that the purchaser pays for a product delivered
over an extended term. These agreements may also stipulate either of the
following: a particular payment level whether or not the product is purchased
(take-or-pay contracts) or, on the other hand, a guarantee that the product will
be purchased and paid for (take-and-pay contracts). Such agreements give
lenders excellent security because loan repayment is provided for even given
severe fluctuations in market demand [Beidleman 90].
Table 3.9 shows the typical allocation of risks among Project Finance
participants. A project risk summary in the development phase, construction
phase, and operation phase is shown in Table 3.10. Table 3.11 shows selected
international financial mechanisms used for Project Finance.
3.3.1.2.4 Ongoing Risks
I should emphasize that Project Finance risk management is unique:
Sponsors and lenders alike are willing to assume higher-than-traditional levels
of risk because this risk can be allocated. Serious financial-exposure risks are
present throughout the Project Finance process and must be continuously
monitored.
This exposure is best handled through financial engineering -specifically
through financial swaps and options or other financial derivatives instruments.
A diligent financial advisor will focus on the cash flow maintenance throughout
the project by attempting to alter the cash throw-offs to make them acceptable
to short-term and permanent investors. Both maturities and currencies can be
matched to the needs of the project's investors and participants.
Financial engineering concerns include the following :
3.3.1.2.4.1 Interest Rate Risk
Changes in interest rates affect the cash flows and market values of
borrowers and lenders who use contractually determined or fixed-income
securities. Coupon Swaps are a convenient way to alter interest rate risk. A
coupon swap is an "exchange of one coupon or interest payment for another
that has a different configuration but the same principal amount" [Beidleman
90]. Borrowers in Project Finance usually have access to certain floating and
fixed-rate debt markets. They are able to utilize either market with the
assurance that they may swap the debt service into the coupon configuration
of their choice. The project's financial advisor can design the necessary
configuration of cash flows and hence manage these over the course of the
project as interest rates change.
Note : Coupon swaps are a fairly recent phenomenon in capital markets
instruments; they lenghten the time period over which interest
rate risk can be hedged. For shorter maturities, Treasury note and
bill interest rate future contracts can cover interest rate exposure
and, hence, alter the project's cash flows, but swaps are essential
to the effective management of longer-term interest flows.
3.3.1.2.4.2 Currency Risk
Foreign exchange rate fluctuations affect international projects in which
project revenues or expenses are paid out in foreign currency.
To mitigate this risk, financial managers can convert the exposed cash
flows into the desired home currency in proximate amounts and dates. Short-
term transactions in major currencies can be readily hedged in the foreign
currency forward or futures markets. However, recurring transactions, such as
collecting revenues from an operating project, expose currency for much longer
periods. In these cases, it is more appropriate to hedge with either a series of
long-date forward currency contracts or else a currency swap to mitigate the
currency risk [Beidleman 90].
Financial managers can also convert the exposed cash flows into the
desired currency using currency-collateralized loans and foreign exchange
options. The best method depends on the length of the exposure and hedging
period, as well as the currency in which the transactions are denominated.
During a project's bidding stage, options are particularly useful because they
can cover uncertain or conditional future foreign exchange cash flows. The
option to purchase or sell the foreign currency in question would not be
exercised should the bid be unsuccessful. However, the longest option period
is nine months (on all international options exchanges), which curtails long-
date appllication.
To manage interest rate and currency risks is to manage a foreseeable
problem. Unforeseeable, uncontrollable problems -such as "force majeure"
events- are also a possibility throughout the life of a project. These risks
cannot be reliably estimated and are not commonly provided for contractually.
Project sponsors typically assume these risks themselves, though there is
growing pressure for lenders to assume some portion of their cost.
3.3.2 BOT and BOO Schemes
3.3.2.1 Definition
Build-Operate and Transfer (BOT) and Build-Operate and Own (BOO)
schemes are particular forms of the Project Finance technique. The principal
difference between BOT/BOO schemes and the classical non-recourse Project
Finance described in the precedent paragraphs is that in BOT/BOO some
"second level" guarantees must be provided by the host government concerning
local political and economic risks, while the classical Project Finance does not
require specifically any government guarantee. It is a pure non-recourse
scheme, the sole recourse being the cash flows generated by the project. In all
other aspects (construction and operation risks, financial structure, etc..),
BOT/BOO and Project Finance are similar.
What is exactly BOT and BOO ?
The structure of BOT or BOO is simple. Governments invite foreign and
domestic contractors to form special ventures which raise finance for, build,
and then operate projects to pay off construction financing and equity
dividends. In a BOT scheme, the project is handed over to the government
after a finite operating period -around 15 years in most cases. In the BOO
approach, the venture operates the scheme for the whole of the project life, the
equipment and facilities of the project remaining the property of the private
investors with a possibility of sale to domestic investors before the expiration
of the project life [MEED-b 87].
Generally, BOT and BOO are financing schemes for large-scale capital
intensive infrastructure projects. BOT was pionereed by Turkey's privatizing
government in the mid-eighties [MEED-b 87]; while BOO was implemented for
the first time by Pakistan's privatizing government in 1987 [MEED-a 87]. The
basic premise of the BOT/BOO concept is that construction financing is covered
by investors outside of a government's public investment program.
Practically, BOT leads to a contract to be signed between the host
government and the promoter (or sponsor). This contract is a concession during
which the promoter will own the project. The period of operation is based on
the expected cash flows of the project [Selwan 90].
One special feature of BOT/BOO is that the project cannot rely on any
main guarantee from the government and must be analyzed based on its
proper cash flows, without considering any consequence of decisions that could
be taken by the government and that could affect the feasibility of the project.
However, the consequences of government decisions and policies which could
affect the project indirectly are indeed guaranteed by the host government.
Those secondary guarantees -also called "second level" guarantees [Selwan 90]-
could be summarized in four main points.
First, the host government should give guarantees concerning the
consequences that might emerge from domestic political decisions and that
might affect negatively the construction or the yield (during operation) of the
project. Another main point concerns the cash flows generated during the
operating phase. There should be a guarantee for the normal transfer of funds
and the stability of exchange rates. Those two items are necessary in order to
convert the local currency provided by the cash flows from operations into
foreign currency, and to transfer the funds to repay the loans and the
investments provided by investors. Third, a guarantee concerning the transfer
of the project ownership is necessary at the end of the concession. It can be
done by signing during the contract negotiation, a selling convention for a
determined price at a specified date. And finally, the government should
guarantee the payment of financial backup in order to reach the equilibrium
agreed upon during the contract's negotiation in the operating phase in the
event the revenues are lower than expected due to reasons external to the
operator's management. For example, the reduction in the amount of energy
bought by the local public utility from an electricity power plant would force
the local authorities to pay the required sum to reach the agreed upon level.
This financial backup is in fact just the difference between the expected
minimum revenues and the actual revenues [Selwan 90].
3.3.2.2 Objectives of BOT and BOO Schemes
The objectives in using a BOT or BOO scheme to finance the
construction of an infrastructure project are different whether we are
considering industrial or developing countries. In the following paragraphs, I
will expose the goals those countries are expecting to attain with this new
project financing scheme.
3.3.2.2.1 Industrial Countries
The reliance on the private sector to build and operate large public
works projects is principally aimed at transferring to the private sector the
large industrial or publicly-oriented enterprises (i.e., infrastructure). The
developed countries have two main goals for such a move. First, this strategy
allows the state to reduce its financial involvement in megaprojects. The local
authorities can now rely on the domestic and international financial markets
to provide the long-term finance required to support the development of these
types of projects. Development is required to meet demand which is generally
always rising.
Second, this strategy allows the private sector's managers and executives
to take advantage of such oppoortunities in order to prove their skills in the
development and management of megaprojects, and be able to compete
efficiently in international markets. The participation of the private sector in
the ownership, construction, and ownership of infrastructure projects in the
United States through the conventional project financing techniques, has
proven to be economically feasible, and can be extended to the use of BOT/BOO
schemes in the U.S. and other industrial nations. For example, in France, the
construction and operation of highways and toll-bridges is increasingly being
financed by using BOT schemes implemented by joint-ventures of domestic and
international contractors [Selwan 90].
3.3.2.2.2 Developing Countries
BOT and BOO were first implemented in developing countries -Turkey
and Pakistan respectively. And indeed, contractors and financiers seeking
large-scale capital intensive projects in developing countries, are increasingly
turning to the BOT/BOO concept. This trend has now reached a watershed
with the World Bank's leadership in formulating and developing new BOT and
BOO projects. The case for wider use of BOT/BOO schemes in developing
countries is championed by Ibrahim Elwan, one of the World Bank's divisional
heads for energy programs. It offers "flexibility, lower overall costs, and
incentives to private developers" he argues [MEED-b 87].
One recent example can be drawn from Pakistan which has used BOO
schemes to develop a number of electric power plants. The core of the three
Pakistani schemes is the way World Bank financing can be used to attract
additional funds from other sources. In this way, the Bank helps to mobilize
resources that might not otherwise be available. In the Pakistani schemes, the
private investors accept all the project's risks. Sovereign guarantee is provided
only up to the amounts owed to international funding agencies. Those include
the Saudi Arabia-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB), The US Agency for
International Development (USAID), the UK's Overseas Development
Administration (ODA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
Agency money is to be provided to the Pakistani government, which will pass
it on to private schemes. This private sector "window" will channel money
through the government to the private sector for schemes that are cost-
effective and are "financially and technologically viable" [MEED-b 87].
In the Pakistani BOO projects, equity investors will have to provide 25%
of the financing themselves, the window will provide another 30%, and the
remaining 45% would be covered by commercial loans and supplier credits.
This contrasts with schemes implemented in other developing countries. In
Turkey, for example, the state is a direct or indirect shareholder in BOT/BOO
projects, and through the compromise of contingency funds, has provided at
least a partial sovereign repayment guarantee for construction financing
[MEED-b 871.
On the surface, there might appear to be some potential disadvantages
to BOT or BOO schemes. These are, namely, in that with the foreign debt
repayment, repatriation of dividends represents an outflow of scarce hard
currency, and might cost more than conventional project funding. However,
this is more than offset by the benefits accruing from the the additional foreign
and local private resources mobilized without government guarantee and the
debt relief to the public utility for example, during the construction period of
the power plant.
In the Pakistani model, like the Ankara model, there will be an "escrow"
account, into which part of the BOO venture's profit will be paid to secure the
government against the venture's non-performance [MEED-b 87]. This gives
the government leverage -the venture gets all its initial equity when the debt
is retired after 20 to 25 years. The government has additional security as far
as the venture's performance is concerned, by virtue of the completion and
operating guarantees provided by contractors.
Pakistan's Water and Development Authority will purchase the
electricity output at agreed volume and price levels. However, because the
Authority does not have to borrow construction costs the burden of debt on
electricity tariffs to customers is reduced.
World Bank's Elwan summarizes the benefits of BOT/BOO schemes in
developing countries as follows: "BOT/BOO will reduce the burden of
investment on the public sector, particularly during periods of financial
constraints. Furthermore, as well as mobilizing international resources, The
BOT/BOO approach will encourage local private sector capital formation.
Shares in the projects are sold to the private sector through the domestic stock
exchange, once the schemes are commissioned" [MEED-b 87]. However, to
ensure commitment by the initial investors, they would be required to remain
with the scheme for at least 10 years. Initial investors can sell their shares
after that. Finally, Elwan says that "BOT/BOO schemes will eventually
encourage repatriation of flight capital -capital invested outside the home
country- and attract foreign exchange savings hoarded overseas by expatriate
workers of developing countries" [MEED-b 87].
Today, the first private sector project with 1,292 megawatts' capacity is
being installed at Hab River in Pakistan. A number of other power-generation
projects are still under construction. It is expected that those projects will raise
the generation capacity by 4,235 MW by June 1992 [Uddin 91]. The total
number of electrified villages as of February 1991 had risen to 34,928, or 71%
of the total. In coming years, the remaining villages will also be electrified
[Uddin 91].
Recent BOT project proposals in the Middle East are shown in Table
3-12.
3.3.2.3 Participants in the BOT/BOO Process
In BOT/BOO schemes, we have six main actors with different impacts
on the process. The main actor is the private promoter, also called the sponsor.
He is the creator of the project. The second important actor is the operator of
the infrastructure because he will be in charge of the project's day-to-day
operations. The operator is responsible to get the best out of the equipments
and facilities (this is generally the key for a successful BOT/BOO project)
[Selwan 90]. The other participants are the Public Authorities, the constructor,
the investors, and, least but not last, the lenders.
3.3.2.3.1 The Private Promoter
The private promoter's ability to create, execute, and operate the project
is based from the lenders and investors point of view on different
characteristics. The first characteristic is the promoter's technical and financial
expertise that would allow him to undertake and ultimately, conclude
successfully the project. Second, the reputation and previous experience in
similar projects is an important criterion for the selection of an adequate
private promoter. Finally, the motivation and commitment of the promoter play
an important role. This criterion can be most sustained by the promoter
participation in the equity-financing of the project. Furthermore, the promoter
ability to assemble local and international investors and lenders is primordial.
The private promoter can be a local developer, or a local or international
engineering and construction (E&C) company. A joint-venture between
domestic and international private concerns is also feasible.
3.3.2.3.2 The Public Authority
As the purpose of BOT/BOO is to build an infrastructure project which
is ulimately transfered to the host government or domestic investors, the
government has to regulate the different phases of the project. This regulatory
role is necessary in addition to the "second level" guarantees mentioned earlier
in this paragraph. The host government should first of all, authorize and
accept the location and utility of the project. Second, he should regulate the
process following which the transfer of funds generated by the project is to be
undertaken. He should authorize and facilitate such process if the country was
previously under strict transfer of funds policies. Third, the host government
must regulate and supervise the contracts signed between the promoter and
the constructor, and the operator and the public utility. Finally, the
government can give some financial incentives (i.e., tax exemptions) to
promoters and constructors depending on the relative importance and impact
of the project on the local economy.
3.3.2.3.3 The Constructor
The constructor is responsible for the proper execution of the
construction phase of the project. He should be aware of the host country's
needs and regulations (e.g., construction codes, environmental regulations,
safety procedures, employment policies, etc..). The constructor should be able
to provide a final and reliable cost estimate that takes into account the
eventual changes in the economic conjuncture of the host country. This does
not mean that the constructor will ultimately assume all the cost risks, but he
will surely bear the bulk of the risks associated with the construction phase of
the project.
3.3.2.3.4 The Operator
As mentioned earlier, the operator will assume the responsibility of the
efficient and optimal operation of the facility. We should keep in mind that in
a BOT/BOO scheme the operational phase is essential and the sole security to
the promoter and investors to cover construction and development expenses.
An infrastructure project is a long-term investment, and the operator is the
main actor after the construction phase, as soon as the project is in its
operational stage. Generally, the operational phase is between 15 and 25 years
for BOT schemes [Selwan 90], and the operating life of the project for BOO
schemes.
3.3.2.3.5 The Investors
Investors are looking for an investment that would maximize the yield
in regard with the associated risks they are bearing and the length of the
investment. Here, we note that the length of the investment is generally equal
to the length of the concession, especially in developing countries where the
capital markets are not sufficiently developed to allow foreign and domestic
investors to sell large blocks of their holdings in the secondary market [Selwan
90]. The magnitude of the investment involved in infrastructure projects
financing precludes a high liquidity for equity investments. Therefore,
investors should look at the expected yield for the long-term, and not be
interested in short-term or speculative returns. This is why the technical and
financial feasibility of the project in addition to the reputation of the promoter
play a major role in securing investors' confidence in the long-term prospects
of the project.
3.3.2.3.6 The Lenders
The lenders, which are generally commercial banks, that enter a BOT
or BOO scheme will have to bear some of the risks associated with the project.
Although this additional risk is reflected in the borrowing rates, lenders are
concerned with the default risks associated with the schemes, and focus
extensively on the economic and financial feasibilty of projects.
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In practice, the banks do not rely completely on the feasibility studies
provided by the promoter. They prefer to have their own study done, because
infrastructure financing requires substantial amounts for long-term
commitments, and the slightest deviation from the expected outcome can
translate into huge financial losses. Here, we note that a banks-sponsored
feasibility study is not necessary if the promoter's reputation is strong enough,
and further if a prestigious development agency (e.g., the World Bank) has
placed it "seal of approval" on the promoter's feasibility study.
If the project is to be executed in a politically unstable environment,
lenders will try to secure further their participation by using private or public
insurance agencies (e.g., OPIC). Generally, the insurance provided by OPIC or
any other guarantee corporation is solely against political and economic risks
of the host country (e.g. expropriation and funds transfer risks) , and not
against the technology or credit risks of the project.
The role of the different participants in a BOT or BOO scheme is shown
in Figure 3-1.
Table 3-1: Individual Enterprise Shareholders in Selected Countries, 1986
Estimated
Shareholders As Percent of
Country (thousands) Total Population
Industrial Countries
United States 47,000 19.6
Japan 22,000 18.3
United Kingdom 8,500 15.2
Canada 3,200 12.8
France 7,000 12.6
Developing Countries
Chile 500 4.2
Jordan 100 2.9
Brazil 3,300 2.4
Korea, South 755 1.8
India 8,000 1.1
Portugal 70 0.7
Venezuela 75 0.4
Mexico 200 0.3
Nigeria 200 0.2
Argentina 50 0.2
Note: These estimates refer to direct ownership of shares of business
enterprises and exclude participants in mutual funds and other vehicles
for indirect ownership of shares. If the latter were included, the
percentages would increase by as much as 6.7 percentage points, for a
total of 26.3% for the United States. Other countries for which data were
available were Canada (1.9% increase), France (2.7%), and India (0.2%).
Source: [Gill 891
Table 3-2: United Kingdom: Privatization of Major Public Enterprises,
February 1981 - January 1987
Proceeds
Date, Enterprise (millions of pounds sterling)
February 1981 British Aerospace 43
October 1981 Cable & Wireless 181
November 1983, Britoil 627
December 1983 Cable & Wireless 263
June 1984 Enterprise Oil 382
July 1984 Jaguar Cars 297
November 19843 British Telecom 4090
May 1985 British Aerospace 346
August 1985 Britoil 426
December 1985 Cable & Wireless 571
December 1986, British Gas 1796
January 1987, British Airways 415
Notes:
1. Dates shown indicate initial offering.
2. Of which 334 million sterlings in 1982/83 and 293 million in
3. Of which 1352 million sterlings in 1984/85, 1246 million in
1084 million in 1986/87. Also included is 408 million generated
British Telecom stock and preference shares.
4. Total estimated proceeds are 5090 million sterlings, wit]
installment having been due in June 1987 and the third in A
addition, 750 million sterlings of British Gas debt was redeemed
5. Total estimated proceeds are 825 million sterlings, witi
installment paid in August 1987.
1983/84.
1985/86, and
by the sale of
h the second
\pril 1988. In
in May 1987.
i the second
Source: [Hemming 88]
Table 3-3: Revenues from Privatization in Great Britain,
1979 to 1987
Net
Proceeds
Fiscal Year (in millions
of Sale of pounds)
Sales of local authority council houses
1979-1980 500
1980-1981 800
1981-1982 1,400
1982-1983 1,850
1983-1984 1,700
1984-1985 1,600
1985-1986 1,200
Sales of Public Enterprises
1979-1980 377
5% of British Petroleum 276
25% of international Computing Labs 37
Shares in Suez Finance Company 22
Shares in Drake and Scull Holdings Ltd. 1
Land and Buildings of Regional Water Authorities,
New Towns, and Property Services Agency 41
1980-1981 405
50% of Ferranti 55
100% of Fairey 22
North Sea oil licenses 195
49% of British Aerospace 43
Miscellaneous (including motorway service area
leases, land, and buildings) 90
1981-1982 494
24% of British Sugar 44
50% of Cable & Wireless 182
100% of Amersham International 64
100% of National Freight Corp. (to its employees) 5
National Enterprise Board subsidiaries 2
British Petroleum rights issue 8
Crown Agents and Forestry Commission land and property;
miscellaneous 21
Motorway service area leases 19
New Towns 73
Oil stockpiles, other stocks, and Forestry Commission 76
1982-1983 488
51% of Britoil (first cash call) 334
51.5% of Associated British Ports 46
Crown Agents Holding, Forestry Commission land and
miscellaneous 38
Motorway service area leases 4
North Sea oil licenses, and Oil stockpiles 66
1983-1984 1,142
Britoil (second cash call) 293
7% of British Petroleum 543
25% of Cable & Wireless 263
Scott Lithgow shipyard 12
Miscellaneous 32
1984-1985 2,132
Associated British Ports (remaining 48.5%) 51
British Telecom (first installment) 1,352
British Telecom (loan stock) 61
Enterprise Oil 142
NEB subsidiaries 382
Forestry Commission land and miscellaneous 40
North Sea oil licenses 121
1985-1986 2,702
British Aerospace 346
British Telecom (second installment) 1,246
British Telecom (loan stock) 61
Britoil 426
Cable & Wireless 571
NEB subsidiaries 30
Forestry Commission and Land Settlement Association
(land and buildings) 22
1986-1987 (See Note) 4,400
1987-1988 (April-December) 5,100
Note: Net proceeds for 1986-1987 are not available. Gross proceeds were:
British Gas, 7.7 billion pounds; British Airways, 900 million; Rolls
Royce, 1.1 billion; British Airports Authority, 1.3 billion; and British
Petroleum (31.5%), 5.7 billion pounds.
Source: [Vernon 88]
Table 3-4: Price Discounts in the Offer for Sale of British PEs at
"Fixed Prices"
Increase from
issue price to
Discount share price in 9/30/1985
Company (%) (%)
Amersham International 35 10
Associated British Ports 98 169
British Aerospace 15 66
British Petroleum 6 -130
British Telecom 91 111
Cable & Wireless 15 295
Jaguar Cars 8 45
Notes: * The discount is measured by the change in price from the issue
price to the closing price after one week's dealings after allowance
for market-wide share price movements.
* The increase from issue price to market price on Sept. 30, 1985,
is similarly adjusted for market-wide movements in share prices.
Source: [Kay 86]
Table 3-5: Changes in Share Prices of Privatized Firms in the U.K.
Price (in pence)
Firm Issue date Issue 10/15/1987 10/22/1987
British Telecom Dec. 3, 1984 130 265 222
TSB Oct. 10, 1986 100 150 125
British Gas Dec. 9, 1986 95 170 142.5
British Airways Feb. 11, 1987 125 221 166
Rolls-Royce May 20, 1987 170 208 152
British Airports
Authority July 28, 1987 100 150 118
Note: The two dates of Oct. 15 and Oct. 22, 1987, were chosen to reflect
changes occured before and after the stock market crash ("Black
Monday") of October 19, 1987.
Source: [Vernon 88]
Table 3-6: Methods of Privatization in the United Kingdom
Method of Privatization
Public sale of shares
Selling or "giving" to the
workforce and management
Contracting out
Notes:
Source:
Selected Examples
Amersham International,, British
Aerospace2 , British Telecom3, British
Gas, British Petroleum, Jaguar Cars1,
Cable & Wireless, Britoil, and Rolls
Royce.
National Freight Corporation (NFC),
and Hoverspeed.
Local authority and National Health
System (NHS) services.
1. 100% of the shares of Amersham International and Jaguar Cars
were sold at the initial offerings.
2. 51.6% of British Aerospace was sold at the initial offering.
3. 50.2% of British Telecom was sold at the initial offering.
Compiled by author from data in M. Pirie, Privatization (London,
Adam Smith Institute, 1985), and data in Economic Survey of the
United Kingdom (Paris: OECD, January 1985).
Table 3-7: Methods of Privatization in Developing Countries,
by Region and Type, as of End 1987.
Public Sale Private Sale Contracting Out
Region No. Percentage No. Pecentage No. Percentage
Latin America and
the Carribean 36 46.1 139 49.5 3 4.2
Sub-Saharan
Africa 6 7.7 98 34.9 48 67.7
Asia 27 34.6 31 11.0 15 21.1
Pacific Countries 1 1.3 3 1.0 2 2.8
North Africa and
the Middle East 8 10.3 10 3.6 3 4.2
TOTAL 78 100.0 281 100.0 71 100.0
* "No." indicates the number of privatization transactions
occuring in each region.
* The number of countries involved in each region is:
Latin America and the Carribean: 12
Sub-Saharan Africa: 25
Asia: 10
Pacific countries: 3
North Africa and the Middle East: 7
* Leasing transactions were: 15 in Latin America (29.4%), 22 in
Sub-Saharan Africa (22%), 8 in Asia (15.7%), 4 in Pacific countries
(7.8%), and 2 in North Africa and the Middle East (3.9%).
* Other methods of privatization included: Sale of assets,
Employee Buyouts, fragmentation of PEs, and new private
investment in existing PEs.
Compiled by
Privatization
World Bank,
author from data in R. Ramamurti and R. Vernon,
and Control of State-Owned Enterprises (IBRD, the
1991).
Notes:
Source:
Table 3-8: Project Financings in the United States,
January 1, 1987 to August 31, 1988.
Power Production Project Financings
TOTAL
Cogeneration
Geothermal
Hydroelectric
Wood-fired
$5,702.2 million
$4,400.4 million
$709.2 million
$272.1 million
$338.5 million
5,076.4 MW
4,577.2 MW
284.8 MW
102.5 MW
112.0 MW
57 projects
38 projects
7 projects
7 projects
5 projects
Other Project Financings
TOTAL
Oil & Gas Development
Plant Construction
Resort Development
R&D Partnerships
Miscellaneous
$7,248.0 million
$4,631.3 million
$1,344.9 million
$593.3 million
$457.2 million
$221.2 million
26 projects
projects
projects
projects
projects
projects
Source: [Kensinger 88]
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Table 3-9: Typical Allocation of Risks among Project Finance Participants
Types of
Risk Developers Contractors Lenders Suppliers Gov't Investors
Technology X
Credit X X X
Bid X
Completion X X
Cost overrun X X
Performance X X X
Political X X X
Liability X
Equity resale X X X
Off-take X
Source: [Beidleman 901
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Project Risk Summary
Project Phase/Risk Participant Mechanism
Development Phase
Technology Risk
Credit Risk
Sponsors
Banks, Developers
Sponsors
Sponsors
Financial advisors
Bid Risk
Equity or subordina-
ted debt
Letters of credit
Credit rating
Equity
Success fee
Construction Phase
Completion Risk
Cost overrun Risk
Performance Risk
Political Risk
Contractors
Sponsors
Suppliers
Sponsors
Subcontractors
Sponsors
Sponsors
Performance incen-
tives and guarantees
Turnkey contracts;
use and occupancy
Performance incen-
tives and guarantees
Fixed price contracts
and completion bonds
Fixed Price contracts
and completion bonds
Completion and per-
formance guarantees
Tax-exempt finance,
joint ventures with
public partner, and
OPIC (country risk)
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Table 3-10:
Operating Phase
Performance Risk
Cost overrun Risk
Liability Risk
Equity resale Risk
Off-take Risk
O&M contractor
Sponsors
National and
local governments
Insurance firms
Sponsors
Sponsors
Equity, performance
guarantees
Throughout agree-
ments, fixed price
contracts
Insurance contracts
Subordinated debt
Take-or-pay
Take-and-pay
Advanced payments
Source: [Beidleman 90]
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Table 3-11: Selected International Financial Mechanisms
Used for Project Finance
Extent to
Extent to which which involves
Time frame project risks are concessionary
of resource shifted to resource
transfer financier transfer
Commercial Bank
Loan Short Small Small
Long-term Bond Long Small Small
World Bank Loan Long Small Moderate
IDA Term Loan Long Moderate Large
Ex-Im Loan Long Small Moderate
IMF Compensa- Short Moderate Large
tory Finance
Commodity None Large Small
Futures
Commodity Long Large Small
Price-Linked
Bond
Equity Long Large Small
Investment
Source: [Paddock 91]
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Table 3-12: Build-Operate Projects in the Middle East
(proposed in 1987)
TURKEY
* Three letters of intent have been awarded for thermal power stations burning
imported coal. In order of priority, they are to:
* A consortium led by Australia's Sea-Pac Control Services, including
Japan's Chiyoda Chemical Engineering & Construction Company, the
US' Westinghouse Electric Corporation and the local Sabanci Holding.
Its proposal is for a 1,200-MW plant costing US$1,200 million at
Yumurtalik, with an associated port and coal terminal with a through-
put capacity of 10 millions tonnes a year.
* Two US firms -Bechtel and General Dynamics- with Siemens and
Kraftwerk Union, both of Germany, and the local group Enka. It has
proposed an $800 million, 960-MW plant at Tekirdag.
* Three Japanese concerns -Electric Power Development Company
(EPDC), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Hitachi- which have proposed
a 1,050-MW plant at Aliaga, near Izmir. It will cost an estimated $1,000
million.
* Two other thermal plants burning imported coal may follow. They have been
proposed by Switzerland's Asea Brown Boveri (capacity 1,200 MW), and
France's Alsthom (capacity 1,050 MW).
* The Turkish government has also invited proposals for three BOT highways
projects -Izmir to Cesme, Izmir to Salihi, and Izmir to Urla.
PAKISTAN
* Three big BOO power projects with a total output of 1,340 MW are being
backed by the World Bank. They are:
* Two 600-MW stations to be built at Port Qasim or Hub Chowki, near
Karachi. They have been proposed separately by Saudi Arabia's Xenel
Industries and the UK's Northern Development Corporation, a subsi-
diary of the UK's Hawker Sideley. The two ventures have said they will
build the plants next to each other to make them more cost-efficient in
terms of fuel transport and storage, and other shared supplies and
services. The World Bank may provide 15-20 percent of the $800 million
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total cost as the nucleus of a funding group that will include other multi
and bilateral agencies. Financial adviser is the UK's Morgan Grenfell &
Company.
* A smaller plant supplied bu coal from an associated mine. This has
been proposed by Pyropower-Pakland-Bechtel, a venture including local
interests and the US' Bechtel. Bechtel, with another US firm, Peabody
Development Company, and the local House of Habib, has submitted
proposals to mine the coal using open-cast methods. Bank of America is
financial adviser to Pyropower-Pakland-Bechtel.
* Germany's Siemens and the local Habibullah Mines have also submit-
ted a proposal -awaiting ratification- for a small power plant in
Baluchistan.
U.A.E. and OMAN
* In the UAE, Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC), an Athens-based,
Lebanese-owned concern, has for some time been operating a gas pipeline
supplying Dubai government installations at Jebel Ali from Sharjah fields.
* A similar BOT
Sohar.
method has been proposed in Oman for a fertilizer project in
Source: [MEED-b 87]
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Figure 3.1: Participants in B.O.T. Schemes
BOT Contract
PROJECT
Debt
Financing
Guarantee for
Buying
* Take or Pay: Agreement through which the buyer will buy the output even if
he does not need it
Source: [Selwan 90]
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Chapter 4
Applications and
Problems of Privatization
4.1 Introduction
We have seen that scores of governments throughout the world have
announced their intention to foster the role of the private sector in the
domestic economy, to dispose of some or all of the public enterprises that they
own, and to contract out public service to private operators. It is the beginning
of a worldwide rehabilitation program called: Privatization.
In the preceding chapters, I introduced the concept of privatization, and
investigated the different methods and techniques used for the implementation
of privatization. In this chapter, I will first discuss the areas of application of
privatization in both developing and industrial countries. I will focus on
privatization of public services: electricity generation, telecommunications,
water supply, and transportation. I have chosen to focus on these areas of
public services, because the need for privatization and private sector support
will most likely arise in these areas in particular in the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of Lebanon's infrastructure.
Empirical evidence showing the superiority of the private sector in
providing public services is shown. This evidence is primarily drawn from the
experience of the United States. However, evidence from other industrial and
developing countries is also provided. The experience of Latin American
countries in privatizing their public services -with a special emphasis on the
cases of Argentina and Mexico- is thoroughly investigated.
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Secondly, the problems and difficulties facing privatization programs
worldwide are examined. The nature of problems varies from country to
country and depends on the precise scope, magnitude, and objectives of the
program.
We will see for example that ownership transfer using a public sale of
shares method through the local stock exchange is not easily feasible in
developing countries, as it is in developed nations like the U.K. or France,
which enjoy the existence of a strong and efficient domestic exchange, and a
fairly rapid access to major capital markets worldwide. The lack of an
efficient stock exchange will thus be one of the difficulties facing privatization
programs in developing economies.
Another problem facing privatization is related to the economic
environment in which the program is implemented. Triple or double-digit
inflation, constant depreciation of the domestic currency, significant public
indebtness, and high variability in nominal interest rates, are all
characteristics of economic environments in most developing countries;
including, unfortunately, my homeland Lebanon, which is struggling to reach
the land of macroeconomic stability.
Therefore, unless the economic environment is stabilized, privatization
cannot be successfully implemented in developing countries. Most Latin
American countries, which embarked in ambitious privatization programs in
the mid-eighties, immediatly understood that macroeconomic stability is a key
condition for the success of privatization. Until now, a number of Latin
American countries have succeeded in stabilizing their economies -Argentina
and Mexico in particular- while others (e.g., Brazil) are still struggling with
high inflation and rapid depreciation of the national currency.
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Other hurdles to privatization include: Political opposition, management
and unions opposition, and inadequate legal frameworks. These problems also
are most likely to arise in developing countries, although the U.K. has
experienced intense political and unions opposition to its privatization
program, especially at the outset of the effort in 1979.
Therefore, knowing that most of the problems of privatization described
in this chapter are more likely to arise in developing nations, the chapter will
rely heavily on the privatization experiences of Latin American, African, and
Middle Eastern countries. Those countries present striking similarities with
the case of Lebanon. However, the British experience will not be forgotten in
this chapter, especially in the discussion of the political and unions opposition
to the privatization program. Examples will be drawn also from the U.S.'
experience in the privatization of electricity and water supply systems.
4.2 Applications of Privatization
4.2.1 Privatization of Public Services
The public services considered in the following paragraphs are: electricty
generation, telecommunications, water supply, and transportation. I have
deliberately chosen those areas of privatization because the purpose of this
thesis is the evaluation of the role of privatization in the reconstruction of my
homeland, Lebanon; and it is precisely in those areas that private sector's
support is most likely to arise in rehabilitating Lebanon's infrastructure and
public services provision.
The need for privatization and development in infrastructure is
enormous around the world, especially in developing nations of Latin America,
Africa, and newly democratized Eastern Europe. Recent economic figures and
infrastructure needs in Eastern Europe are shown in Tables 4-1 and 4-2.
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4.2.1.1. Electricity Generation
One of the major obstacles to the privatization of the electricity supply
system is the widespread belief that the industry should be treated as a
"natural monopoly", and that electric power must therefore be supplied by the
public sector, or at least regulated by it. It can reasonably be argued that
electricity transmission and distribution exhibit such economies of scale that
they can be regarded as natural monopolies, but the generation of electricity
can be carried out either for use by the generating firm or for sale to the public
[Roth 87]. There is also the possibilty of cogeneration (an industrial process
that produces heat and electricity simultaneously), with electric power being
sold for use by the government. Therefore, the potential for privatization arises
mainly in the generation of electricity, where the power generated is sold to
local electric utilities. The reliance on the private sector to build and operate
electric power plants has already been carried out in a number of developing
countries and LDCs (see Chapter 3). Among those countries are: Turkey,
Pakistan, Yemen, India, Bangladesh, and others (see Table 3.12).
In theory, one can envisage a publicly owned and operated transmission
and distribution system (grid) buying electricity from competing suppliers at
prices that reflect supply and demand forces. This competition in supply
feature does not appear anywhere in the Thirld World, but legislation passed
in the United States in 1978 requires "electric utilities to buy power from
certain producers if it is offered at favorable rates" [Roth 87]. The law
encouraged the emergence of hundreds of small companies that generate
electricity from wind or water power. In this manner, electricity could be
provided in the developing world.
One method of ownership that seems to have more attractiveness in
less-developed countries than private enterprise is cooperatives. Cooperatives
are private enterprises that are owned by the users instead of by shareholders
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or investors [Roth 87]. Some detractors of cooperatives will argue that they are
not all that private; it is true that in the early stages they do not need public
support. This is because in the early stages electricity rates are controlled and
usually set at below-return rates. But eventually that changes: older systems
such as those in Costa Rica, Argentina, and Chile are private. BOT and BOO
schemes which were thoroughly examined in Chapter 3, could also be an
excellent method of privatization in electricity generation available to scores
of developing countries.
4.2.1.2 Telecommunications
In most developing countries, demand for telecommunication services far
exceeds supply, as evidenced by the high prices at which telephone lines
change hands in cities where such transactions are allowed. A World Bank
study posed the question, "Who or what group has decided that
telecommunications investment should be constrained relative to demand by
closely regulating and controlling inputs to the sector, its organizational
structure, and the internal procedures of telecommunications operating
entities, and by imposing numerous restrictions under which operating entities
must operate ?" It concluded that, rather than the users, it must be the
owners, suppliers, and regulators of the services -which in most developing
countries are governments [Saunders 83]. Table 4-3 shows the number of
telephone lines available per 100 people in Latin American countries. We
notice that in most of these countries there are fewer than 10 phone lines per
100 people. That compares with 58.5 lines per 100 in the United States and
44.6 lines per 100 in France [Heywood 91].
In the past, the governments of developing countries and LDCs have
generally decided that food, transport, power, health, and other most pressing
needs should receive the most emphasis. So long as telephones were viewed as
an inessential and largely luxury consumption, investment in the
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telecommunications sector received low priority. In the last few years, this
perception of the role of telecommunications has been changing, largely
because of the explosion of telecommunications activity occasioned by the
technological revolution. Modern telecommunications are becoming essential
to business activity -initially to compete in the international marketplace and
increasingly for domestic business activity as well. This revolution is
generating pressure for change in the traditional organization of
telecommunication activity and in the priority it receives in the investment
world. Where developing countries have such a demand for telephones that
individuals wait a year for installation, there is a strong case for allowing a
competitive service to operate. A good deal of discussion about reform is going
on, with many different mechanisms being examined, to make
telecommunications entities more flexible, commercial, and efficient.
Proposals for full-scale privatization are extremely rare, even among the
most active reformers, because most governments feel that, even if ultimately
deemed to be desirable, full privatization is too large a step to be taken all at
once [Roth 87]. Some governments are instead seekinggradual reform, through
which the consequences of each change can be evaluated before the next step
is taken. These reforms include :
* Internal reorganization of telecommunications entities, such as changes
in procurement, pricing, and management systems.
* Creation of autonomous or semiautonomous government entities to
replace government ministries.
* Joint ventures and management contracts with private operators.
* Permission granted to major competitors and users to create alternative
systems and connect them to the public network.
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Experience with private sector operation of telecommunications in
developing countries has been mixed. In a number of countries, government-
owned companies have been managed by foreign private firms with reasonable
success. Private telecommunications companies owned by foreign interests
were once common in Latin America, but most were nationalized in the 1960s.
Today, Latin American countries are privatizing their telecommunications
again (see next paragraph).
In conclusion, we say that the communications revolution requires
developing countries to rethink their telecommunications strategies and make
appropriate adjustments to meet escalating needs and pressures. Increased
commercial orientation for existing PTTs which are still under government
control, and an increased role in the near future for the private sector are
important and highly desirable components of this adjustment. But care must
be urged, as the problems are extremely complex and technology is evolving
rapidly. Public interest concerns in telecommunications will always be
important, so there will always be a role for the government, but now the
private sector should be the driving force in telecommunications provision.
4.2.1.2.1 Telecommunications Privatization in Latin America
Latin America's public telecom networks are underveloped,
overstretched, and often in a poor state of repair. According to statistics
released in 1991 by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU,
Geneva, Switzerland), there are 5.57 phone lines per 100 people in Mexico, and
9.58 lines per 100 people in Argentina. That compares with 58.5 lines per 100
in the United States. A study by the World Bank estimated that $27 billion a
year needs to be poured into Latin America telephone networks to meet user
demand by the year 2000. Yearly investments in public networks averaged
about $4 billion in the late eighties [Heywood 91].
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Solving these problems will be very costly for Latin American
governments. Since most governments are already burdened with high debts
and huge public deficits, they are turning to PTT privatization as a way of
financing those much-needed rehabilitation programs. Foreign enterprises are
encouraged to form joint-ventures with domestic investors to own and manage
Latin America PTTs.
In general, the privatization process is as follows: Governments invite
bids for management control andpartial ownership of their PTT from consortia
led by foreign telecom carriers, with financial backing from domestic private
investors and international investment banks. A five to seven-year monopoly
on public services is usually guaranteed, with extensions of up to 10 years if
targets for expansion, rehabilitation, and improvement are met [Heywood 91].
During that period, the government usually holds up its involvment in the
management of the PTT but retains partial ownership. At the end of the initial'
operation period, the private monopoly over the national PTT can be halted,
and government regulations and policies are enacted to promote competition
and encourage entry by competitors. Knowing that Latin America's PTT
privatization is fairly recent (Chile was the first country to privatize its PTT
in 1987), we are still in the private monopoly period and no competition is
noticed in Latin America's privatized PTTs.
As mentioned, Chile set the trend in PTT privatization in 1987, handing
over management control and partial ownership of its main domestic carrier,
Compania de Telefonos de Chile (CTC), to a consortium led by Bond
Corporation of Australia. Bond promised an aggressive modernization program,
and from 1987 to 1989 CTC increased the number of installed lines fivefold
(from 37,589 to 188,292), raising the proportion of digital lines in Chile's
networks to 52%, by far the highest percentage in Latin America. In March
1990, Bond Corp. ran into financial problems elsewhere in the world, and sold
a controlling 48% of CTC to Telefonica, the Spanish PTT [Heywood 91].
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The dramatic improvement in Chilean telecom has encouraged other
Latin American countries to follow suit. Similarly, the handsome profits made
by Australia's Bond Corp. have aroused the interest of other foreign investors.
Argentina was the first country to follow Chile's example, splitting the main
public carrier, ENTEL, into four in June 1990. There are now two regional
domestic carriers, both headquartered in Buenos Aires. The southern one,
Telefonica de Argentina S.A., is managed by Spain's Telefonica; the northern
one, Telecom S.A., is managed by STET, Italy's PTT holding company, and
France Telecom.
Next in line was Telefonos de Mexico S.A. (TelMex), which was
privatized in December 1990, and is now managed by Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company of the United States and France Cable et Radio, a France
Telecom subsidiary, in a consortium led by Grupo Carso, a Mexican private
concern. The sale of TelMex was the biggest privatization sale in Mexico, and
sale proceeds amounted to US$8 billion [Glade 91]. However, the sale was not
easy to accomplish. The telephone unions opposed fiercely the transaction
fearing that privatization would lead to heavy job losses. Digusted with the
poor quality and inefficiency of telephone service in Mexico, the Mexican public
pressured the unions to accept the privatization deal, and stood on the side of
President Salinas' decision to privatize TelMex. Finally, telephone workers
voted for privatization in return for job preservation agreements. It was also
agreed that the proceeds generated from the sale are to be used by the
Mexican government in social service projects such as housing, health care,
and education [Glade 91].
However, in their rush to privatize their PTTs, Latin American
governments are neglecting important regulatory issues to guarantee the
continuity of foreign interest in PTTs' operation and ownership. For all their
potential benefits, PTT privatizations may not be a cure-all for Latin America's
troubled networks if not accompanied by clear regulatory policies. For example,
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if the profitability of privatized PTTs looks in doubt in the near future, they
could become "financial orphans" according to Bjorn Wellenius, an official of
the World Bank studying telecom funding in developing nations. The PTTs will
be unable to raise funds on commercial markets and cut off from finance
meant for governments. Similarly, foreign investors might follow Bond
Corporation's example in Chile and decide to take on their profits early, before
their hopes for Latin America turn sour. Regulatory policies should be enacted
at the outset of the privatization program to prevent such practices, and
guarantee the commitment of foreign investors to the privatized PTTs for at
least a determined period of time.
Other difficulties which are arising currently, and risk to become more
acute in the future, have their source in the lack of a regulatory framework
accompanying privatization. In Argentina, a government commission is
struggling to resolve questions over what charges the regional carriers should
levy for carrying each other's traffic. Access arguments also look likely in
Venezuela, where BellSouth Corp. recently paid four times the market price
for a concession to run a national cellular radio network, assuming that it
would be allowed to interconnect with the terrestrial network now being
privatized. In Chile, lack of regulations hinders competition because dominant
carriers are not required to give operators even partial access to their networks
[Heywood 91].
Recent PTT privatization transactions in Latin America are shown in
Table 4-4.
4.2.1.3 Water Supply
Because of a genuine or alleged reluctance to pay for piped water in
developing countries, private investors are reluctant to supply the necessary
infrastructure. One way of dealing with the problem is to adopt the French
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system of "affermage", whereby the infrastructure is financed out of public
funds but operated by a private firm. Such systems are to be found in North
and West Africa as well as in France, where there are sufficient qualified firms
to ensure that cities can always solicit bids. There are different ways of
bidding: the company might win a contract by being the one to quote the
lowest rate of charge to provide customers with a package of services, or it
might be the one to offer the lowest sum for the right to supply these services
at prices determined by the government [Roth 87].
Agricultural production is often constrained due to lack of water, while
surpluses exist in neighboring areas. Can large quantities of irrigation water
be moved from areas of plenty to areas of shortage? One of the main
constraints to activity of this kind is the absence of clear property rights for
water. If such rights were clarified, it is conceivable that the movement of
water over long distances could do as much to stimulate agriculture in India
as it already does in California. A transfer of water on the basis of property
rights implies payment to the sellers at freely negotiated prices.
A move toward the privatization of domestic water supply by granting
property rights has taken place in Kenya [Kia 81]. In some regions, villagers
had not been paying the small monthly tax that was to be used to help operate
and maintain local water supply systems. Furthermore, frequent acts of
vandalism on faucets, drainage facilities, protective fences, and so on made it
financially prohibitive and almost physically impossible to maintain many of
the public standposts. To overcome this, public water facilities in a few areas
were converted to water vendor operations, a licensed vendor paying a
subsidized rate for the metered water and selling it to users by the container
at a slightly higher fee. As a result of the switch to kiosks, vandalism has been
greatly reduced, thus saving government funds spent for repair and
replacement; a small amount of revenue has been generated; and the rate at
which people apply for house connections has increased [Kia 81]. Some people
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presumably felt that if they were going to have to pay for water, it might as
well be convenient.
4.2.1.4 Transportation
None of the above examples is of actual public sector divestitures; the
total transfer of a public service to the private sector is comparatively rare, but
there are some cases in transportation. In Mexico, for example, the port of
Tampico was given to the workers when the government got tired of paying its
deficits. Under worker management, efficiency increased markedly. However,
in 1985 Tampico joined Altamira to become once again a public sector complex
[Roth 87]. Road maintenance is being contracted out to private firms in
countries as dissimilar as Brazil, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia [Harral 85].
A very interesting example of urban bus divestiture occured in Buenos
Aires, where in 1951 a national enterprise known as Transportes de Buenos
Aires took over all bus and rail transport operations. The services deteriorated
rapidly both financially and in quality. By 1959 the service was losing the
equivalent of US$40 million per year. In 1962 the situation became intolerable,
and Transportes de Buenos Aires was dissolved. All the lines except the
underground railway were turned over to the private companies that had been
operating before 1951. Many of these companies were empresas (route
associations) of owner-drivers empowered to serve just one route. The
empresas governed routes, fares, and schedules, subject to rules determined
by the regulating authorities. The vehicles used were typically twenty-three-
seat buses, which provided a high frequency of service. Competition was
created by the establishement of new empresas that duplicated the routes of
existing ones. The Argentinian microbuses still operate profitably and provide
a highly praised level of service [Roth 87].
119
A different approach is seen in Calcutta, where in 1960 all bus services
were vested in the Calcutta State Transport Corporation (CSTC). The CSTC
suffered from managerial and financial problems and was paralyzed by strikes
in 1966. In response to its need for ready cash and to public demand before the
1966 elections, the government of West Bengal sold permits that enabled 300
private buses to be operated. The buses earned a profit, although they charged
the same fare as the money-losing CSTC and had inferior routes. By the late
1970s some 1,500 full-size private buses were operating in Calcutta, in addition
to about 500 private minibuses. In 1985 the private buses accounted for about
two-thirds of all bus trips without subsidy. Meanwhile, the CSTC, which
operated similar routes at the same fares, had to be subsidized at the
equivalent of $1 million a month by a government desperately short of funds.
A similar coexistence of profitable privately owned buses and loss-accruing
government-owned ones can be found in Sri Lanka and in the state of New
Jersey [Wynne 82].
In conclusion, I mention that of the services examined, electricity
generation and telecommunications probably offer the greatest potential for
private involvment because of intense demand, the comparative ease of
collecting payment, and the poor existing levels of service in most countries.
Transportation is also a fertile field for privatization, one that is already being
tilled. Water supply, and also, education and healthcare, are more difficult to
privatize, because payment by government may be required. But even when
services are paid for by the public sector, management of them can still be
contracted out to private enterprise. The use of BOT and BOO schemes could
be most applied to privatization of electricity generation to build power plants,
and in transportation privatization to build highways and bridges. Mexico has
recently engaged in a huge highway-building program relying mainly on
private sector financing using private toll schemes. This ambitious program is
described in the next paragraph.
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4.2.1.4.1 Transportation Privatization in Mexico: Private Toll Roads
With over 600 miles of private toll roads in operation and 2,700 miles
planned and under development, Mexico is on its way to become a world leader
in the number of miles of private toll roads. Even Mexico's rich neighbour, the
United States, lags far behind when considering private toll roads. In
December 1991, a new federal law was signed to allow private partnerships in
highway construction in the U.S. for the first time. California has sized the
opportunity with four private toll road projects in the planning stages [Scott
92].
The program in Mexico, which started in 1989, was born of necessity.
Most of the bone-jarring 22,000-kilometer (13,750-mile) Mexican highway
system desperately needs repairing, improvement, and extension. But
government funds are tight. So Mexican investors have been given two- to 10-
year concessions to build and operate new highways and bridges. Concession
rights to 3,661 kilometers have been sold, and the goal is to build another
2,941 kilometers by 1994 [Scott 92].
The process is as follows: The Mexican government invites bids from
consortia of domestic and private firms to build and operate for a given period
highways and bridges. The length of the concession varies from 2 to 10 years,
depending on the expected profitability and traffic flow figures. The projects
must pay for themselves, and the Mexican government will not guarantee in
any way the debt servicing of the projects.
Of the 32 Build-operate-transfer (BOT) concessions granted since 1989 -
involving 28 highways and four international bridges- only nine projects are
finished by now and sections of seven are operating. The completed jobs total
621 miles of highway and two bridges [ENR 92]. Total investment in the
program is expected to reach $9.8 billion by 1994. As of 1991, investment
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totaled $4.6 billion, 74% funded by the Mexican private sector [ENR 92].
Mexico's public toll road authority, its state-run oil company and state
governments made up the balance.
However, in terms of road concessions, most Mexican banks seem to
have reached their limit, both in terms of risk exposure and portfolio capacity.
Domestic funding appears to be drying up, and the Mexican government is now
looking for ways to lure foreign investment in the program. This will not be an
easy task knowing that many of the projects are facing technical difficulties in
addition to money woes. Many project cost overruns were reported recently.
The reasons most widely mentioned are: incomplete, government-supplied
engineering, overly optimistic traffic estimates, and government-set tolls,
reportedly up to $0.25 per mile on average. This compares with $0.031 per mile
on the New York State Thruway [ENR 92].
Although high tolls explain why short concessions can be lucrative, they
also induce commuters to reduce their use of the toll road. For example, the
13-mile road between Mexico and Toluca costs about 5 dollars, while one can
travel the length of Pennsylvania, which is more than 300 miles, and pay less
than 10 dollars [ENR 92]. Mexico's private toll roads are by far more expensive
than America's public toll roads, while the income per capita in Mexico is less
than 10 times that of the United States.
Once again, the reasons for those difficulties in the implementation of
privatization lie principally in the lack of a clear regulatory framework
established by the government; and the short preparatory phase which did not
allow for a precise estimate of the real domestic financial resources, and the
exact technological capability of local engineering firms to prepare reliable
feasibility studies. It is not enough to engage and commit itself to
privatization. Privatization must be planned, weighted, and evaluated in a very
objective manner by the government before embarking in ambitious
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privatization programs. The failure of such programs can burden the domestic
economy in a harmful way by drying up investments which could be utilized
in more socially productive ways in other sectors such as education, health
care, and domestic manufacturing.
4.2.2 Empirical Evidence of Private Sector Superiority
Economic theory as well as common sense strongly support the notion
that private enterprises should be more efficient and productive than public
enterprises. One question remains: Does the evidence support the theory ?
4.2.2.1 Electricity
A comparison of ninety-five publicly owned hydro-electric plants and
forty-seven privately owned plants in the United States shows that the cost per
kilowatt-hour was 21% higher, on average, for the public than for the
comparable private plants [USGAO-b 79].
4.2.2.2 Water Supply
Data from a sample of twenty-four private and eighty-eight public water
enterprises in the United States were used to construct a water cost model. It
can be concluded from this model that average operating costs per 1,000
gallons of water produced is 25% lower (other cost determinants held constant)
when water is produced privately than when it is produced publicly [Crain 78].
4.2.2.3 Streets and Highways
Street and highway maintenance is one of the few functions for which
comparative cost analyses are available for private versus public supply in
developing countries. A detailed evaluation of the costs of 19 types of road
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maintenance functions in Brazil showed that private, contracted-out road
maintenance was less costly than that performed by the Brazilian National
Highway Department. On a weighted average basis, the cost for these 19
functions was 37% less when they were all supplied by private contractors
[Harrol 82].
4.2.2.4 Urban Transportation
Considerable data on the comparative efficiency of private and public
transport support the proposition that private suppliers are more efficient than
public providers. In Australia, private urban bus systems cost almost 42% less
per kilometer than do public systems [Feibel 80]. In West Germany, the
nationwide average cost per km. is 160% higher for public urban buses than
for private buses [Blankart 791. In Abidjan, Ivory Coast, private mini-buses
cover three times as many vehicle miles per employee as do public buses [Roth
84]. In New York City, the cost per vehicle hour is 10% lower for private than
for public buses [Roth 84]. In Istanbul (Turkey), the cost per seat, per
kilometer, is about 50% lower for private mini-buses than for public buses
[Feibel 80]. In Calcutta, the capacity cost per kilometer is 35% less for the
private than for the public buses [Feibel 80].
4.2.2.5 Nationalized Industries
Nationalized industries produce a wide variety of goods and services in
Western Europe. When compared with their private counterparts, sales per
employee are lower for nationalized firms. Adjusted profits per employee are
lower. Operating expenses plus wages per dollar of sales are higher. Sales per
dollar of investment are lower. Profits per dollar of total assets are lower. Sales
per employee grow at a slower rate. And with the exception of nationalized oil
companies, nationalized enterprises typically generate accounting losses
[Monsen 83].
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4.2.2.6 Garbage Collection
A nationwide study of 1,400 communities in the United States found
that, after adjusting for factors that determine costs, private garbage collectors
are about 30% less costly than public collectors [Savas 771. Similar results
have been reported for Canada and Switzerland [Kitchen 77].
4.2.2.7 Hospitals and Health Care
The U.S. government, through the Veterans Administration (V.A.),
operates the largest health care system in the United States. When compared
with private profit and nonprofit systems, the V.A. system is much more costly.
For example, the construction cost per bed is 50% higher for V.A. hospitals
than for nonprofit hospitals. And the construction cost per bed for V.A. nursing
homes is almost 290% higher than for comparable private nursing homes
[PrivRep 83]. These cost differences are explained in large part by the fact that
the V.A. construction programs are overadministered and wrapped in
bureaucratic red tape. For example, the V.A.'s construction administration staff
is about 16 times larger on a per-bed basis than comparable private sector
staffs, and the length of time from initiation to completion of construction
projects is 3.5 times longer for V.A. projects than for private ones [PrivRep 83].
The V.A.'s operating costs are also much higher than those of private hospitals.
The average cost at V.A. hospitals is 70% higher per episode for acute
inpatient care, 48% higher for surgical care, and 140% higher for nursing home
care [PrivRep 83].
4.2.2.8 Administrative Functions
Studies in the United States show that administrative functions are
performed at lower cost by private than by public enterprises. For example, the
costs of maintaining and pursuing comparable accounts receivable are 60% less
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for private firms than for the federal government, and the federal government
requires one year or more to obtain a judgment against a bad debtor, whereas
private firms require only five months. As a result, the federal government
writes off bad debts when they reach $600. The comparable figure for private
firms is $25 [USGAO-a 79]. The comparative costs of processing payroll checks
represent another disparity. Each check issued by the US Army costs $4.20.
The same function is performed by large private enterprises at a cost of $1
[JEC 84]. The cost of processing a claim costs Medicare, the government health
insurer, about 26.5% more than it does a comparable private health insurer.
Moreover, private claims are processed more rapidly and with fewer errors
[Hsaio 78].
4.3 Problems of Privatization
We have seen in the earlier examples of privatization in Latin American
countries that privatization is not as easy as it seems. Multiple problems might
arise and endanger the continuity of the programs. Those problems are
sometimes characteristics of the local economy, and can be very detrimental
to privatization if they are not given the adequate weight in assessing the
chances of success of a privatization program. Overly optimistic programs can
harm the economy more than the previous nationalization and state-ownership
policies did.
The potential problems and difficulties most likely to arise at the outset
or during a privatization program, are :
* Political opposition
* Management and unions opposition
* Inhospitable investment environment
* Inadequate legal structures
* Under-developed capital markets
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4.3.1 Political Opposition
Poltical opposition is one of the most serious problems facing
privatization programs. Although, generally, political opponents are active
members of the opposition parties (e.g., the Labour Party in the U.K., or the
PRD Party of Socialist Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in Mexico), sometimes opposition
comes from ongoing or former government members which are or were involved
in privatization and express their discontent with the program by resigning
from their positions, or by refusing to co-operate with government officials to
implement the program.
Political opposition is especially harmful in non-democratic regimes,
where the military is generally close to pro-socialism and nationalistic
activists, which are prone to defend the "poor" interest, and are very sensitive
to the issue of foreign participation in the privatization program. Indeed, we
notice that the domestic political constituency for privatization -and especially
for divestiture- is small in many less-developed countries. The military is often
opposed to privatization in places like Turkey, Brazil, and Argentina, where
it initiated many of the public enterprises [Berg 87]. In some countries, half of
the industrial sector is run by the ministry of defense, which will certainly be
against privatization. Moreover, intellectuals in virtually all of the developing
world are against privatization [Berg 87].
In democratic regimes, political opposition does not have a significant
impact, simply because the voters can express their dissatisfaction with
privatization by casting their votes in favor of the opposing party. Therefore,
government officials can regularly "gauge" the people's satisfaction with the
process by following closely periodic elections results.
Political opposition may be based on ideology grounds (e.g., pro-
nationalization and pro-central planning politicians), or simply driven by self-
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interest considerations from government members fearing that privatization
will lessen their power and influence on domestic decision-making, by placing
key decisions about national resource use and disposition under private
control.
4.3.1.1 Political Misconceptions About Privatization
Robert Poole [Poole 87] identifies four political misconceptions about
privatization. Those misconceptions are often cited by political opponents to
privatization, and constitute the basis of their arguments in their fight against
privatization. Poole explains how these arguments are generally presented to
the public and gives interesting counter-examples proving that those
arguments, although perfectly plausible in the surface, are in reality
misconceptions, used in a misleading way by political opponents to
privatization. Those misconceptions are :
"The service must be provided by the state to ensure that the poor will
have access to it."
This widely believed proposition is one of the major arguments used to
defend the provision of public services by the state, often at derisive and
heavily subsidized prices. Ironically, such a policy can actually be harmful to
the poor. A heavily subsidized transit system, for example, does manage to
keep the prices low. But there are numerous other consequences of
subsidization: a lack of cost consciousness by management and employees;
continuation of little-used routes and toleration of above-market pay scales and
inefficient work policies, for instance. The result is often a very costly transit
system that is not responsive to changing demands for service. The poor are
especially vulnerable because they rely heavily on public transit. Moreover,
although the poor receive the greatest benefit from subsidized prices, they
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themselves pay many of the taxes used to provide the subsidies through sales
or value-added taxes, property taxes (as part of their rent), and corporate taxes
(as part of product prices). There is also the huge waste involved in subsidizing
the majority of riders, who are not poor and who could readily afford to pay
market rates.
A far more efficient alternative is to make use of what the U.S.
Department of Transportation calls "user-side subsidies", which entails
subsidizing only those users who are too poor to pay market-level prices, and
letting everyone else pay the full rate [Poole 87]. The transit system can then
be run as a business, presumably by private entrepreneurs interested in
getting the job done in the most efficient way. This mechanism is usually
accomplished through vouchers. The state can issue transit vouchers, health
care vouchers, housing vouchers, or school vouchers, each redeemable only for
the designated service, that the service provider can present for reimbursement
by the state. The provision of vouchers solves the problem of access by the
poor, allowing facilities to open up entire areas to more efficient provision of
services by private enterprise.
* "Public services should be organized for service, not profit."
This objection is purely emotional or ideological, with little real
application to reality. Even the most sensitive -whether it be the skill of a
surgeon or the compassion of a clergyman- are rewarded with a regular
income. Everyone engages in a trade or profession in order to "profit". What
separates productive economies from stagnating ones is the presence or
absence of human motivation to devote talents most effectively toward
identifying and meeting the real needs of others. This is precisely what
entrepreneurship is designed to do. By ruling some areas of life off limits to
entrepreneurship, a society denies itself a vital source of innovation and
creativity. The desire for profit is what motivates entrepreneurs to seek out
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and fill the vast diversity of human needs. There is no dichotomy between
profit and public service.
"Many public services are 'natural monopolies', so they should be
operated by the public sector."
There are two relevant questions to ask about this assertion. First, are
the services in question really "natural monopolies" ? And second, even if they
are, is public ownership best ?
All too often, existing providers of a service claim that their field is
naturally monopolistic or oligopolistic in order to prevent the introduction of
competition. For decades this claim supported public-utility type regulation of
airlines, railroads, bus lines, trucking, and taxicab service in the United States
[Hanke 87]. But within the past decade significant deregulation has occured
in all of these areas, leading to expanding service and lower average prices for
the majority of consumers [Poole 87]. Even such traditional public utilities as
telecommunications are being opened up to competition, and studies of even
limited competition among both electricity firms and cable TV firms show
lower costs and greater responsiveness to consumers. Therefore, "we should be
very suspicious of claims that a given public service represents a 'natural
monopoly', and we certainly should not protect any provider against entry by
other would-be providers." [Poole 87].
Even where there is a political consensus that a utility should be
provided through a monopoly, it is not all clear that state ownership is the
preferred form. American telephone service has generally been acknowledged
to be among the cheapest and best in the world. Yet it has always been
provided by private -though regulated- franchised monopolies. Most U.S.
electricity and most French water supply systems are also provided by the
private sector. Poole contends that "the possibility of competition in the private
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sector is a better protection for consumers than the guaranteed monopoly of a
public sector bureaucracy, given what we have learned about the relative
performance of the public sector versus the private sector in terms of both cost
and responsiveness".
* "There won't be enough suppliers to permit competition."
The implication of this claim is that only one of a handful of firms will
actually be qualified or willing to enter a field, leading to a monopolistic or
oligopolistic situation that will harm consumers; hence the status quo of state
provision should be maintained.
The first problem with this view is the assumption that a permanent
public monopoly is better than a temporary private monopoly. Numerous
studies of how bureaucracies actually perform dispel the naive notion that civil
servants are more altruistic or enlightened, on the average, than
entrepreneurs. And because a public monopoly is generally permanent,
consumers have no hope of an alternative if the service is costly or of low
quality. Turning the service over to one or a few private firms under conditions
that permit competition at least offers the chance of improvements, as new
suppliers are ultimately attracted by the monopoly profits being earned by the
initial entrant.
But the reality is likely to be even better for consumers. In virtually
every field of public service, many possible suppliers exist. For example :
* The employees of a public service agency can form a company and bid
for the contract to provide the service (employee buyouts);
* Administrators frustrated by bureaucratic constraints will often be
motivated to form companies to do the same work more efficiently;
* Firms in related fields may be attracted by the chance to diversify into
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a new area;
* Many labor-intensive public services are ideal start-up businesses for
lone entrepreneurs, of which there will always be a good supply if the
opportunity to make money is present (garbage collection is an example).
Finally, it is only fair to mention that the political risks to any
leadership that heads down the road of privatization are extremely high [Berg
87]. The process of divesting state enterprises involves an admission of
national guilt, as it were: the great number of white elephants constituting
huge deficits means terrible mistakes were made. Divestiture is a very tough
political action to take, and very few governments have shown themselves
willing to take it [Berg 87]. A story illustrates just how difficult this can be. A
methanol/gasohol plant built in Kenya cost a billion Kenyan shillings. It never
operated, and the best offer for the plant was 5 million shillings. To accept
such a price for this huge piece of machinery and publicly admit that it was a
gross failure would have been extremely difficult. And the government, of
course, never did.
4.3.2 Management and Unions Opposition
The labor union movement is traditionally strong in developing
countries. In Latin America, for instance, a high percentage of the workforce
is unionized, and union leaders occupy high positions in the executive and
legislative branches [Glade 91].
The most powerful union leaders belong, logically, to the economic
sectors that previously enjoyed the benefits of an economic growth strategy
based on protectionism, indiscriminate subsidies, and a strong state. If the
current trend calls for an immediate reallocation of resources, sectors that feel
threatened will resist instinctively. Thus, unions tend to oppose any attempt
at reform, including privatization [Glade 91].
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In the few recent privatization experiences, the unions and PEs'
management generally played an opposition role throughout. Only when under
tremendous pressure will union leaders agree to negotiate, to avoid losing all
their power. Such pressure is building up in developing countries, where the
genral public is disgusted with the poor service and inefficiency of the public
sector. For example, we have seen earlier that unions opposition was the main
hurdle facing the privatization of Telefonos de Mexico, Mexico's national
telephone company. It was only after tremendous pressure by the general
public, that the telephone union has accepted the deal in return for job
preservation agreements. The recent privatization of Aerolinas Argentinas,
Argentina's national airline company, would have been unthinkable only a
short time ago, mostly because of union opposition. The powerful airline union,
however, has been forced to accede in a climate of public disgust with poor
service and inefficiency [Glade 91].
Unions and management opposition to privatization is encountered in
both developing and industrial countries. The unions oppose privatization
mainly because they fear heavy job losses after privatization, knowing that
overmanning is a problem inherent in all state sectors, and reduction in staff
is a logical consequence of divestiture to profit-oriented concerns [Berg 87].
Management is against privatization, again for obvious reasons: they don't
want to see their particular interests and privileges shrink away.
The fear of job losses and unemployment is justified. As an example, I
show in Table 4-5 the percentage of jobs lost after the privatization of the
U.K.'s local authority cleansing system in the early eighties. We notice that
around 38% of the previous number of jobs were lost after privatization
[Ascher 87].
However, if governments anticipate the problem, techniques can be
developed for dealing with it. Among the methods that can be used are the
following:
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* Contractor preference requirements. When a public service is first being
privatized, the state can require that the company or companies taking
over give first preference in hiring to the displaced government workers.
* Phased-in privatization. Another option is to implement privatization
gradually, usually on a geographical district basis. Public employees
displaced by the first privatization can be transferred to other (not yet
privatized) districts to fill any vacancies arising from normal attrition
(employment turnover in state and local public services can range from
as little as 5% to as much as 20% per year) [Poole 87].
* Worker enterprises. Government employees in an enterprise slated for
privatization should always be given the option of forming a company
and bidding for the enterprise in competition with other bidders. This
is especially feasible when considering peripheral privatization (i.e.,
contracting out the provision of goods or services). A variant of this idea
is to require a department to bid against outside firms without requiring
conversion to corporate status. If the department wins the bidding, it
continues to perform the function in accordance with the terms of its bid
(which may mean a significant revision of work policies and fewer total
employees). If it loses, the work goes to the winning outside firm, which
may or may not offer to hire the now displaced workers.
Finally, whenever possible, it is wise to give affected parties a stake in
privatization. The compensation of agency administrators can be based on
achievement of the maximum level of performance per unit of money spent
instead of on the size of the agency (as measured in money and numbers of
employees). This gives the administration a tangible incentive to seek out more
cost-effective ways to operate, such as contracting out. Similarly, when a state
agency is denationalized, the natural fear and opposition of the work force may
be overcome if it is given (or allowed to purchase cheaply) shares of stock in
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the newly privatized company. ESOPs and pension plans -which were
described in Chapter 3- can be established to implement employees' ownership.
The transfer of public enterprises to employees has been accomplished with
great succes in the U.S. and Great Britain [Poole 87].
One example of a public to private transition in the U.S. involved the
contracting out of data processing services in Orange County, California.
Orange County is the second-largest county in California; a very large
department did all of the data processing for the county government. A number
of firms offered bids for a seven-year contract, and the winning firm's bid
amounted to something like a 25% reduction in the annual cost compared with
county's estimate. In addition, the winning firm offered jobs to virtually all of
the existing employees. Clearly, the firm would have a problem if it intended
to keep all of the employees but charge the county only 75% of the previous
price. It needed to reduce the level of employment within the first few years
in order to meet the contract and not go broke. The firm succeeded, using two
methods.
One was to offer lateral transfers to other parts of the firm, once it
became familiar with the new employees. The firm happened to be the
Computer Sciences Corporation, a fairly large provider of computer services in
the United States, so there were many job openings throughout the company's
operation. The other method was simply to take advantage of normal
employment turnover, somewhere between 5 and 10% per year. For the first
several years, vacant positions were not filled, and work was reorganized and
functions absorbed. Utilizing mainly these two methods, the company was able
to cut the work force by about 20% in the first two years of the contract and
succeed in meeting the bid price to the county.
The firm was also successful in motivating the employees to work for it,
first because the firm had a good reputation in the computer field, and second
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because the possibility of transfers to other parts of the company opened up
career paths to employees that they would not have had working for the county
government. The trade-off was the security of civil service employment for
opportunities to do more interesting and different types of work within the
company [Poole 87].
4.3.3 Inhospitable Investment Environment
Privatization is about capital investment. And capital investment needs
an hospitable economic and monetary environment. Therefore, developing
countries must first stabilize their investment environment before launching
ambitious privatization programs.
Generally, developing economies registered triple or double-digit
inflations in most of the late seventies and early eighties. Living with high
inflation has produced adaptive behaviour and expectations, as well as
economic policies and institutions, that would seem strange in other
circumstances. Therefore, understanding high inflation's effect on the economic
environment is essential to understanding why so little privatization has
occured in developing countries until now.
A fundamental characteristic of high inflation is that it reduces the time
available for economic decisions. Strong oscillations in the inflation rate and
the violent price fluctuations they produce also reduce the predictability of key
variables and increase uncertainty [Glade 91]. In this environment, long-term
investment, which is the main characteristic of privatization-related
investment, is only an illusion. Short-term and speculative investments
dominate.
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Besides high inflation, other economic defficiencies that affect negatively
the investment environment hospitable to privatization, are :
* Rapid depreciation of the national currency. In developing nations, the
national currency tends to be weak and unstable versus hard currencies
(e.g., US Dollar, Deutch Mark, Japanese Yen). The weakness of the
domestic cuirrency is not in itself a defficiency. However, high variability
in the exchange rate of the domestic currency versus hard currencies is
a major concern. No long term investment decisions can be made -
especially if the expected cash flows are denominated in the domestic
currency- if the conversion rate to hard currency is variable. Long term
business planning is halted. Furthermore, rapid depreciation contributes
to continued capital flight, since only a very high return can cover the
risk of holding assets in a weak currency. The stability or relative
stability of the exchange rate is primordial to encourage long term
planning, and to halt capital flight.
* Variability in nominal interest rates. Variability in the nominal
interest rate destroys any attempt at fixed-rate financing. Although
floating-rate financing can be used, fixed-rate financing is always
preferable for long term investments.
* Weakness of the domestic private sector. In developing countries
dominated by public sector activity, the domestic private sector lacks the
enough capital, technical and human resources to undertake a successful
privatization program. However, in developing countries with mixed
economies, we notice the existence of a relatively strong and capable
private sector. Nevertheless, in both cases, the domestic private sector
must be assisted with foreign aid and expertise to implement
successfully privatization programs.
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4.3.3.1 The Need for Foreign Financial Assistance
Because most developing countries lack the capital markets for Western-
style privatization, the successes of the United Kingdom are not easily
translated to them. However, there is much the developed countries can do to
remedy the problem of lack of capital. Indeed, privatization itself could prove
an important means of building up capital ownership by both domestic and
foreign investors in developing countries and thus spurring further economic
growth. This should be an aim to privatization, and policies should be crafted
to help achieve it [Young 87].
However, a potential problem can arise in developing countries when
asking for foreign capital assistance: Sensitivity and in some cases, antipathy
to foreign ownership. This is a legacy of the colonial period, when developing
countries' economies were largely controlled by Western interests. Indeed, the
desire for domestic ownership of countries was a key factor in the
nationalization of many developing countries' enterprises. Thus the takeover
of nationalized concerns by foreign interests is not a popular option in most of
these countries.
Concerns about capital and foreign ownership can be appeased through
contracting out, by which the government remains in charge of the public
function, but contracts out its operations to qualified firms (for more details
about contracting out, see Chapters 2 and 3). This practice should be
encouraged and expanded because it saves money, diminishes local sensitivity
to foreign involvement, allows scarce resources to be spent elsewhere, and
builds indigenous private sector expertise in the provision of the contracted
services [Young 87]. Foreign firms under contract in developing countries
usually employ indigenous managers who can gain the experience to start their
own contracting firms.
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Foreign capital can also be attracted through the creation of free zones
in developing countries without many of the political common problems. Free
zones can act as a focus for investment and as a location for private companies,
which can provide capital for privatization. They are already proving to be a
useful innovation in the developing world, and their number has increased
dramatically in recent years [Young 87]. The provision of tax incentives by
developed countries for their companies investing in free zones might also be
a useful policy.
4.3.4 Inadequate Legal Structures
One factor contributing to the government's inability to act favorably to
privatization in the developing world is the lack of an adequate legal
framework. Fast and effective legislative proposals encouraging and
institutionalizing privatization should be amended. For example, privatization
did not take an effective boost in Argentina until President Menem's famous
Enabling Law in 1989 [Glade 91]. One of the principal features of this law was
the institutionalization of private ownership by small investors with the
Program of Shared Property through which employees could participate in
investing and purchasing government enterprises. Another important
legislative proposal in Argentina was presented by the Ministry of Economy in
1986. The legislation authorized the executive branch to name companies
subject to privatization, with some exceptions in strategic sectors -such as
natural resources, banking, transportation, and communications- whose
privatization would require congressional approval. The legislative proposal
would direct proceeds from privatizations and liquidations, supplemented with
contributions from the national treasury, toward the creation of a National
Fund for Industrial Modernization [Glade 91].
In addition to efficient legislation, it is crucial to institute better access
to courts by the public, stronger legal protection and law enforcement
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mechanisms, and a tax code that does not penalize investment and allows
people to have a realistic chance of making money from being entrepreneurs
and investing in privatization [Poole 87].
Indeed, privatization depends largely upon the willingness of
entrepreneurs to risk their own funds toward developing an enterprise in the
hope that it will meet the needs of enough customers to cover the
entrepreneur's costs. But the willingness of entrepreneurs and those who lend
them money to take those risks depends very much on the legal environment
in which they seek to operate. If the law does not contain strong protection for
private ownership of property and sanctity of contracts, backed by an
impartial, smoothly working judicial system, then entrepreneurship is unlikely
to develop and flourish. What entrepreneurial energies remain will likely be
channeled into the underground or informal economy instead. In many
countries, both developed (like Italy) and less developed (like Peru), thriving
informal sectors testify to the gross inadequacy of one or more key elements
of the legal system [Poole 87].
Finally, in the context of legal structures, I direct attention to the
problems of fraud and inefficient tax collection mechanisms. The problem of
fraud in privatization is most likely to occur in countries with "soft" control
mechanisms. The inexperience of regulatory agencies in private control
mechanisms adds to the likelihood of fraud in privatization. This is the case
of Hungary for example, where a major scandal has recently revolved around
a dummy corporation, the Quintus Company, set up in Sweden to buy
HungarHotels, the owner of most of Hungary's finest hotels and restaurants.
The investors included some foreigners, but the deal was managed by
HungarHotels' management. Quintus paid a small fraction of the value of the
hotels. A legal challenge was mounted to abrogate the articles of incorporation
because of apparent fraud. Because Hungary lacked the appropriate statutes,
incorporation could not be blocked on this basis. The case went to the
140
Hungarian Supreme Court where the case was declared void on the basis of
technicality [Vernon 88].
Although fraud is an important problem and may have an appreciable
effect on the distribution of wealth and income, its economic effects are
probably of less importance. Even if fraudulently acquired, the privatized firm
should pay taxes. And here we note that inefficient tax collection is an
inherent problem of developing countries. Enterprises keep two sets of books,
one for the auditors and one for management with real figures, many
transactions are conducted in cash to avoid taxes, and many active enterprises
do not even bother to register with the state. Therefore, the reform of tax
collection mechanisms is important for governments implementing
privatization with the main objective of improving their resources and heap up
their budget deficits.
4.3.5 Under-developed Capital Markets
Historically, capital markets in developing countries have performed
poorly. They are under-developed and highly inefficient in allocating capital.
In general, there is no organized stock exchanges, no standardized accounting
procedures for private companies, or regulated disclosure laws of listed
companies; there is no bond market, except for short-term government credit
instruments (Treasury Bills); and in practical terms, there is no efficient
regulation of securities transactions. Savers demonstrate their lack of
confidence in this rudimentary financial system by relying primarily on
currency forwards and gold, rather than financial instruments, as the preferred
savings vehicle. With limited access and choice when funds were needed,
borrowers rely primarily on short-term credit acquired through the banking
system. In this financial environment, the implementation of a privatization
program is quite difficult even with the best intentions.
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In Argentina, for example, the stock market is illiquid, concentrated and
manipulated. Average daily trading volume on the Buenos Aires Stock
Exchange during 1988 -a strong year- was just $1.5 million. There were fewer
than 200 listed companies and total market capitalization at year-end 1988
equalled only 2.4% of Argentinian GNP [Euromoney 90]. Financial observers
argue that it is unlikely that the Argentinian capital market can absorb more
than 20% of the domestic privatization issues [Euromoney 90]. The balance
will have to be taken up by international investors: industrial companies which
would work closely with the Argentinian firms and passive investors,
traditional stock market investors and specialist funds.
Therefore, a critical question is whether, in an under-developed capital
market, governments should embark in privatization programs ? The answer
to this question is simple and direct: Yes, governments should privatize simply
because privatization in itself is an opportunity for financial market
development. Privatization will lead to developed capital markets, and it is not
developed capital markets that will lead to privatization. Developed capital
markets will enhance the chances of success of privatization, indeed, but will
not favor privatization. Capital markets in the U.K. and France were very
efficient in the late seventies, although nationalization was booming. It is
indeed in 1981 with the election of President Francois Mitterrand (French
Socialist Party Chairman) that the bulk of the French nationalizations occured.
David Gill [Gill 891 argues: "Privatization programs present a major
opportunity to institute the economic and financial liberalization measures and
equity market reforms". Moreover, in presenting its privatization program, the
Turkish government explained that one of the primary privatization objectives
is "to promote the development of the capital markets and to broaden the
public's participation in share ownership" [Leeds 88]. Indeed, trading volume
in the Turkish secondary market increased from 72 billion Turkish lire in 1984
(before the launching of Turkey's privatization program) to 2,405 billion
Turkish lire in 1986 (after the launching of privatization) [Leeds 88].
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Therefore, the most obvious impact of privatization on the domestic
capital markets is measured in terms of trading volume. Besides the Turkish
example mentioned above, privatization has had a positive impact on the
Egyptians stock exchanges (in Cairo and Alexandria) when President Anouar
Sadate implemented the "Infitah" (i.e., economic liberalization) policy in the
late seventies. "Infitah" is still implemented and improved by Sadate's
successor President Husni Mubarak. Table 4-7 shows total annual dealings on
Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges from 1956 to 1987. Trading volume of
securities on Istanbul Stock Exchange in 1988/89 is shown in Table 4-8.
However, especially at the outset of a privatization program,
mechanisms can be devised that allow the general public to be reached,
without a strong and efficient capital market. First, the government can sell
shares directly to already large domestic groups or to foreigners. Second, the
government can give the shares to taxpayers or voters on a pro rata basis as
some form of national stock dividend [Gill 89]. This give-away options, along
with highly subsidized purchase agreements, however, are not likely to benefit
in the short term either the financial markets or the privatized enterprises.
Such gifts, or near gifts, of shares usually only enhance savings or expand
habits of equity buying at the margin, as the shares are usually sold quickly
at low valuations by those unused to share ownership to wealthier, more
sophisticated investors. This will result in the concentration of ownership in
the hands of few wealthy investors. Nevertheless, the government must
institute some degree of fiscal incentive for domectic share buyers, combined
with educational programs for new investors and fair treatment of minority
shareholders, which can build serious saver interest in shares over the long
term. In addition, government must institute new regulations encouraging
investment from foreign investors in the domestic market. The Turkish
government published on August 11, 1989, the widely acclaimed Decree 32
which declared the securities market in Turkey fully open to foreign
institutional and individual investors [Euromoney 89]. Excerpts of the full text
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of Article 15 of Decree 32 are shown in Table 4-9. The increased efficiency and
trading volume of Istanbul Stock Exchange show that governments, with
adequate planning and support from international advisors (e.g., advisors from
I.F.C. or renowned investment banks), can succeed in utlizing privatization as
a tool to improve domestic capital markets.
The problems of privatization and the adequate solutions are shown in
Table 4-10. Table 4-11 shows how selected countries and regions compare in
respect to different problems of privatization.
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Table 4-1: Main Economic Figures in Eastern Europe, 1989.
GNP Private Savings Deposits
Country (in U.S.$ billions) (in U.S.$ billions)
Bulgaria 51.2 0.8
Czechoslovakia 123.2 17.9
Hungary 64.6 6.0
Poland 172.4 3.1
Romania 79.8 0.5
Total 491.2 28.3
Note: * The net hard-currency indebtednesses of these countries were
in December 1990 (in US$ billions) :
Bulgaria: 9.8
Czechoslovakia: 6.3
Hungary: 20.3
Poland: 41.8
Romania: 1.3
Source: [Ferriss 91]
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Table 4-2: Approximate Infrastructure Gap vs. GNP in Eastern Europe,
1989
(in U.S.$ Billions)
Aggregate Cost Spread % of
Upgrade Over 8 GNP
Category Cost Years
Telecommunications 57.5 7.2 1.2%
Roads, Rail Transport 45.0 5.6 0.9%
Private Housing Stock 15.1 1.9 0.3%
Electric Power 64.0 8.0 1.3%
Pollution Control 72.0 9.0 1.5%
Total 253.6 31.7 5.2%
Source: [Ferriss 91]
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Telephone lines in Latin America, 1991
Telephone lines Number of
Country per 100 people leased lines
Argentina 9.58 N.a.
Bolivia 2.50 1,460
Brazil 6.01 24,760
Chile 4.89 1,120
Colombia 6.72 16,314
Ecuador 5.07 57
Guatemala 1.76 N.a.
Mexico 5.57 90,040
Paraguay N.a. 53
Peru 2.40 3,819
Uruguay 12.72 N.a.
Venezuela 7.77 13,686
France 44.6 N.a.
United States 58.5 N.a.
Source: [Heywood 91]
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Table 4-3:
PTT Privatization in Latin America
Main Managed Investment
Country carriers by plans
Argentina Telecom S.A. STET (Italy) $900 million
France Telecom in 1991-92
Telefonica de Telefonica of
Argentina Spain
Chile CTC Telefonica of
Spain $1.457 billion
in 1991-96
ENTEL of Chile Telefonica of
Spain
Mexico TelMex Southwest Bell $5.4 billion
France Telecom in 1991-92
Venezuela CANTV To be announced T.b.a.
Note: * Argentina's PTT privatization took place in June 1990,
Chile's in 1987 and 1988, Mexico's in December 1990, and
Venezuela's in September 1991.
Source: [Heywood 91]
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Table 4-4:
Table 4-5: U.K.'s Local Authority Cleansing Privatization: Job Losses
Previous number Jobs after
Area of jobs privatization % loss
Wirral 456 254 44
Southend 297 213 28
Merton 176 95 46
Eastbourne 140 90 36
Milton Keynes 104 74 29
S. Oxfordshire 59 43 27
Tandridge 58 37 36
Taunton Deane 43 22 49
Mendip 35 24 31
Total 1368 852 38
Source: [Ascher 87]
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Table 4-6: General Overview of Privatization in Latin America,
1970-1991
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Despite his efforts, Raul Alfonsin (1983-89) privatized few
enterprises, but Carlos Menem's administration has already raised
$3.232 billion through privatization.
Since 1985, state enterprises have been decentralized or
transferred to regional bodies, but no companies have been
privatized.
Government raised $200 million in revenues through privatization
in the period 1981-89. No companies have been privatized since
1989.
Between 1973 and 1975, the restitution of 360 companies provided
government with a revenue of $1 billion. Between 1975 and 1980,
the sale through public auction of 90 companies and 16 banks
produced $1 billion. The implementation of the "Popular
Capitalism" program in 1985 through 1988 raised $1.564 billion.
Timid program. The state development bank sold its holding in
the local car assembly plant to Renault of France.
Government raised $2.31 billion through February 1991 with the
privatization of Telefonos de Mexico, Compania Mexicana de
Aviacion, and Macocozac, S.A. These companies make up the bulk
of the privatization to date, and another 124 smaller companies
were privatized in 1989 and 1990.
Until 1989 privatization was limited to a few cases where plants
were handed over to employees. In 1989-90, government raised
approximately $6 million through privatization.
Source: [Cardoso 911
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Table 4-7: Total Annual Dealings on Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges
(in millions of Egyptian pounds)
Year Cairo Alexandria Total
1956 57 25 82
1958 67 45 112
1961 23 16 39
1963, 5 1 6
1977 6 2 8
1982 8 1 9
19842 107 2 109
1987 230 27 257
Notes: 1. In 1963, President Gamal Abdel-Nasser instituted the bulk of
Egypt's nationalizations.
2. In 1984, the Egyptian government instituted on a large scale
the "Infitah" (i.e., economic liberalization) policies.
Source: [Al-Ahram 881
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Table 4-8: Trading Volume of Securities on Istanbul Stock Exchange,
1988-1989
(Trading Volume in Turkish Lira million)
Stocks Corporate Bonds
Month 1988 1989 1988 1989
January 25,552 7,168 84,665 131,490
February 23,971 9,760 70,155 113,510
March 17,765 26,115 95,700 125,506
April 13,776 15,917 66,838 153,906
May 13,168 36,827 71,444 162,931
June 7,941 113,850 79,297 402,244
July 5,720 45,440 64,979 345,154
August 5,587 60,496 79,921 269,522
September 10,655 245,222 125,558 239,639
Total 124,135 560,795 738,557 1,943,402
Daily Average 660 2,967 3,928 10,283
Source: [Euromoney 89]
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Table 4-9: New Rules for Foreign Investors in Turkey
There is now no restriction on foreign investors in Turkey. The issue of
repatriation of funds was finally resolved on August 11, 1989, when the
government, in a resolution published Decree 32 in the Official Gazette. It
declared the securities market open to foreign institutional and individual
investors.
The act redefined a communique passed in July 1988 that allowed only
foreign mutual funds to have access to the equities market. Incorporated into
this wide-ranging legislation intended to liberalize Turkey's financial markets,
one particular article permits Turks to buy foreign securities, while foreigners
can buy Turkish securities listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
The stocks and bond markets are now completely open to foreign
investors with guaranteed repatriation of any profits. Excerpts of the full text
of Article 15 of Decree 32, entitled "Securities" follows:
"Persons resident abroad (including investment companies and
investment funds established outside the country) are permitted to
purchase and sell any and all types of Turkish securities quoted on the
exchange utilising the intermediation of financial institutions, pursuant
to the provisions of the Turkish Capital Market Law, and to repatriate
the proceeds earned on trading in such instruments and from the sale
of the same by banks and special finance institutions. Persons residing
in Turkey are also permitted to buy securities listed on the exchange
through banks ans special finance houses and transfer abroad the
proceeds accruing from such transactions involving the said securities.
Banks and brokerage houses are required to provide the ministry with
quarterly reports and information concerning such transactions. In the
event that persons resident abroad who purchase shares under the scope
of the present resolution of a company incorporated in Turkey wish to
participate in the corporation's board of directors of the general assembly
or to interfere in the operations of a corporation in any way, such a
desire will have to be duly registered pursuant to the provisions of the
Foreign Capital Law."
Source: [Euromoney 89]
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Table 4-10: Problems of Privatization and Adequate Solutions
1. POLITICAL OPPOSITION
Solutions: * Gain international support
* Show initial success
* Rapid, positive results
* "Capitalismo Popular" (targeting small investors)
* Vouchers (targeting the poor)
2. MANAGEMENT AND UNIONS OPPOSITION
Solutions: * Worker enterprises (possible technique: ESOP plans)
* Contractor preference requirements (give first preference
in hiring to displaced workers)
* Phased-in privatization (gradual implementation on a
geographical basis)
3. INHOSPITABLE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT
Solutions: * Control inflation (bring it down to one-digit annual
inflation, or less than 15% per year)
* Stabilize the exchange rate (stop the depreciation of the
national currency)
* Stabilize nominal interest rates (because high variability
destroys any attempt at fixed-rate financing)
* Halt capital flight (however, do not control or limit the
free flow of currency)
* Strenghten domestic private sector (encourage private
ownership) -
* Encourage foreign capital (institute adequate regulations
and eliminate restrictions)
4. INADEQUATE LEGAL STRUCTURES
Solutions: * Speed up legislation (amend adequate legislative
proposals)
* Institute better access to courts
* Strenghten legal protection and law enforcement
mechanisms
* Institute favorable tax code (give fiscal incentive for
investing in privatization)
* Control fraud (institute supervisory boards)
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5. UNDER-DEVELOPED CAPITAL MARKETS
Solutions: * Increase efficiency (organize stock exchanges and regulate
disclosure laws of listed companies)
* Institute standardized accounting procedures for listed
companies
* Protect minority shareholders (institute "fair treatment"
rules)
* Give fiscal incentive for equity investment (decrease tax
rate on capital gains)
* Bring in international advisors (from I.F.C. or renowned
investment banks)
Source: Developed by author of thesis.
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Table 4-11: Problems of Privatization: Country and Region Comparisons
Latin Eastern
Type U.S.A. U.K. America Europe Lebanon
Political
Opposition Weak Moderate Strong Strong Moderate
Employees
Opposition Moderate Strong Strong Moderate Weak
Inhospitable
Investment
Environment Weak Weak Strong Strong Strong
Inadequate
Legal Structures Weak Weak Moderate Strong Moderate
Under-Developed
Capital Markets Weak Weak Moderate Strong Strong
Source: Developed by author of thesis.
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Chapter 5
Lebanon,
Past and Present
5.1 Introduction
In 1991, Lebanon lived its first year of military stability after a
devastating war which lasted sixteen years (1975-1990). Indeed, hopes are very
high today among the Lebanese population and political leadership that the
country has finally taken the road of peace.
However, the path of recovery and prosperity is long and arduous. From
1975 to 1990, battles have raged on every part of the Lebanese territory,
causing more than 110,000 deaths, enormous physical destruction, and the
collapse of the economy. The amount of destruction and that of sixteen years
of foregone development are hard to quantify. In the summer of 1984, the
former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Reginald Bartholomew, estimated the
reconstruction bill to amount to U.S.$ 33.2 billion [Majdalani 88]. An
evaluation sponsored by Lebanon's Council for Development and
Reconstruction (CDR) and studied by Lebanese E&C Dar El-Handassah
estimated the costs of reconstruction to U.S.$ 33 billion in 1985. This figure
adjusted for 1991 prices yields U.S.$ 42 billion approximately [ComLevant-b
91]. If we take into account damages occured between 1985 and 1990 the
reconstruction bill amounts to nothing less than U.S.$ 50 billion.
Therefore, in all cases, it is clear that Lebanon will need large sums of
capital for reconstruction, and the main objective of this thesis is to investigate
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the potential sources for financing the reconstruction bill. Today, in early 1992,
with the slowness and uncertainty of international and Arab financial
supports, it appears that the Lebanese private sector is most likely to be the
major source of financing. Indeed, on July 23, 1991, the government-sponsored
CDR urged in an emphatic press statement the Lebanese private sector to
participate actively in the reconstruction of the nation:
"Knowing that the availability of foreign funding for the reconstruction
of Lebanon -beginning by Beirut's Central District and the country's
infrastructure- is still uncertain, we urge the Lebanese people and
officials to work on every effort to secure the adequate environment for
the encouragement of Lebanese capital and investment. The Lebanese
diaspora established all over the world is strongly invited to play an
important role in the reconstruction of the nation."
Council for Development
and Reconstruction
Beirut, Lebanon
Source: "L'Orient-Le-Jour",
July 23, 1991
The Lebanese private sector is strong. However, due to the unstable and
highly volatile investment environment currently prevailing in Lebanon, the
majority of the Lebanese private capital is invested or saved outside the
country. Capital flight has prevailed since the outset of the depreciation of the
Lebanese pound against hard currencies in early 1984. Moreover, the rounds
of violence of 1989 and 1990, coupled with the highly publicized bankruptcies
of some major Lebanese banks (Bank Almashrek, Banque du Credit Populaire,
Banque Trad-Credit Lyonnais, and others), have further encouraged capital
flight and installed a climate of lack of confidence and doubt in the economic
viability of the country.
The Lebanese "diaspora" is established all over the world, with a major
presence in Europe, North and Latin America, Africa, and the Arab countries.
Dr. Khalil Makkawi, Lebanese Ambassador to the United Nations, estimated
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in a lecture at Harvard University on March 30, 1992, the private holdings in
hands of Lebanese individuals and institutions around the world to amount to
U.S.$ 40 billion approximately [Makkawi 92].
This thesis will investigate the potential contribution of the Lebanese
private sector in financing the reconstruction of Lebanon. In this chapter, I will
provide an overview of facts about Lebanon. The economic systems of pre-war
and present Lebanon are examined. Special emphasis is placed on monetary
and structural indicators, and the different sectors of the Lebanese economy.
Chapter 6 deals with the issues of private sector participation and the role of
privatization in the reconstruction of Lebanon. Prospects for privatization are
proposed, and government and private sector contributions to the success of
Lebanon's recovery are examined.
5.2 Historical Background
In November 1941, the French Mandate over Lebanon was officially
ended and independence put into effect in 1943. In September 1943, the
Lebanese Parliament freely elected the first President of the Republic,
promulgated a national Pact ("Al-Mithak-al-Watani) to which all the minority
groups comprising the entire population of Lebanon affixed their signatures.
This Pact established a set of guiding rules for self-government, requested the
evacuation of French troops stationed on Lebanese soil and became the
effective national binding instrument which freely united the Lebanese people.
Under the mandate however, French and Arabic were both made official
languages. Administrative and judicial organs were improved, the local
currency was tied up to the French franc and sericulture was revived. New
entrepreneurs in pursuit of profits mobilized savings and took risks, notably
in commerce. The 1.2 million Lebanese emigrants sent capital and fresh ideas
to their relatives to invest at home [Mallat 73]. The commercial market of
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Beirut took such a business scope, mainly because of its strategic location, that
it soon became a world center known for its triangular trade, its transit to the
inner Arabic countries and its gold transactions. By 1944, the French had
forged a business-like relationship between the two republics of Syria and
Lebanon for the purpose of expanding the economic growth and future
integration of both countries. Common interests relating to frontier control,
tobacco monopoly, customs union, and concessionary companies were
established and operated in both hands [Saba 61]. A commission administered
the revenues from these interests in the ratio of 40% to Lebanon and 60% to
Syria. Soon Syria developed a protective policy while Lebanon committed itself
to a policy of free trade.
On December 31, 1946, the long struggle for complete independence and
sovereignty was achieved. The French troops evacuated Lebanon leaving
behind them large reserves of foreign exchange. In March 1950, the dispute
over the customs union with Syria reached its peak and the accord was
dissolved. Lebanon instituted then its own and independent economic policy.
Since that date, the Lebanese economy became as close to the classical laissez-
faire model as one can expect in the modern world. Meyer, in his 1958 book
'Middle Eastern Capitalism' expressed it in these words: "Lebanon today is
held as one of the world's few remaining citadels of truly laissez-faire
capitalism" [Meyer 58].
From 1950 to 1965, the Lebanese Republic has traveled quite a distance
towards the solution to its knotty economic and social problems -inherent in
its geography, inherited from its history and resultant from the heterogeneous
ethnic and religious composition of its population. It has witnessed a
remarkable average rate of economic growth and an adequate reform in the
public administration up to the mid-sixties; since then economic growth has
been more difficult to achieve, inflation more threatening and economic
downswings more acute [Mallat 73]. The 1970 population estimate denoted
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that it is an over-populated small nation with a density of about 210
inhabitants per Km2 , a total Lebanese population of 2,109,000, a total resident
population of 2,650,000, and a per capita income of 500 U.S. dollars [Mallat
73]. In comparison to most of the Middle East, Lebanon seemed much out of
a place. It does not "look, think, vote, or behave like any of its neighbors"
[Gaskill 58]. In an area famous for flat, broiling, hot waterless deserts,
Lebanon stood out like a vast oasis, with cool mountains, a refreshing climate,
plenty of water, green forests and so much social, cultural and religious
activity that it has become an international center. Its outgoing disposition and
its lead in the adoption of Western and Arab education gave it a high level of
education greater skill and more versatility that can be found in other parts
of the region. In the early seventies, Lebanon indeed had one of the highest
standards of living and was one of the best educated lands in the East with
92% of its people literate -roughly the rate of illetracy among most of its
neighbors [Mallat 73].
5.3 Economic Structure Before the War
Lebanon was mainly a services economy and remains so until today. In
1970, trade, finance, and related services accounted for 72.8% of Net National
Product (i.e., total income generated). Agriculture accounted for barely 9.1% of
NNP, and industry and construction together amounted to 18.1% of NNP
[Mallat 73]. Table 5-2 shows the percentage shares of NNP by categories of
economic sectors in Lebanon from 1950 to 1970. In terms of growth, Lebanon's
economy fared fairly well at 6.3% average compound growth rate in the 1950-
1970 period, raising the per capita real income of the Lebanese people at a
yearly average of 4.1% [Mallat 73]. Economic growth rates in Lebanon in the
1950-1970 period are shown in Table 5-3.
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5.3.1 Trade and Services
Trade and services dominated Lebanon's economy, accounting for about
three quarters of total income in the early seventies. More specifically, it is a
trade economy with 31% of total income concentrated in the commercial sector
alone. About 60% of the total income accruing from this trade came solely from
external trade -i.e., imports and transit trade [RecStat 71]. It should also be
noted that the above trade estimates exclude incomes accruing from the heavy
triangular trade transactions as well as the huge counterband exchange which
was responsible for a significant source of income to the nation.
However, the share of trade between 1957 and 1963 dropped remarkably
due to protectionist policies of the neighboring Arab countries which were
developing their own means for servicing their imports directly from abroad
rather than through Lebanese intermediaries. After 1963, the value of transit
trade recovered hesitantly, to rise again drastically after the 1967 six-day war.
The value of transit trade passed from 957 million Lebanese pounds (LL) in
1967 to 1,272 million LL in 1970 [RecStat 71].
Also, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq were developing their own harbors
and competing with Lebanon for transiting goods to the inner lands. Parallel
trends were also visible in finance as these countries gained strength and self
confidence in their dealings in the international financial markets.
Nevertheless, before the start of the war, the main gaining sectors of the
Lebanese economy have been in commerce, banking, real estate, tourism,
service and government [Mallat 73].
5.3.2 Industry
The growth of the industrial sector in Lebanon is relatively recent and
dates back to the late fifties. Before that period, there were no large factories
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except for tobacco, natural silk, and a few handicraft works. During the 1950-
1970 period, the Lebanese government showed concern for the lack of
manufacturing in Lebanon, and began implementing various measures aimed
at promoting industrial development. Most of these measures unfortunately
were of a selective nature and had only limited results. The most outstanding
of these was the raising of tariffs on some competing goods, the exemption of
import duties on industrial equipments, spare parts and raw materials, and
the exemption from income tax of the first five years on all new industrial
ventures [Yafi 62].
In result, industrial output has expanded at a fairly rapid pace in the
1950-1970 period, contributing on the average a share of 13.6% of the NNP by
1970 [Mallat 73]. Rapid as the industrial growth seemed to be in absolute
terms, it remained questionable in relative terms, for compared to its share of
the NNP, it was 13.5% in 1950 and moved up to 13.6% in 1970; thus having
no impact on the structure of the economy. Indeed industrialization as such did
not occur in Lebanon for industrial investment has been throughout the post-
war period irregular, whismical and with no definite planning [Mallat 73].
In terms of the various groups of industries, food and beverage, textile
and its derivatives, and non-metallic mineral industries alone accounted
respectively for 59% of the total number of enterprises, and 49% of the value
added for 1964. This very structure in the industrial sector still existed in
1970, with a heavy concentration of the industrial sector in the food, the
textiles and the non-metallic industries. Table 5-4 shows the industrial census
in Lebanon in 1964.
5.3.3 Agriculture
Lebanon has three distinct land areas: the littoral, the Mountain and the
Bekaa Valley. The littoral consists of narrow plains stretching about 125 miles
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from North to South of Lebanon and averaging 1.5 miles in width. The
Mountain consists of two parrallel chains, the Western chain or "Mount
Lebanon" that stretches 125 miles from North to South and averages 30 miles
in width; and the Eastern chain or anti-Lebanon that stretches along the same
line from North to South of Lebanon reaching occasional peaks of 8,500 feet.
The Bekaa Valley separates the two chains of mountains but is more of a
plateau than a real valley since it is at an altitude of 2,850 feet. It stretches
66 miles from North to South and attains a width of seven miles.
In the 1950-1970 period, about 45% of the Lebanese manpower was
involved in agriculture, and about half the population relies on that sector for
its livelihood [Mallat 73]. As a result, Lebanon has been commonly classified
as an agricultural country. However, on the basis of national income Lebanon
may not fit well in this classification since the total agricultural produce does
not exceed one-tenth of the NNP. Also worth mentioning is the fact that this
low share of the agricultural sector is not necessarily indicative of the level of
personal income in the rural areas of the nation, as many of those engaged in
agriculture had also other sources of income. Moreover, even if the Litani
Water Project (South Lebanon) is fully utilized, the natural possibilities of
agricultural income will remain limited by the small size of arable land in
Lebanon [Mallat 73]. The lack of extensive agriculture would still remain the
main handicap. Intensive agriculture is the only solution and efforts in this
direction in the post-war period have shown remarkable results in the
cultivation of fruits and vegetables. In 1950-1970, agricultural income
increased by almost 100%, mainly due to technical improvements and know-
how, going from 206 million LL in 1950 to 401 million LL in 1970 [Mallat 73].
Table 5-5 shows land cultivation figures in Lebanon in 1964 and 1969.
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5.4 Lebanon Today
Sixteen years of war caused enormous damages to the Lebanese
economy. While no official statistics are available, estimates show that there
was a sharp reduction in GDP accompanied by a sharper reduction in
investment spending. Lebanese statistician Fernand Sanan estimated the
Lebanese GDP in 1990 to U.S.$2.137 billion; while if the war did not occur,
and following the post-war 8.7% annual growth rate on average, the GDP in
1990 should have been around U.S.$13 billion [Sanan 91]. The loss is indeed
overwhelming. Table 5-6 shows the evolution of the Lebanese GDP from 1974
to 1990.
5.4.1 The State of the Economy
Today, Lebanon's economy is in an unpleasant shape. Constant
depreciation of the Lebanese pound (LL), hyper-inflation, and increasing
capital flight create a highly unstable economic environment in Lebanon, at a
point where in late 1991, the majority of the population was doubtful in the
chances of economic recovery. Those doubts were confirmed most recently in
1992, when the Lebanese pound lost more than 40% of its value in less than
three weeks in March 1992. Following a decision of the Lebanese Central Bank
to stop supporting the national currency against hard currencies, the
population rushed to buy U.S. dollars, causing the LL to fall from 879 LL for
one U.S. dollar in early March 1992 to 1,350 LL for one U.S. dollar in late
March 1992. Table 5-7 shows the deterioration of the exchange rate of the
Lebanese pound against the US dollar from 1983 to April 1992.
However, some positive signs must be noted. First, 1991 was the first
year of military stability since 1975, and the Lebanese GDP moved up from
about U.S.$ 2.2 billion in 1990 to about U.S.$ 3.3 billion in 1991. The annual
inflation rate dropped from 84.7% in 1990 to 50% in 1991 [Orient-lb 92]. It
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reached a peak of 727.4% in 1987 (see Table 5-8)[ComLevant-a 91]. Second,
agricultural and industrial exports grew by 74.3% from 1990 to 1991 (U.S.$
214 million in 1990 to U.S.$ 373 million in 1991) [AudiBank 91]. Third, the
relative peace recorded in 1991 encouraged many Lebanese expatriated all over
the world, to return to their homeland bringing in capital and hard currencies.
Fourth, construction activity posted a sinificant increase in 1991 compared to
1990. According to the Lebanese Association of Engineers, 8,236 construction
permits were issued by the Association in 1991, versus 2,859 permits in 1990.
These permits were for 6.1 million square meters in 1991, compared with 2.2
million in 1990 [AudiBank 91]. Fifth, the Port of Beirut and Beirut
International Airport showed notable improvements in total activity in 1991
compared to 1990 and 1989. Total number of incoming and departing
passengers at Beirut's airport was up to 825,764 in 1991. It was only 637,000
in 1990 and 220,000 in 1989 [ComLevant 92]. Beirut's port received 2,225 ships
in 1991 which handled a total of 3,098,600 tons of goods [Orient-la 92]. The
Port of Beirut was closed in 1990 and 1989. The volume of activity in the Port
and Airport of Beirut in 1991 is shown in Tables 5-9 and 5-10 respectively.
Nevertheless, the current indebtedness of the Lebanese public sector, the
continuing high inflation, and the recent depreciation of the Lebanese pound
confirm that the economy is still in a very fragile state. As of September 30,
1991, the internal indebtedness of the Lebanese public sector amounted to
2,184 billion Lebanese pounds (94.3% of GDP) [ComLevant-c 91]. This public
debt is growing at a high rate knowing that it was only 1,583.3 billion
Lebanese pounds as of end 1990. Table 5-11 shows the total indebtedness of
the Lebanese public sector in 1990 and 1991.
Furthermore, the bad shape of the Lebanese commercial banks -which
constituted the back bone of private sector activity in the seventies- has added
to the complexity of the situation.
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The banks' problems began in 1983, when all the factors that had
allowed the banking sector to adapt in the early years of the war (1975-1983)
disappeared. The money of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
deserted the Lebanese financial institutions after the 1982 Israeli invasion, the
Arab aid for reconstruction came to a stop and remittances dwindled to $40
million per year -less than half the amount transfered before 1983- because of
both an economic slowdown in the Gulf region and a continuing instability in
Lebanon.
Hence, since 1983, and because of the reasons mentioned above, the
banks started to face a host of problems. The accumulation of bad debts is an
example of these problems. Starting in 1975-76, a large number of commercial,
industrial, and other establishments sustained damages which made it difficult
and sometimes impossible for them to meet their debt obligations. In other
cases, collateral had become devalued leaving loans uncovered. As a result of
all this, there has been a rise in the proportion of bad debts in the portfolio of
most commercial banks [Iskandar 84]. Such debts were estimated in 1986 at
around 30 to 40 percent of total loans outstanding [Ecochiffres 86]. However,
bankers have stopped hounding their clients for overdue loans because the
collaterals are also devalued. Rather than showing losses on their books they
prefer to carry bad debts indefinitely [NYTimes 84].
Another problem facing Lebanese banks is the scarcity of safe
investment outlets on the domestic market. In the prevailing situation of
economic instability and political uncertainty, banks have generally faced
growing difficulties in locating safe and profitable investment outlets in the
local private sector [Majdalani 88]. The alternative is to subscribe heavily to
the low risk-low return treasury bills regularly issued by the Lebanese
government to finance its expenditures. In addition, many banks have resorted
to alarming speculation in the foreign exchange market. The failure in 1985
of the First Phoenician Bank, contained by a swift action on the part of
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Lebanon's Central Bank, was largely caused by risky speculative operations in
the foreign exchange market [El-Khazen 85].
The First Phoenician failure was followed by a succession of failures
from 1987 to 1991. The most notable failures were that of Bank Almashrek,
Banque du Credit Populaire, Banque G.Trad-Credit Lyonnais, Mebco Bank,
and most recently Banque Libano-Bresilienne which liquidated itself in early
1992 [Orient 92]. Besides the reasons for banks failure mentioned above, one
additional reason for failure could be that the number of commercial banks
operating in Lebanon -84 banks- is quite large relative to the size of the
market. In the early eighties, this was not really a problem since most banks
were able to acquire a share of the growing market. However, with the
economic slowdown that started in 1983, competition among banks increased
in order to maintain their share of the declining volume of banking activity. In
this climate of intense competition, a number of banks have made imprudent
or unguaranteed loans while others have offered high rates of interest to
attract depositors.
Mr. Nadim Salem, Lebanese Minister of Public Works, that I
interviewed on July 31, 1991, argues that "it is better to have a banking sector
in Lebanon with 30 or 40 strong and healthy banks than to have 80 banks
with half of them being in a very.weak position, on the edge of failure". Mr.
Salem added: "The future economic environment will require a high level of
effectiveness and banking excellence to succeed and only the most efficient and
healthy banks will survive. All over the world, the banking sector is
consolidating and the Lebanese banking sector is not an exception" [Salem 91].
Table 5-12 shows the deposits of the private sector in Lebanese banks in 1989-
1991. The consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in Lebanon for 1990
and 1991 is shown in Table 5-13.
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5.4.2 The Reconstruction Efforts
Reconstruction will be the major task on the agenda of the Lebanese
government and population at least for the next decade. The country is
overwhelmingly destroyed after 16 years of war, and no economic recovery can
be envisaged without considering first the rehabilitation of the nation's
infrastructure, rebuilding the devastated districts and towns, and the return
of the displaced population to its villages.
Today, in 1992, reconstruction efforts are restricted to the most urgent:
rehabilitating the infrastructure. A considerable amount of work has been done
in the last two years in the areas of electricity generation and distribution,
water supply, and telecommunications. However, although some positive
results are being recorded, the infrastructure -or more specifically, public
services- are still deficient in many aspects. Electricity is supplied only 12 or
18 hours per day, water is supplied one day out of three, and telephone, telex,
and postal services function in a very arbitrary manner. Nevertheless, the
situation is by far better than two years ago, when electricity, water, and
telephone services were completely halted.
In July 1991, the Minister of Hydraulic and Electric Resources,
Mohammad Youssef Baydoun, estimated the cost of the rehabilitation of
electricity supply to amount to U.S.$210 million [Orient-7 91]. He also
indicated that until July 1991, no portion of this amount was provided to the
Electricit6 du Liban (EDL), Lebanon's unique electricity company, which is at
100% under state control.
A mega-reconstruction project in Beirut's Central District (BCD) is likely
to take off in late 1992. Indeed, on June 1, 1991, the Lebanese government
issued the official Decree No. 1273 entitled "The Beirut's Central District
Project", and presented the decree for approval by the Lebanese parliament.
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After a first rejection in July 1991, the parliament voted in favor of the decree
in September 1991. The project is mainly driven by private capital as outlined
by the Lebanese Minister of Finance, Dr. Ali El-Khalil, that I interviewed on
July 30, 1991: "The BCD project is principally a private project, and the
Lebanese government's role in this project is limited solely to some regulatory
and general policy questions" [El-Khalil 91]. Dr. El-Khalil added: "Knowing
that the Lebanese government, i.e. the public sector, is unable to finance mega-
reconstruction projects like the BCD Project or other infrastructure
rehabilitation requirements, we strongly encourage the private sector's
participation in the reconstruction efforts" [El-Khalil 91].
The BCD Project is supervised by the CDR, studied by a joint-venture
of Lebanon's Dar El-Handassah and the U.S.' Bechtel Corporation, and
financed by private sector's funds. The area of Beirut's Central District is
about 1.3 million square meters, of which 550,000 m2 could be build, after
deducting roads, public gardens, and parkings [ComLevant-a 91]. I will
describe thoroughly this project in Chapter 6 which examines the role of the
private sector in the reconstruction of Lebanon.
Unfortunately, other districts devastated by the 16-year war have not
been considered for reconstruction yet. Those districts are: Aley and Bhamdoun
Districts in the Lebanese mountain and East-Saida and Jezzine Districts in
South Lebanon. Private developers are probably waiting to see how successful
the BCD Project will be, before embarking in other mega-ventures.
Nevertheless, in considering the needs for reconstruction, we should not omit
in any case those important districts.
In conclusion of this chapter, I should mention that current
reconstruction efforts are not proceeding easily. Multiple problems are facing
these efforts, and the Lebanese private sector is still very cautious in investing
in the reconstruction program. The major difficulty is related to the high
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degree of uncertainty concerning Lebanon's political future. Moreover, the
structural problems that the Lebanese economy is facing today constitute also
a major hurdle facing investment in reconstruction. I investigate these
difficulties in detail in Chapter 6, and provide possible solutions that could be
implemented to insure the continuity and viability of Lebanon's reconstruction
program.
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Lebanon Facts and Figures
Area: 10,452 Square Kilometers (4,015 Square Miles)
Population: 2,655,000 in 1990
Capital and Largest City: Beirut
Other Major Cities: Tripoli, Saida, Tyr, Zahleh, and Baalbeck.
Population of Beirut Metropolitan Area: 1,250,000 million in 1990
Political System: Democratic, Parliamentary
Economic System: Liberal, "Laissez-faire"
National Currency: Lebanese Pound (L.L.)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 1990: U.S.$ 2.137 billion
1991: About U.S. 2.80 billion
Exchange Rate on April 15, 1992: 1410 L.L. for one U.S. dollar
Boundaries: North and East: Syria
West: Mediterranean Sea
South: Israel
Principal Activities: Commerce, Banking, and Services
Languages: Arabic, French, and English
Major Universities: * American University of Beirut (AUB)
* "Universit6 Saint-Joseph" (USJ)
* "Universit6 Libanaise" (UL)
Source: Developed by author of thesis.
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Table 5-1:
Table 5-2: Percentage Shares of Net National Product (NNP) in
Lebanon by Categories of Economic Sectors,
1950-1970
Category 1950 1957 1964 1970
Primary Activity
Agriculture 19.7 15.8 11.8 9.1
Secondary Activity
Industry and
Construction 17.6 15.2 18.4 18.1
Tertiary Activity
Trade, Real Estate,
Transport, Finance,
Services, Government 62.7 68.7 69.8 72.8
Source: [Mallat 73]
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Table 5-3: Growth Rates in Lebanon by Tranche of 5 Years,
1950-1970
% Average growth % Average Increase
rate of NNP at in per Capita
wholesale Real Income
Periods constant price
1955-55 7.4 4.8
1955-60 4.4 1.8
1960-65 13.6 9.7
1965-70 2.8 0.2
1950-60 5.9 3.3
1960-70 8.2 4.9
1950-70 7.0 4.1
Source: [Mallat 73]
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Industrial Census in Lebanon (1964)
Number Total Cash Receipts Value Added
Industry of firms Employment (LL 000's) (LL 000's)
All Industries 2,099 41,093 862,500 312,300
1. Food and
Beverage 534 8,237 241,689 60,201
2. Textiles
and Derivatives 395 9,840 110,562 46,145
3. Non-Metallic
Minerals 302 5,731 86,855 42,833
Total of Items
1 + 2 + 3 1,231 23,808 439,106 149,179
Percentage
of Total (%) 59 52 51 49
Source: Recensement Industriel au Liban, 1964.
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Table 5-4:
Land Cultivation in Lebanon: 1964 and 1969
Types of Area Cultivated Value of Produce Productivity by Ha.
Produce in Hectares (Ha) (in million LL) (in tons)
1964 1969 1964 1969 1964 1969
Cereals 91,700 53,815. 25.4 11.4 5.1 3.1
Vegetables 41,495 46,504 57.6 85.7 317.4 288.7
Industrial
Produce 11,800 17,826 23.6 46.3 87.3 69.8
Fruits 86,179 81,617 234.5 210.0 173.4 121.9
TOTALS 231,174 199,762 341.1 353.4 583.2 483.5
Source: Le Receuil de Statistiques Libanaises, Ministry of Planning,
Republic of Lebanon, 1970-1971.
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Table 5-5:
Table 5-6: Evolution of the GDP in Lebanon (1974-1990)
GDP (in GDP (in GDP Projections
Year LL billion) US$ million) (in US$ million),
1974 8.1 3,479 3,479
1975, 8.2 3,573 3,782
1976 6.1 2,125 4,111
1977 10.2 3,324 4,469
1978 11.4 3,858 4,858
1979 14.6 4,502 5,280
1980 19.0 5,530 5,739
1981 22.6 5,239 6,238
1982 24.3 5,139 6,781
1983 25.4 5,619 7,371
1984 27.8 4,270 8,012
1985 42.6 2,594 8,709
1986 103.5 2,697 9,467
1987 400.0 977 10,291
1988 910.0 2,224 11,186
1989 1313.0 2,645 12,159
1990 1500.0 2,137 13,217
Notes: 1. The Lebanese war began in 1975.
2. Projections were made assuming that GDP would continue
growing at the 1974 annual average rate of 8.7%.
Source: [Sanan 91]
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Table 5-7: Average Exchange Rate: Lebanese Pound (L.L.) vs. U.S. Dollar,
1983-1992
Year L.L. per one U.S. Dollar
1983 4.52
1984 6.51
1985 16.42
1986 38.37
1987 224.74
:1988 409.23
1989 496.50
1990 701.76
19911 879.00
19922
* January 2, 1992 879.00
* January 31, 1992 879.00
* February 28, 1992 879.00
* March 16, 1992 1040.00
* March 31, 1992 1200.00
* April 15, 1992 1410.00
* April 23, 1992 1540.00
Notes: 1. In 1991, due to the intervention of the Central Bank of
Lebanon, the exchange rate was stable during the last two months
of the year at 879.00 L.L. per one U.S. Dollar.
2. On March 16, 1992, due to the shortage in its hard currency
reserves, the Central Bank decided to halt supporting the L.L.
against the U.S. Dollar. As a result, the L.L. lost around 80% of
its value in forty days, dropping from 879 L.L. per one U.S.
Dollar on March 13, 1992, to 1540 L.L. per one U.S. Dollar on
April 23, 1992.
Source: [Sanan 91] and [ComLevant 92]
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Inflation in Lebanon (1974-1991)
Year
1974
1982
1987,
1988
1989
1990
1991
Inflation Rate
11.1%
19.6%
727.4%
155.0%
70.0%
84.7%
50.0%
Note: 1. In 1987, inflation in Lebanon reached its peak in the modern history
of the country: 727.4%.
Sources: [ComLevant-a 91] and [Orient-lb 92]
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Table 5-8:
Table 5-9: Activity in the Port of Beirut Since Its Re-Opening on March 15,
1991
Number of Amount of Cash Receipts
Month Ships Goods (in tons) (in LL millions)
March 1991 46 144,300 2,625
April 1991 144 244,000 9,009
May 1991 220 353,500 15,348
June 1991 232 286,300 19,045
Source: [ComLevant-a 911
180
Activity in Beirut's International Airport in 1991.
Passengers
Month Arrivals Departures Total
January 21,579 23,555 45,314
February 11,810 14,057 25,867
March 19,762 19,685 39,447
April 24,913 24,159 49,072
May 26,210 24,055 50,265
June 49,551 28,850 78,401
July 62,409 39,825 102,234
August 54,015 68,936 122,451
September 42,227 67,374 109,601
October 31,020 37,675 68,765
November 28,602 30,672 59,274
December 41,074 33,979 75,053
Total (1991) 413,412 412,452 825,764
Total (1990) 300,678 337,266 637,944
Source: [ComLevant 92]
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Table 5-10:
Table 5-11: Internal Debt of the Lebanese Public Sector in 1990-1991
Cumulative Internal Debt
"Year (in L.L. billions)
1990 1,583.3
:1991
* As of March 31 1,745.6
* As of June 30 1,774.1
* As of September 30 2,184.0
Source: [ComLevant-c 91]
Table 5-12: Private Sector Deposits in Lebanese Banks, 1989-1991
(in Lebanese Pounds millions)
1989 1990 Sept. 1991
Deposits of Residents
* in Lebanese pounds 750,771 930,468 1,433,183
* in hard currencies 1,519,774 2,557,204 3,109,390
Total 2,270,545 3,487,672 4,542,573
Deposits of Non-Residents
* in Lebanese pounds 43,490 64,177 N.a.
* in hard currencies 126,972 211,954 N.a.
Total 170,462 276,131 353,694
Source: [ComLevant-c 91]
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Table 5-13: Consolidated Balance Sheet of Lebanese Banks, 1990-1991
(in Million Lebanese Pounds)
1990 As of Sept. 1991
Reserves 178,002 266,954
Claims on Private Sector 1,548,259 1,944,678
Claims on Public Sector 688,400 1,098,584
Other Claims 2,374,502 2,608,002
Fixed Assets 57,825 78,938
Other Assets 88,457 113,112
Assets = Liabilities 4,935,445 6,110,268
Deposits of Residents 3,487,672 4,542,573
Deposits of Public Sector 26,120 45,080
Deposits of Non-Residents 276,131 353,694
Other Deposits 437,709 302,059
Capital 103,932 129,462
Other Liabilities 603,881 737,400
Source: [ComLevant-c 91]
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Chapter 6
Privatization
in Lebanon
6.1 Introduction
Many recent developments converge today to make the Lebanese private
sector the major and most likely source of finance for the reconstruction of the
country.
First, the highly destructive Gulf war of January-February 1991 has
shifted the priorities of the Arab world. Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran (after the 8-
year Irak-Iran war) are heavily destroyed, and reconstruction plans costing
billions of dollars are being considered. Therefore, the 1983 CDR study which
relied primarily (around 75% of the total cost) on Arab and foreign funds in the
form of grants and soft loans to finance the reconstruction of Lebanon [CDR
83], is not realistic today. Although some Arabic countries, especially Saudi
Arabia which sponsored the Taef Peace Agreement in 1990, are still promising
to assist Lebanon in its efforts, we cannot rationally expect that this assistance
will be substantial enough to provide a solid base of finance for reconstruction.
Furthermore, the promised payments of the 1979 Tunis Pledge, fell short of the
commitments. As of the end of 1991, and out of the U.S.$2 billion of grants
promised by the Arab states in November 1979, less than U.S.$450 million
were actually disbursed to Lebanon [El-Khalil 91].
Second, the difficult economic conditions in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, are shifting the priorities of the EEC and the United
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States. The newly established European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) is still investigating its funding sources and raising
capital. Therefore, we expect that the EEC and the U.S. will give first priority
to assist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Although some
European grants and loans were committed to Lebanon in 1991 (U.S.$60
million [El-Khalil 911), here also, we cannot rationally expect the financial
assistance of the EEC and the U.S. to be substantial enough to provide a solid
base of finance for Lebanon's reconstruction efforts.
Therefore, it is safe and rational to argue today that Lebanese must rely
primarily on their own resources to rebuild their country. And knowing that
the Lebanese public sector is in a state of quasi-bankruptcy, the resources we
are talking about here are that of the Lebanese private sector.
This chapter will investigate the role of the private sector in the
reconstruction of the country. First, an overview of the capabilities of the
Lebanese private sector is provided. Second, prospects for privatization and
private sector's participation are examined. Special emphasis is placed on
infrastructure, public services, and mega-reconstruction projects. Third, the
potential problems likely to arise and discourage private investment are
investigated, and possible solutions to these problems are proposed.
6.2 The Lebanese Private Sector
Compared to neighboring Arab countries, Lebanon has a strong private
sector. Indeed, since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has adopted a liberal
economic policy based on laissez-faire principles, which gave a lot of freedom
to the private sector in developing its capabilities. The private sector was the
driving force of the Lebanese economy. This contrasted sharply with state-
planning policies adopted by neighboring Arab nations like Syria, Egypt, and
Iraq, where the public sector controlled the majority of economic activities.
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As a result, the Lebanese private sector developed tremendously, and
came to dominate all aspects of economic life in Lebanon. The superiority of
the private sector over the public sector in the pre-war period was
overwhelming, and was best expressed by A.J. Meyer in his 1958 book entitled
'Middle Eastern Capitalism': "Lebanon today is held as one of the world's few
remaining citadels of truly laissez-faire capitalism" [Meyer 58].
The private sector dominated trade, industry, agriculture, tourism,
banking, and almost any other category of economic activity. No significant
presence of the public sector was recorded in those areas, despite the socialist
wave that invaded the Arab countries in the early sixties and led to the bulk
of the Syrian and Egyptian nationalizations of industry, agriculture, and
commerce. Lebanon remained insensitive to this wave.
The only activity which escaped private sector control was "public
services" (i.e., electricity, water, telecommunications, public works, and
community services). Those services were and are still provided solely by the
Lebanese state in a monopolistic manner. A 1989 study by Peter Heller and
Christian Schiller of the I.M.F. found that the Lebanese government's
aggregate subsidies to the public services sector amounted to 20% of total
government expenditures in the late eighties [Heller 89]. Today, and with the
increasing difficulties faced by the State of Lebanon in providing those
subsidies, serious thoughts are being given to the privatization of public
services. This possibility will be investigated later in this chapter.
Today, in 1992, and after sixteen years of war, the Lebanese private
sector is still by far more resourceful than the public sector. While the public
sector has posted a record high Lebanese Pounds 2,184 billion indebtedness in
September 1991 [ComLevant-c 91] and the Lebanese Central Bank has seen
its reserves of hard currencies shrink to U.S.$ 550 million in April 1992, the
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Lebanese private sector is estimated to hold U.S.$ 40 billion saved and
invested mainly outside the country [Makkawi 92]. Private sector deposits in
Lebanese banks amounted to Lebanese Pounds 4,900 billion in September 1991
[ComLevant-c 91].
However, when we talk about the Lebanese private sector, it is useful
to distinguish between the domestic private sector and the Lebanese diaspora
(i.e., Lebanese citizens established outside Lebanon). The Lebanese diaspora
is established all over the world with major presence in Europe, North
America, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. While no official
statistics exist, the diaspora population is estimated at around 4,000,000. The
disapora includes citizens who fled their homeland fifty years ago, in the mid-
twentieth century, and Lebanese who fled their country after the recent rounds
of violence in 1989 and 1990.
The 16-year war affected solely the domestic private sector. Capital
losses due to the war amounted to U.S.$4,746 million in the 1975-1983 period
(see Table 6-1) and U.S.$531 million in 1989-1990 (see Table 6-2). The
Lebanese diaspora was not affected by the war and its holdings grew to
U.S.$40 billion, saved and invested outside the country.
Therefore, when we consider the Lebanese private capital as a source of
fimds for the reconstruction of the country, it is rational to think first about
the capital of the Lebanese diaspora saved and invested in foreign countries.
Domestic private capital is scarce today, and capital flight is continuing at a
rapid pace, especially after the recent steep depreciation of the Lebanese
Pound against the U.S. Dollar in March and April of 1992 (see Table 5-7).
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6.3 Prospects for Privatization in Lebanon
As mentioned above, the Lebanese public sector has no tangible presence
in the majority of economic activities in Lebanon like manufacturing and
industry, agriculture, commerce, tourism, and financial services. Those sectors
are overwhelmingly controlled by the Lebanese private sector, and no single
state-owned enterprise is operating in those areas.
However, the State of Lebanon controls in a monopolistic manner "public
service" activities like electricity generation and distribution, water supply,
telecommunications, public works, mass-transportation, and community
services (i.e., postal services, garbage collection, and street cleaning).
Therefore, prospects for privatization in these areas are high. Indeed,
the lack of public resources necessary to rebuild and rehabilitate those vital
services, heavily damaged after sixteen years of war, makes privatization a
very plausible solution to provide adequate financial and technical resources
to undertake the badly needed rehabilitation works.
Besides privatization of public services, privatization schemes and
private sector support are needed in the mega-reconstruction projects that
should be undertaken in Lebanon's most devastated districts: Beirut's Central
District, Aley and Bhamdoun Districts in the Lebanese Mountain, and East-
Saida and Jezzine Districts in South Lebanon. Those districts are vital to
Lebanon's economic activity knowing that Beirut's Central District was the
financial and commercial center of the country, Aley and Bhamdoun Districts
contained the bulk of Lebanon's hotels and summer resorts and were the
principal attraction of foreign and Arab tourists, and East-Saida and Jezzine
Districts were the link between the capital Beirut and the South of the
country. The prospects for privatization in Lebanon are shown in Table 6-3.
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6.3.1 Privatization of Public Services
Today, public services in Lebanon are in a poor state and are functioning
in a very arbitrary manner. Electricity is provided 12 to 18 hours per day,
water is supplied one day out of three, telephone, telex, and fax services
function very poorly, public transport is non-available in many parts of the
country, and postal services and other community services like garbage
collection for example, are almost non-existent.
Since early 1989, private sector provision of these services was noticed
in some parts of the country especially in the capital Beirut and Mount
Lebanon. However, this private provision is done on a small scale, in a very
anarchical way, and is very expensive to be afforded by low-income and middle-
income families. For example, one minute of international calling to the United
Sates provided by a small private operator through satellite costs five Dollars
in week-days and four Dollars in the week-ends. This is very expensive indeed
when we know that the minimum wage in Lebanon is 125,000 Lebanese
Pounds per month or the equivalent of 85 U.S. Dollars. Therefore, five minutes
of calling costing 25 Dollars constitute about one-third of the minimum
monthly wage !!!
This small-scale provision of public services was improvised by some
Lebanese entrepreneurs, and was not undertaken following specific planning
and regulatory policies. It is running in parallel with state provision. Further-
more, no co-ordination with the Lebanese government, who owns the totality
of public services networks, was made, and today some highly respected
Lebanese government officials are claiming that private operators are illegal
and are hindering the rehabilitation work undertaken by state agencies and
enterprises. When we look at examples of public services privatization in other
parts of the world, which were undertaken following strict regulatory and
consumer protection policies, we conclude indeed that the anarchical
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privatization occuring today in Lebanon is unacceptable and cannot constitute
a long-term or even medium-term solution to the troubles of Lebanon's public
services.
As outlined in the preceding chapters of this thesis, privatization is not
an easy procedure, and should be implemented following clear regulatory and
policy frameworks. Adequate planning and co-ordination between the public
and private sectors is necessary before any attempt to privatize. Feasibility
studies (technical and financial), regulatory procedures, control mechanisms
(to prevent prohibitive pricing), official contracts, and long-term commitments
are all primordial to insure the success of privatization.
In the following paragraphs, I will investigate the possibility of
privatizing the ElectricitA du Liban, Lebanon's state-owned electricity
company, and the privatization of the Lebanese PTT services. The choice
between ownership and peripheral privatization options is examined, and the
current financial needs of the Electricit6 du Liban and the PTT are exposed.
6.3.1.1 Privatization of the Electricite du Liban
The Electrict6 du Liban (EDL) is Lebanon's sole electricity company. It
is at 100% state owned, and is responsible for the generation, transmission,
and distribution of electricity on the Lebanese territory. Before the start of the
war, EDL was a profitable and efficient enterprise, providing non-stop
electricity to every square mile of the territory.
Today, after 16 years of war, EDL is in a poor state. Enormous damages
occured in the power plants, transmission cables, and distribution networks.
The Lebanese Minister of Electric and Hydraulic Resources estimated in July
1.991, the cost of rehabilitating EDL to U.S.$210 million [Orient-7 911. He also
indicated that as of July 1991, this amount was not allocated to the ministry.
190
Moreover, the current indebtedness of the EDL is substantial. As of end 1991,
the amount of debt denominated in hard currencies was U.S.$273 million, and
debt denominated in Lebanese Pounds amounted to L.L.37 billion [Aldestef-a
91]. Table 6-4 shows the current indebtedness of the EDL. The rehabilitation
projects needed to upgrade and modernize EDL are shown in Table 6-5.
The major financial difficulties faced by EDL today could be summarized
as follows :
* Unavailability of loans considering the already high debt to equity
ratio (D/E) of EDL, and lack of equity resources.
* Devaluation of the local currency versus hard currencies which
significantly decreased the purchasing power of EDL, and resulted in the
discontinuation of development projects.
* Decrease in revenues due to thefts, lack of necessary spare parts,
illegal connections to the distribution network which still prevent EDL
staff from collecting more than 10% of its revenues [Yehya 92].
* Lack of metering equipment which is compelling EDL to charge new
subscribers using a flat rate which does not reflect accurate consumption
costs [Yehya 92].
An outright ownership privatization of EDL is difficult. First, the private
buyer must absorb around U.S.$318 million in debt, which is definitely not an
attractive proposal for any rational investor. Second, strong political opposition
to the sale of EDL is likely to arise and discourage any potential buyer.
Finally, the limited profits that EDL is expected to generate considering the
enormous capital requirements needed to upgrade and modernize the company
would not attract private investors.
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Nevertheless, two possible alternatives to ownership privatization could
be implemented to attract private investors: One is a policy of peripheral
privatization of EDL, and the other is a policy of incremental privatization
using BOT or BOO schemes.
Peripheral privatization (or privatization of operations) is feasible. The
State of Lebanon would retain ownership of EDL and assume the liabilities of
the company, and contract out selected operations performed currently by EDL
to private operators. Those operations could include: maintenance and control
of EDL equipment, upgrading EDL distribution network, and collection of EDL
revenues. The profit-oriented motivations of private operators will result in a
better maintenance for a lower cost especially if contracting out maintenance
is done on a competitive basis, more effective upgrading work, and more
efficient collection schemes especially if the operators are compensated for their
collection activities on a "commission" basis: the more they collect revenues
from EDL customers, the more their final compensation will be.
A second proposal for EDL privatization is that of an incremental
privatization in new generating capacity. As shown in Table 6-5, EDL needs
an addition of 650 megawatts of generating capacity in the near future. The
new power plant (or plants) could be build, operated and owned by private
concerns. This privatization in generating capacity method was successfully
implemented in other developing countries like Turkey and Pakistan (see
Chapter 3), and there is no reason why it cannot be successfully implemented
in Lebanon. BOT and BOO schemes, which were thoroughly described in
Chapter 3, could be utilized. Joint ventures between Lebanese construction
companies (e.g., Dar El-Handassah) and international engineering companies
(I will propose here the U.S.' Bechtel which successfully undertook many BOT
projects in Turkey -see Table 3-12) could be created to act as sponsors to the
BOT or BOO projects. The World Bank could also provide a financing
assistance to the project. In this context, I can think about the World Bank's
192
Private Sector Energy Development Fund (PSEDF) which was established in
the late eighties and is currently the most significant international lending
program for financing private energy projects. Indeed, at present, this Fund
lends $3 to $4 billion per year to developing countries to upgrade their energy
infrastructures [Landry 91]. The time of the concession could range from 15 to
20 years depending on the investment costs of the project, and the power
generated would be sold to EDL. With this privatization technique, we would
remove the burden of power plant construction and operation from EDL, and
the private sector would be given the chance to participate in the rehabilitation
of the Lebanese electricity system without having to absorb the high debt in
EDL balance sheet and the modernization costs required to upgrade the old
EDL plants. EDL will still have the responsibility of these necessary
expenditures, but at least the enormous burden of a 650 MW power plant
investment costs is removed.
6.3.1.2 Privatization of the Lebanese PTT System
As is the case with the electricity system, the Lebanese PTT system was
significantly damaged during the sixteen years of war. Today, the telecom-
munications networks, telephone stations, and PTT administrative buildings
are in a poor state. Telephone service is halted in the majority of the Lebanese
territory, telex and fax services necessary to link Lebanon to the rest of the
world are functioning in an random manner, and postal services are almost
non-existent. In late 1991, Lebanon's PTT Ministry estimated the costs of
rehabilitating the PTT network to amount to L.L.200 billion (or the equivalent
of U.S.$240 million at year end 1991). The Ministry considered that
rehabilitation works are most urgent and should be undertaken in the 1992-
1995 period. The L.L.200 billion would be allocated in the following way:
L.L.25 billion in 1992, L.L.40 billion in 1993, L.L.60 billion in 1994, and L.L.75
billion in 1995 [Aldestef-b 91]. Table 6-6 shows the PTT Ministry's
rehabilitation program for 1992-1995.
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However, as is the case with electricity, these capital requirements are
difficult to find in the government budget. And even if the government can
provide a part of this amount or any additional amount required in the future,
it is clear that an efficient and complete rehabilitation program cannot be
totally sustained with solely government funds. The participation of private
capital is required.
Here, the method of privatization that I propose could be similar to PTT
privatizations undertook in Latin American countries ("Telefonos de Mexico"
in Mexico, ENTEL in Argentina, etc..) that I thoroughly examined in Chapter
4. The scheme could be the following: The Lebanese government would retain
ownership of the PTT System and contract out the operations to private
operators. The government would not have to disburse any funds in this
scheme, it is the sole responsibility of the private operator to efficiently collect
fees from the customers to cover its costs plus an acceptable profit level. The
operator could be formed by a joint venture of Lebanese investors and a foreign
PTT company that would bring in the necessary technical know-how and
facilitate access to international networks. In Latin America, because of
cultural and language links, Telefonos of Spain was the main foreign operator
to bid for the PTT in conjunction with local private concerns. In Lebanon, I
would suggest France Telecom who was active in bidding for Latin American
PTTs, and is likely to be interested in operating the Lebanese PTT in
conjunction with the Lebanese private sector, knowing that the cultural and
historical links between Lebanon and France are very solid. Indeed, France
Telecom has currently a number of French engineers and technicians working
with Lebanese PTT staff to rehabilitate the PTT network.
Nevertheless, we can also imagine a competitive bidding scheme for the
operation of Lebanon's PTT system. France Telecom and any other major
telecom carriers would form joint ventures with Lebanese investors and bid
competitively for the system. The current presence of the U.S.' Bechtel who is
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undertaking in joint venture with Lebanon's Dar El-Handassah the study of
the BCD project, could encourage AT&T or Southwestern Bell of the United
States for instance, to step in and bid for the Lebanese PTT. The handsome
profits realized by major telecom carriers in Latin American privatizations (see
Chapter 4) would encourage the participation of these telecom carriers in the
bidding process. If it was successfully undertaken in Latin America, I cannot
see why it cannot be successfully implemented in Lebanon.
6.3.2 Privatization in Mega-Reconstruction Projects
Enormous capital requirements are needed to rebuild Lebanon's
devastated districts. The reconstruction of Beirut's Central District alone could
cost U.S.$10 billion approximately. To this figure we should add the capital
requirements needed to rebuild other devastated districts, namely: Aley and
Bhamdoun Districts in the Lebanese mountain, and East-Saida and Jezzine
Districts in South Lebanon.
However, in those mega-reconstruction projects, the financial input of
the State of Lebanon (i.e., the public sector) will be very limited, and it is also
the Lebanese private sector -with an additional input from the Arab and
foreign investment community- that is the most likely source of capital. Indeed,
it is in this spirit that Decree No. 1273 of June 1991, which describes the
legislative basis of Beirut's Central District Project, was drafted. The private
sector is expected to be the driving force of the project. The government's input
is limited to regulatory and policy questions. In my interview with Lebanon's
Minister of Finance in the summer of 1991, the minister was very clear on this
point: "The BCD Reconstruction Project is a private project. The Lebanese
government's role in this project is limited strictly to some regulatory and
general policy questions" [El-Khalil 91].
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The scheme of the BCD project is as follows: A private real estate
company ("Societe Foncibre et ImmobiliBre") is officially created and approved
by the Lebanese Parliament through Decree No. 1273. The company will be the
legal entity on which the project is based: it will "own" Beirut's Central
District. The capital of the company will be evenly divided (50/50) between
fresh-money input from Lebanese, Arab anf foreign investors, and real assests
input from the current property owners in Beirut's Central District. Both the
investors who are providing cash and the property owners who are giving up
their property rights will receive common stock (i.e., equity participation
shares) on a pro rata basis in the ownership of the real estate company. Those
shares could be traded at any time in Beirut's Stock Exchange or any other
exchange where the shares could be listed.
The company is thus responsible for developing, rebuilding, and
operating the project. First, the infrastructure of the BCD area is rehabilitated.
Second, the destroyed buildings and facilities are rebuild or renovated,
depending on the properties' degree of destruction. Third, the company
undertakes to promote, develop, and sell the new properties. The old owners
of the properties are given first priority in re-acquiring their estate if they wish
to do so. Thus, they sell their shares in the secondary market and from the
sale proceeds they acquire back their property. It is clear that the net proceeds
of the sale will not be enough to cover the entire purchase price of the
property, otherwise the company will make no profits and no investor will
invest in the fresh money part of the capital in the first place. The old owner
will have to pay a "premium" which is the cost of rebuilding and rehabilitating
his property. Of course, the old owner can choose not to buy back its property,
in which case the property is sold to any interested third party.
An implicit BOT scheme is included in Decree Law No. 1273 of the BCD
Project concerning the rehabilitation of the BCD's infrastructure :
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"The Lebanese government could authorize the private operation by the
real estate company of the newly rehabilitated infrastructure of the BCD
area. This private operation will be allowed for either a limited or an
unlimited period of time. In the case of a private operation of the
infrastructure of the BCD area, the Lebanese Treasury is exempted
from any rehabilitation expenses associated with this infrastructure."
Article 2, Clause C, Point #8
Decree No. 1273, Republic of Lebanon
This is indeed a BOT scheme in disguise. The private real estate
company will rebuild at its own expenses the infrastructure of Beirut's Central
District and operate this infrastructure for a specific period of time to recover
its costs. In this case, the Lebanese government is exempted from any
construction or rehabilitation expenses. BOT schemes described in Chapter 3
of this thesis coincide exactly with this scheme.
In an appendix to this thesis, I provide a complete translation of Decree
Law No. 1273, where all the clauses related to foreign ownership in the BCD,
public estates preservation, and infrastructure ownership are covered.
In the following sections of this chapter, I will examine the potential
problems and difficulties likely to arise in Lebanon and endanger privatization
and private sector's participation in the reconstruction of the country. We will
see that, although the financial input of the public sector is likely to be limited,
its planning and regulatory inputs are not. The government must be an active
player in reconstruction, and a passive -though hospitable- attitude is not
acceptable. The government's input is principally required in: shaping the
adequate environment to encourage private investment; stabilizing the
economy through necessary structural adjustments in its budgeting and public
expenditures policies; developing Beirut's Stock Exchange; eliminating political
interference in economic activities; and strengthening Lebanon's legal
structures.
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6.4 Problems of Privatization in Lebanon
The problems of privatization related specifically to developing nations
that we examined thoroughly in Chapter 4, are all likely to arise in the case
of Lebanon. Indeed, inhospitable and weak economic environment, political
opposition, unadequate regulatory structures, and under-developed capital
market, are all characteristics of the current environment in Lebanon.
Therefore, privatization in Lebanon will not proceed without
encountering major difficulties related to: (a) lack of confidence and high
uncertainty about Lebanon's political future; (b) unstable and weak economic
environment characterized by high inflation, steep depreciation of the Lebanese
pound, growing difficulties of Lebanese commercial banks, and significant
public debt; (c) unadequate regulatory structures characterized by the
weakness of the Lebanese legal system, lack of planning and supervisory
boards, and inefficient regulatory mechanisms; and finally, (d) under-developed
capital market, knowing that Beirut's Stock Exchange is probably among the
least efficient exchanges in the Middle East region today.
In this section, I will investigate Lebanon's problems and their impact
on private investment in reconstruction. Possible solutions that could eliminate
or lessen the influence of those problems are also proposed.
6.4.1 Weakness of the Economic Environment
Lebanon today is facing the most difficult economic problems of its entire
modern history. In October 1991, the Wall Street Journal ranked Lebanon
1.18th among 130 countries according to its "global risk" (see Table 6-7). This
compares with a ranking of 23rd for Malaysia, 49th for Saudi Arabia, 66th for
Egypt, and 70th for Syria. Only 12 countries had a lower ranking than
Lebanon, among these countries were Ethiopia (123rd), Iraq (126th), and
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Somalia (128th). This was Lebanon lowest ranking since World War II.
On April 23, 1992, the Lebanese pound attained a record level of
depreciation against the U.S. dollar: 1540 L.P. for one U.S. dollar. Only two
months earlier, in February 1992, the exchange rate was 879 L.P. for one U.S.
dollar (see Table 5-7). Thus, the Lebanese pound lost almost 100% of its value
in two months. Furthermore, inflation is soaring. Indeed, knowing that
Lebanon is primarily an "import" economy, the majority of the goods consumed
by the population are imported and their price is directly tied to the U.S. dollar
exchange rate. With the steep depreciation of the Lebanese pound, prices soar
automatically in a frenzy manner.
On April 20, 1992, an extensive report published by a commission
comprising Lebanon's most knowledgeable economists, designated three major
reasons for Lebanon's economic misery: (1) a growing and uncontrollable public
debt which attained record levels recently (see Tables 5-11 and 6-8 for internal
and external public debt respectively); (2) a careless public expenditures policy
practiced by the Lebanese government, where huge amounts of money are
spent for political and military purposes, without proper consideration to the
most urgent needs in other sectors of the economy like infrastructure, housing,
health care, agriculture, and industry; and finally, (3) a significant
overmanning in the ministries and the public sector's administrations. This
overmanning was estimated by the report to 20% approximately of the current
number of public sector's employees. Thus, the commission recommended the
layoff of at least 20% of current public sector's employees.
Therefore, it appears clearly that such an economic environment, will
not encourage privatization and private investment in the reconstruction of the
nation. As mentioned in the preceding chapters of this thesis, privatization is
about long term capital investment, and long term investment needs a reliable
and stable economic environment. No long term -or even medium term- capital
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planning is feasible in an inflationary environment. In the contrary, inflation
enhances short term and speculative investment decisions, knowing that
private investors will seek high rates of return and rapid profits to compensate
for the uncertainty inherent in inflationary environments. Moreover, foreign
investment is totally halted in unstable economic conditions. The high
variability of the exchange rate will result in increasing difficulties in
assessing the value of future cash flows and profit remittances converted in
hard currencies. Finally, the recent poor ranking of Lebanon in the Wall Street
Journal's countries risk assessment is likely to further discourage not only
foreign investment, but also private investment by the Lebanese diaspora
established outside Lebanon.
Thus, the present economic picture in Lebanon is bleak. What are the
eventual solutions that should be implemented to prevent the discouragement
of private investments in reconstruction? Although this question is best
answered by economic experts, I will suggest in the following three possible
solutions and steps that can enhance the chances of success of privatization
and private sector's participation in the reconstruction of Lebanon :
1. Stop careless government expenditures. Government waste in politically-
oriented expenditures, and spending on the Lebanese armed forces should be
reduced. Although it is believed that the strengthening of the military will
reinstall confidence in the future of the nation, spending on infrastructure,
housing, health care, and education, is by fare more urgent today than military
spending. Private investors want to have roads, bridges, airports, harbors, and
telecommunications. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, private investors
will most likely be the major source of finance in rebuilding this infrastructure,
nevertheless, the input of the Lebanese public sector -especially at the outset
of the reconstruction program- is necessary to encourage private investors to
proceed with the program. If the government begins first by rehabilitating
airports and harbors for example, then the private sector is encouraged to
200
invest jointly with the public sector in the construction of highways and power
plants. It is important that the government makes the first step.
2. Stabilize the exchange rate and reduce inflation. If it is not possible to
recover the lost value of the Lebanese pound against hard currencies, we
should at least stabilize the exchange rate and halt depreciation. It is not a low
or high exchange rate that hinders private investment, its is the high volatility
of this rate that is most disastrous to investment decisions. Once this rate is
stabilized and allowed to move with certain "reasonable" limits, then
investment can proceed. Long term planning is enhanced and reliable
previsions about cash flows and profit remittance levels can be established.
Consequently, once the depreciation of the Lebanese pound is halted, the
inflation would be significantly reduced. Lebanon is an import-oriented
economy, and the consumers price index (CPI) is directly related to the
exchange rate of the Lebanese pound versus hard currencies.
3. Eliminate overmanning in the public sector. The commission of economic
experts noticed that the Lebanese public sector was overstaffed by 20%, and
suggested that this overstaffing should be reduced or eliminated as soon as
:possible.
We have seen that overmanning tends to be a characteristic of the public
sector in many countries -both developed and developing-, and the figure of
20% seems also to be a raisonable figure for public sector's average
overmanning worldwide (see Chapter 4). We have also seen that the first
impact of privatizing a public enterprise is on the level of employment,
knowing that the private operators eliminate this overmanning as soon as they
take over the public business. This reality was the rationale behind public
sector's employees opposition to privatization. They feared heavy job losses and
they were right.
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In Lebanon today, the government would significantly reduce the burden
of a soaring public debt if he takes the painful but courageous and necessary
step of eliminating overmanning in the public sector. We would not be
enhancing efficient allocation of resources if we would be paying 120 people for
doing a job that 100 people can do. Overmanning should be eliminated.
6.4.2 Political Opposition to Privatization in Lebanon
Knowing that Lebanon has always adopted liberal economic policies
allowing extensive freedom to the private sector, political opposition to
privatization in Lebanon is not intense. Nevertheless, I would describe political
opposition in Lebanon as moderate not weak because of the notable opposition
of some important government figures to privatization in the public services
sector in particular.
Indeed, privatization of public services is not welcomed in all political
circles in Lebanon. Public services are regarded as strategic sectors of the
economy, and many political leaders discourage the idea of transferring the
operations or ownership of these activities to the private sector. Zaher El-
Khatib, current Minister of Administrative Reform, is among those. In an
interview to a local newspaper in July 1991, Mr. El-Khatib strongly opposed
the idea of privatizing public services in Lebanon [Magazine 7-91]. He argued
that public services should remain under state control, and that privatization
would lead to a monopolistic abuse by the private sector which would not fairly
preserve the rights of the citizens. Moreover, the concentration of private
wealth among few individuals in Lebanon, knowing that the Lebanese middle
class was seriously hurt by the recent economic crisis, means that the likely
players in privatization are very limited, and wide public participation would
not occur. Nevertheless, Mr. El-Khatib welcomed the idea of privatizing specific
public services like ports and airports for instance. He proposed the creation
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of mixed enterprises (i.e., enterprises jointly owned by the public and the
private sector) to manage Lebanon's airports and harbors.
On the other hand, some political figures in Lebanon are encouraging
the idea of privatization of Lebanon's public services. Among those is Roger
Dib, Minister of State, who is strongly in favor of privatizing public services.
Mr. Dib argues that privatizing such services as electricity, water,
telecommunications, and public transportation, would reduce the burden on the
public budget by eliminating the subsidies that the state is currently providing
to those services. Moreover, privatization would provide the necessary capital
for rehabilitating Lebanon's public services, which capital is not available with
the public sector presently. Finally, Mr. Dib estimated that roughly 20 to 25%
of the public payroll charges would be reduced if public services are privatized
[Orient-7 91].
Therefore, we notice that political opposition to privatization of public
services is moderate. Some are in favor, some are not. However, privatization
in other sectors of the economy is welcomed by almost every political leader in
Lebanon. Indeed, privatization in public works and mega-reconstruction
projects is not only welcomed but encouraged by the Lebanese political class
in an unanimous way. All agree that the private sector is likely to be the major
driving force in the reconstruction of Lebanon's devastated districts and in the
development of large public works projects. Mr. Ali El-Khalil, Minister of
Finance, and Mr. Nadim Salem, Minister of Public Works, that I met in the
Summer of 1991, were indeed strongly in favor of private sector's participation
in reconstruction, and did not believe that any political party in Lebanon would
oppose such a move. The private sector should play an important role in
reconstruction.
However, what is mostly encouraged by Lebanon's political leaders is
Lebanese private capital. Foreign private capital is not as zealously welcomed,
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and a strong sensitivity against foreign ownership exist within some political
parties.
When we talk about foreign capital, we should distinguish between Arab
private capital and international or non-Arab private capital. Arab private
capital is welcomed in almost an identical way than Lebanese private capital.
Some sensitivity against Arab ownership exists but it is not widespread and
:is not likely to be a major hurdle facing Arab private investment in
reconstruction. On the other hand, like most developing nations which were
under colonial control in the beginning of the century, Lebanon is sensitive to
foreign, non-Arab private capital. This sensitivity is decreasing at a rapid pace
today, especially after the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe,
but it still exists.
In the following, I propose some possible solutions to political opposition
to privatization in Lebanon. These solutions are primarily drawn from the
experience of other developing nations in privatization :
1. Encourage Lebanese-foreign joint ventures. Joint ventures between Lebanese
and foreign, Arab or non-Arab, private concerns are strongly encouraged. This
will eliminate political sensitivity to foreign ownership and enhance the
expertise of the Lebanese private sector. Indeed, by teaming up with an
experienced and well-known international party, the Lebanese private sector
will gain a significant exposure to foreign know-how. This exposure is
particularly important today, knowing that the Lebanese private sector was
practically cut from the rest of the world during the last 16 years of war.
Recent developments in information technology, communications, and
globalization of business, have not yet reached the Lebanese private sector,
and a joint venture with a foreign party would certainly enhance necessary
transfers of technology, know-how, and expertise.
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"2. Ratify laws to encourage foreign ownership. The impact of sensitivity to
foreign ownership would be reduced if adequate legislation encouraging foreign
ownership is ratified. The example of neighboring Turkey, which had a strong
sensitivity to foreign ownership, and successfully eliminated this sensistivity
by enacting efficient laws encouraging foreign ownership (see Chapter 4), could
be followed. Legislation could encompass ownership of real estate, financial
assets (e.g., common stock and corporate bonds), and operating subsidiaries.
If Turkey, which had a far less liberal economy than Lebanon, succeeded in
attracting foreign capital, Lebanon should be able to do so.
3. Create vouchers to replace subsidies in public services. Most political
opponents to privatization of public services in Lebanon, view public subsidies
necessary to preserve the poor's interest and access to those services. A 1989
study by the I.M.F. found that the Lebanese government's aggregate subsidies
to public services amounts to roughly 20% of annual government expenditures
[Heller 89]. Subsidies are mostly noticed in electricity, public transportation,
and essential goods provision, like bread for instance. Those subsidies are very
costly today, their elimination and public services privatization would
significantly reduce public debt levels. To preserve the access of the very poor
to privatized public services, the state can issue vouchers redeemable only for
a designated service, that the service provider can present for reimbursement
by the state. In this way, we would be "subsidizing" only those users who are
too poor to pay market-level prices, and letting everyone else pay the full rate
of the service.
6.4.3 Regulatory and Legal Structures in Lebanon
Due to the war, Lebanon's legal system has been functioning
sporadically in the last sixteen years. Besides physical damages that occured
in the country's courts and administrative buildings, more serious damages
occured in the judicial system and procedures themselves. People lost their
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habit to resort to courts and legal procedures to resolve their disputes.
Disputes are left hanging indefinitely, and even if a dispute is solved legally,
the court verdict is rarely respected. Furthermore, legislation in Lebanon is
slow. The approval of Beirut's Central District project which is vital to the
unity and economic viability of the nation, took approximately six months to
be ratified by the Parliament.
However, we have seen in the preceding chapters that efficient and fast
regulatory procedures are a key element for the success of privatization. The
private sector must be able to rely on clear and efficient procedures that
guarantee investments, rates of return, profit remittances, property ownership,
and non-interference by political parties in economic activities. Moreover, no
government entity exists to guarantee investments by domestic and foreign
investors against political, economic, or simply military risks. Back in January
1977, the government of Lebanon has tried to create an official entity to
guarantee investment in Lebanon against non-business-related risks. It
instituted through Decree Law No. 3 of January 15, 1977, a public agency
named the National Investment Guarantee Corporation (NIGC).
The function of NIGC was to insure new investments in tangible fixed
assets effected in Lebanon after the issuance of the said law. The risk to be
covered by the insurance was strictly political, and "was limited to direct
damages caused by the war, civil insurrection, and all acts of violence which
are public in nature" [Ghattas 85]. Other types of risk such as the risk of
government expropriation, currency inconvertibility, and nationalization were
not covered by this policy as they were supposed to be of little relevance to
Lebanon's case [Majdalani 88]. Eligibility for insurance was given a broad base
both in terms of types of institutions seeking coverage and in terms of the
citizenship of the investor. Both foreign and domestic investors were eligible
for NIGC insurance.
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However, one major flaw of NIGC was that risk coverage was set to be
denominated in Lebanese pounds. No guarantee against the depreciation of the
Lebanese pound was given back then. This could be easily understood, knowing
that in 1977 and until late 1983, the Lebanese pound was quite stable, and
moved against hard currencies within fairly reasonable limits. No one in 1977
predicted the steep depreciation of the Lebanese pound that we have seen since
late 1983, where the Lebanese pound depreciated from about 4 L.P. for one
U.S. dollar in late 1983 to 1540 L.P. for one U.S. dollar today. In percentage
terms, this yields a depreciation of roughly 40,000% !! This compares with a
depreciation of less than 25% from 1977 to 1982 (3.00 L.P. for one U.S. dollar
:in 1977 versus 3.68 L.P. for one U.S. dollar in 1982).
Therefore, another structure incorporating currency depreciation risk
-must be set for NIGC today if it is to be effective in guarantying private
investments in Lebanon. I admit that this is not an easy task to accomplish,
and this is why all activities of NIGC have been halted since late 1983.
Nevertheless, if we are thinking of attracting foreign capital and Lebanese
:private capital invested outside the country to be invested in reconstruction
projects, it is necessary to provide a guarantee against currency depreciation
risk. I strongly believe that this one of the most important risks facing private
investments in Lebanon today. Latin American nations immediatly understood
that controlling inflation and halting depreciation was a key to attracting
private investments. Some of them were quite successful in stabilizing their
economy (see Chapter 2). I can cite particularly Mexico and Argentina which
fought recently a winning battle against inflation and depreciation. They did
so by instoring "austerity" policies. The main features of austerity policies
were: (a) freezing salary increases in every sector of the economy; (b) reducing
public expenditures in a drastic way, and limiting expenses to "most urgent"
cases; (c) instoring restrictions on foreign imports which are considered as non-
vital to the economy (e.g., clothes and luxury products); and, (d) encouraging
domestic exports by lowering export tariffs and increasing quotas. Austerity
207
plans worked successfully in Mexico and Argentina, and we can say today that
those countries are on the right track to economic stability. They fought and
won their battles against inflation, soaring public debt, and home currency
depreciation.
In addition to efficient regulations and policies to re-establish economic
stability in Lebanon, other laws and regulations should be enacted instituting:
better access to courts by the public, stronger legal protection and law
enforcement mechanisms, efficient tax collection schemes, efficient anti-fraud
mechanisms, and finally, a tax code that encourages investment (e.g.,
investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation schedules), and allows
investors to have a realistic chance to earn adequate returns on investment in
reconstruction projects.
6.4.4 Lebanon's Capital Market
Unfortunately, Beirut's Stock Exchange -Lebanon's sole exchange- is
inefficient and illiquid. As Tables 6-9 and 6-10 show, trading volumes are low
and the number of listed companies is very small. Furthermore, there is no
regulated disclosure laws for listed companies, no standardized accounting
procedures, no specialized investment banks, no corporate bond market, except
for short-term government credit (Lebanese treasury bills); and in practical
terms, there is no efficient regulation of securities transactions. Consequently,
Lebanese savers show their lack of confidence in this rudimentary financial
market by relying primarily on Certificate of Deposits (CDs) as the preferred
savings vehicle. Borrowers rely primarily on short-term credit acquired
through commercial banks.
In this financial environment, the implementation of privatization is
quite difficult. For example, one feature of Beirut's Central District
reconstruction project that we described earlier in this chapter is that private
208
investors can trade their shares at any time in Beirut's Stock Echange. This
implicitely assumes that the market will remain liquid at any time, and a
seller can immediatly find a buyer and vice verca. Is that assumption rational?
My answer is no. The historical behavior of Beirut's Stock Exchange does not
allow us to make such a critical assumption. Our market is under-developed,
and cannot easily absorb the number of shares that are going to be issued for
private investors in the BCD Project.
In the following, I propose a number of steps that can be implemented
to enhance the efficiency and liquidity of Beirut's Stock Exchange:
1. Institute regulations for securities transactions. Securities transactions
should be regulated and supervised by an independent commission to prevent
fraud and illegal transactions. One cannot imagine the New York Stock
Exchange for example without the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), or
the Bourse de Paris without the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB).
Those supervisory boards are necessary to install confidence among small and
large investors in securities investment, and institute fair treatment and public
disclosure rules.
2. Give tax incentives for securities investment. For both domestic and foreign
investors, tax incentives can be devised to enhance securities buying. A low
capital gains tax would enhance common stock buying, and a low fixed income
tax would enhance corporate bonds buying. Furthermore, deferred tax schemes
can be implemented for small investors to enhance their participation in
securities buying. Specific sets of tax incentives targeted to small investors
were implemented in Chile for instance following a goverment decision to
enhance small investors share-buying and participation in privatization. The
plan entitled "Capitalismo Popular" was indeed very successful in achieving
its objectives (see Chapters 2 and 3).
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3. Encourage share-buying by foreign investors. Turkey's widely acclaimed
Decree Law No. 32 of August 1989, which opened Turkey's securities market
to institutional and individual foreign investors, was the key in the tremendous
increase in trading volume at Istanbul's Stock Exchange (see Chapter 4). The
decree regulated and instituted foreign participation in domestic shares
buying. Moreover, international investment banks and brokerage houses relied
on the official insurance of the decree to step in and participate heavily in the
activities of the exchange, bringing in much needed foreign capital for
investment in Turkey's privatization program.
A similar regulation could be instituted in Lebanon to encourage
domestic share-buying by Arab and foreign investors. The official guarantee of
such a decree is crucial. Although, and contrary to the case of Turkey, the
Lebanese government has never imposed restrictions on the free flow of
currency in and out the Lebanese borders, it is always useful to officialize the
rules governing foreign investments in Lebanon. Foreign investors are not
satisfied by the historical track record of a developing country, they tend to be
constantly sceptical, requiring official decrees and regulations to rely on.
4. Bring in international advisors. Advisors from the I.F.C. and major
investment banks played a key role in shaping the renaissance of Istanbul's
Stock Exchange. New trading techniques, information systems, accounting
standards, and disclosure laws were instituted, allowing the exchange to be
more efficient, liquid, and compatible with international standards. The crowd
of new technologies, plus the fact that the activities of Beirut's Stock Exchange
were practically frozen in the past sixteen years, require the input of
international advisors in updating and reorganizing the exchange. An efficient
and liquid capital market is the stimulus of private investment, and Beirut's
Stock Exchange should be ready to play a major role in financing the
reconstruction of the nation.
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Table 6-1: Capital Losses Due to the War,
Period Considered: 1975-1983
Losses (in Description of
Sector U.S.$ million) Casualties
Housing 756 11,200 lodgings destroyed.
Tourism 252 65 hotels in Beirut and the
Mountain region (40 in
1975-76 and 25 in 1982).
Commerce and 1,953 13,400 commerces, offices
Services and public equipment in
commercial districts.
Industry 315 300 plants and factories.
Agriculture 210 F.A.O. estimates.
Public Equipment 840 Roads, harbors, airports,
telecommunications, electri-
city and hydraulic networks,
schools and hospitals.
Miscellaneous 420 Raw materials, finite
products, vehicles, and
other properties.
TOTAL 4,746
Source: [ComLevant-b 91]
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Table 6-2: Capital Losses Due to the War,
Period Considered: 1989-1990
Losses (in Description of
Sector U.S.$ million) Casualties
Housing 16 22,000 lodgings (5000
completely destroyed).
Commerce and 20 1000 commerces and offices,
Services 16 bank branches, 240
garages and gas stations.
Industry 50 620 plants and factories
(partially or completely
destroyed).
Public Equipment 25 * Roads, airports and ports
100 * Telecommunications
99 * Hydraulic networks
100 * Electricity networks
40 * Schools and hospitals
Miscellaneous 180 Raw materials, finite
products, vehicles, and
other properties.
TOTAL 531
Source: [ComLevant-b 91]
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Table 6-3: Prospects for Privatization in Lebanon
A. Public Services:
* Electricity System ("Electricit6 du Liban")
* Water Supply ("Office des Eaux de Beyrouth")
* Telecommunications (Lebanese P.T.T.)
* Public Transportation ("Office des Transports Communs")
* Community Services (postal services, garbage collection, and
street cleaning)
B. Reconstruction Mega-Projects:
* Beirut's Central District (B.C.D. Project)
* Aley and Bhamdoun Districts (Mount Lebanon)
* East-Saida and Jezzine Districts (South Lebanon)
C. Public Works
* Highways and Roads (Private Toll Roads)
* Ports and Airports
Notes: * The names appearing between quotation marks are the official
denomination in French of the state agency or enterprise
responsible for providing the public service.
* Two areas of public service in Lebanon are provided by both the
public and the private sector: Education and Health Care.
Source: Developed by author of thesis.
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Table 6-4: Indebtedness of the ElectricitA du Liban (1991)
* Foreign Debt
* Debt to Foreign Suppliers
U.S.$38 million
U.S.$20 million
Internal Debt:
* Due to the Central Bank
* Due to the C.D.R.
* Due to the Treasury
U.S.$90 million
L.L.1,084 million
U.S.$125 million
L.L.150 million
L.L.35,150 million
TOTALS:
* Debt denominated in U.S.$ U.S.$273 million
* Debt denominated in L.L. L.L.37 billion
Note: As of end of 1991, L.L.37 billion were equivalent to U.S.$45 million
approximately. Therefore, total indebtedness of the EDL by the end of
1991, amounted to U.S.$318 million approximately.
Source: [Aldestef-a 91]
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Table 6-5: EDL Rehabilitation Requirements (1991)
* Power plants construction: Increasing the generating capacity by 650 MW.
* Rehabilitation of the 150-66 KV main transmission lines.
* Rehabilitation of the Central substations in Jamhour,
Bouchrieh.
* Reinforcement of the Medium Voltage Transmission System.
* Construction of new substations and transmission lines in the
(East Lebanon) and Zahrani area (South Lebanon).
Bsalim, and
Bekaa valley
Notes: * Today the generating capacity of EDL is as follows: 790 MW in
Zouk Mikhael (East Beirut), 348 MW in Jyeh (South Lebanon),
150 MW in Litani (South Lebanon), and 20 MW in Batroun (North
Lebanon). The Zouk and Jyeh plants rely on fuel for their energy
resources. The Litani and Batroun plants are hydro-electric
power plants.
* Transmission is provided by a 150 KV air network and 66 KV
of underground cables in Beirut. Distribution is provided through
33 KV, 15 KV, and 11 KV networks.
Source: [Yehya 92]
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Table 6-6: Lebanese PTT Rehabilitation Costs (1992-1995)
(in Lebanese Pounds Billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995
* Purchase of equipment to 5 8 8 19
the stations
* Installation of the 10 18 30 30
networks and upgrading
* Purchase of property, 2 4 4 5
construction, and building
equipment
* Network extension work 5 5 9 11
and rehabilitation of inter-
national networks
* Introduction of the 5 5 9 10
"Cellular Phone" system
TOTAL 25 40 60 75
Source: [Aldestef-b 911
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Ranking of Countries According to Their "Global Risk" (1991)
Rank Country
1 Switzerland
2 Luxemburg
5 Germany
8 Japan
9 U.S.A.
16 United Kingdom
23 Malaysia
30 Spain
32 Mexico
49 Saudi Arabia
66 Egypt
70 Syria
71 Iran
71 U.S.S.R.
104 Kuwait
118 Lebanon
121 Zaire
123 Ethiopia
1.26 Iraq
127 Sudan
128 Somalia
129 Liberia
Source: The Wall Street Journal, October 2, 1991.
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Table 6-7:
Table 6-8: External Debt of the Lebanese Public Sector,
As of October 31, 1991.
(in U.S.$ million)
Lender Total Debt Debt Paid Debt Remaining
World Bank 21.2 21.2
European Bank 12.6 12.6
Arab Fund 23.3 23.3 -
Abu Dhabi Fund 6.7 - 6.7
Belgium 0.7 0.7
France 124.6 95.5 29.1
Germany 10.1 10.1 -
Italy 118.2 - 118.2
U.S.A. 41.5 -
TOTAL 254.0 100.0 154.0
Source: [ComLevant 92]
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Table 6-9: Operations of Beirut's Stock Exchange,
1964-1982
Number of Traded Value of Traded
Year Stocks (rounded) Stocks (in LL million)
1964 857,000 81
1965 368,000 29
1966 191,000 14
1967 152,000 8
1968 41,000 5
1969 26,000 2
1970 101,000 10
1971 127,000 14
1972 387,000 43
1973 350,000 52
1974 285,000 50
1977 43,000 7
1978 101,000 22
1979 90,000 12
1980 19,000 2
1981 7,000 0.6
1982 34,000 3
Source: [Ghandour ND]
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Table 6-10: Stocks Listed on Beirut's Stock Exchange (1983)
No. of Stock No. of Traded
Issued Till Stocks in 1982
Company July 1983
Lebanese Cement'
White Cement
Eternit
Kadisha
A.B.C.
SOLIVIR
Financibre et Immobilibre
du Port de Beyrouth
O.KA.L.
Nahr-Ibrahim
Uniceramics
G4ndrale FinanciBre
du Liban
Lebanese Oils
Casino du Liban
Naas-Bickfaya
Faraya-Mzar
Union Nationale
Gestion et Exploitation
du Port de Beyrouth
Compagnie Libanaise de
Tel4pherique
CIL-Immobilier
El-Bared
BonJus
SODECO
Lecico
5,760,000
1,500,000
768,000
230,000
91,500
1,200,000
190,698
250,000
180,000
135,000
108,000
N.a.
360,000
150,000
N.a.
15,000
190,698
45,000
280,000
80,000
80,000
20,000
130,000
Note: Figures between brackets indicate
Lebanese pounds.
Source: [Ghandour ND]
5,845
2,481
2,792
1,138
376
19,875
160
250
335
100
100
40
50
10
118
40
425
100
(90)
(42)
(39)
(207)
(28)
(44)
(272.5)
(115)
(77.5)
(310)
N.a.
N.a.
(110)
(34.5)
N.a.
(502)
(176.5)
(90)
N.a.
(142)
(135.5)
N.a.
(645)
the 1983 average stock price in
220
Table 6-11: Attitude of Lebanese Businessmen With Respect to Profit Levels.
Number Percent
Attitude that would be taken of men of total
* Would withdraw only if there were outright
losses, with no hope of improvement. 84 40.6%
* Would withdraw if profits dropped to a positive
figure well below the lower end of the range of
adequate profit levels. 63 30.4%
* Would withdraw if profits dropped to zero. 31 15.0%
* Would withdraw as soon as profits drop below
the lower end of the range of adequate profit levels. 11 5.3%
* No reply 18 8.7%
TOTAL 207 100%
Source: [Majdalani 881
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Table 6-12: Ranking of Lebanese Commercial Banks According to Their Total
Deposits (1990)
Bank Name Deposits (in L.L. billion)
1. Banque du Liban et
d'Outre-Mer 297
2. Arab Bank Limited 289
3. Banque Libano-Francaise 227
4. BNPI 209
5. Byblos Bank 164
6. Soci6te Generale 161
7. Banque de la Mediterranee 158
8. Beirut-Ryad Bank 157
9. Banque de Beyrouth et des
Pays Arabes 155
10. Banque Audi 154
Source: [ComLevant-c 91]
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Table 6-13: Board of Directors of the Council for Development and
Reconstruction (CDR), 1991.
President
Vice-Presidents
Secretary General
Members
Fadl Chalak
Ibrahim Chamseddine
Butros Labaki
Nuhad Baroudi
Nadra Abou-Khater
Imad Chatila
Ali Dandache
Hagop Demerjian
George Maroun
George Samaha
Yahia Sankari
Walid Takiddine
Source: [Samaha 91]
Table 6-14: Recent Construction Activity in Lebanon (1991)
Construction Permits
Region (in square meters) Percentage
Beirut 264,800 9.47%
Mount Lebanon 833,900 29.80%
North Lebanon 655,500 23.43%
South Lebanon 748,900 26.77%
Bekaa Valley 294,900 10.53%
Total 2,798,000 100.00%
Source: [ComLevant-a 91]
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Table 6-15: Real Estate Activity in Lebanon (1990)
Real Estate Number of sale Total sale
Register Area transactions price (in LL)
Beirut 1,944 25,391,963,400
Baabda 2,485 21,731,724,800
Metn 1,761 15,870,931,700
Kesrouan 2,964 37,341,524,500
North Area I 4,569 7,691,277,780
North Area II 4,112 7,665,763,900
Bekaa 4,316 6,199,485,370
Nabatieh 2,452 1,843,980,240
Saida 4,724 10,443,021,400
Total 29,327 134,179,673,090
Note: In 1990, the average exchange rate of the Lebanese pound (LL) against
the U.S. dollar was 700 LL for one U.S. dollar. Thus, 134,179,673,090
LL yielded roughly U.S.$200 million in 1990.
Source: [ComLevant-a 91]
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate the role of
privatization techniques and private sector's capital in the reconstruction of
Lebanon. We have seen that private sector's contribution is essential, but not
unique. Even with limited financing resources, the government of Lebanon
should play a major role in: shaping the adequate investment environment to
encourage private capital inflow; stabilizing the Lebanese economy through
necessary structural adjustments in the government's budgeting and public
expenditures policies; eliminating political interference in economic activities;
reforming and reorganizing Beirut's capital market; and finally, strengthening
Lebanon's legal and regulatory structures. In Chapter 6, I proposed several
recommendations that could help in formulating and implementing those
necessary reforms.
The experiences of other developing nations in attracting private
investment in construction and development were very insightful in
formulating those recommendations. Some developing countries like Turkey,
Pakistan, Argentina, and Mexico were fairly successful in implementing the
initial phase of their economic reform and development plans. Others -like
Brazil and Peru- were not as successful and are still struggling with poverty,
high inflation, and slow -and sometimes negative- economic growth.
Nevertheless, both winners and losers were an essential source of informations
for this thesis.
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However, the case of Lebanon is somewhat different from that of other
developing countries. Lebanon has unfortunately the unique features of being
currently under military occupation, and suffering the devastating impact of
sixteen years of war. Therefore, one realistic conclusion that could be drawn
from this thesis is that attracting private capital for investment in Lebanon's
reconstruction will not be an easy task. Indeed, the feasibility of the
recommendations of this thesis is challenged by a number of questions
concerning Lebanon's political and economic futures that remain unanswered
today. Lebanese-Israeli talks that started in Washington in October 1991, have
not yet reached any tangible solution to the territorial conflict opposing
Lebanon to Israel. International and Arab financial support to Lebanon's
reconstruction efforts is slow and limited. First, the establishment of the long-
awaited Arab Fund for the Reconstruction of Lebanon which was initially
scheduled for September 1990, was suspended after the Iraki invasion of
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 [El-Khalil 91]. Second, the importance of the
economic crisis in East Europe and the former Soviet Union is diverting the
EEC's and United States' support away from Lebanon. Last but not least, the
acute economic difficulties, which are prevailing currently in Lebanon, are
hindering any possibility for long-term investment in the Lebanese economy.
Those problems are indeed overwhelming, making me a little bit
pessimistic and sceptical about the feasibility of a large-scale participation of
the Lebanese diaspora -which is likely the major source of Lebanese private
capital- in the reconstruction of the country. However, Lebanon is the land of
miracles, and the Lebanese people have shown during their tumultuous history
a great amount of dynamism and creativity. The domestic private sector has
resisted superbly sixteen years of devastating battles on every square mile of
the Lebanese territory. Lebanese entrepreneurs which are present in every
part of the world -North and Latin America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle
East- have established an impressing track record of successes.
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Today, Lebanon is relying on both its domestic private sector and the
Lebanese diaspora to be the driving forces in reconstruction. I hope that this
thesis contains useful insights that could help in shaping the adequate
environment to attract private investments in Lebanon. I admit that the
feasibility of many of the recommendations of this thesis depends to a large
extent on factors external to the will of the Lebanese people, nevertheless, it
is our primary responsability to rebuild our nation. The public sector, the
private sector, and the diaspora, must unite to accomplish another Lebanese
miracle. Our country was once called the "Switzerland" of the Middle East, and
I strongly wish that it will regain this title as soon as possible.
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Appendix A
Decree Law No. 1273
Beirut Central District Project
On June 1, 1991, the President of the Republic of Lebanon, Mr. Elias
Hraoui, issued Decree Law No. 1273 entitled "Real Estate Companies: Beirut's
Central District Project". The decree was approved by the Lebanese Parliament
on a second vote in September 1991, after an unfavourable initial vote in July
1991.
The following is the English translation of Decree Law No. 1273, which
was issued in Arabic, Lebanon's official language.
A.1 Article One
The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is authorized
to control directly, or in conjunction with any other governmental agency,
municipality, or private real estate company created following Article 21 of the
Urban Plan of the Republic of Lebanon, the execution of reconstruction projects
in any region or district of the Lebanese territory. The CDR is further
authorized to expropriate the land of the project.
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A.2 Article Two
If the execution of a reconstruction project is to be undertaken in
conjunction with a private real estate company (the company), the creation of
this company will be authorized by a decree law issued by the Lebanese
government. The decree will expose details of the internal structure and
regulations of the private real estate company. The initial status of the
company could include temporary clauses, permitting outset of operations of
the company before complete resolution of all pending cases of property
ownership disputes between the company and former owners, tenants, or
operators of the property.
The following clauses apply to the real estate company :
A.2.1 Clause A
The ownership of the company could include, in addition to Lebanese
private investors, private investors from the Arab countries represented as
institutions or individuals. Private investors -Lebanese and Arab- will
contribute to the fresh money portion of the capital of the company. The
company's capital could be fixed in a foreign currency other than the Lebanese
pound (LL). However, at the time of the initial subscription to the capital of
the company, the fresh money (i.e., cash) portion could not exceed the real
assets contributions of the former property owners in Beirut's Central District
area.
The company is exempted from all "transfer taxes" on real assets. The
company is further exempted from all "income taxes" to be paid to the
Lebanese government, and that for a period of ten years beginning at the time
of the initial subscription to the capital of the company.
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After the sale, the common stock of the company will be immediatly
traded in the secondary market of Beirut's Stock Exchange. The company is
allowed to buy back up to 10% of the total shares outstanding without the
necessary reserves condition applied to Lebanese corporations.
The company is given full authorization to fill up with earth the sea-
shore on the West side of Beirut's Central District. This newly created land
will be jointly owned by the Lebanese government and the private real estate
company. The new land will be developed in conjunction with the CDR.
A.2.2 Clause B
The real estate company is exempted from the legislation of Article One
of the law regulating foreign (including Arab) ownership in Lebanon, under the
following conditions :
1. At least two-thirds of the members of the Board of Directors of the
company should be Lebanese citizens.
2. The internal statute of the company should include a clause restricting
any private investor -Lebanese national or foreign national- of owning
more than 10% of the outstanding shares of the company. The wife or
husband of the investor and all his or her legal heirs constitute one legal
person.
A.2.3 Clause C
The following rules and procedures shall govern the valuation of the
properties included in the capital of the company :
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1. The decree authorizing the creation of the real estate company must be
published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Lebanon and in at
least three private Lebanese newspapers. A list of the properties to be
included in Beirut's Central District project must also be published.
2. A Valuation Committee of the first instance including a judge of
Lebanon's first instance courts, a civil engineer with at least 10 years
of relevant professional experience, and a real estate valuation expert,
shall prepare the first valuation report.
3. The nomination of the members of the first instance Valuation
Committee shall be published in the Official Journal. The committee will
invite every property owner in Beirut's Central District area to submit
by writing any proposition or complaint that he or she may have about
the valuation of the property, and that within at most two months after
the outset of the activities of the committee.
4. The valuation report prepared by the first instance Valuation Committee
shall be submitted to a Higher Valuation Committee nominated by the
Lebanese Council of Ministers. The Higher Valuation Committee shall
include a judge of the Beirut Court of Appeals, a civil engineer with at
least 20 years of relevant professional experience, and a real estate
expert. The Higher Valuation Committee will review the first valuation
report and any eventual complaints of the property owners. However,
the valuation report prepared by the Higher Valuation Committee is
final and indisputable.
5. Consequently, properties of Beirut's Central District area are subscribed
as real assets contribution to the capital of the real estate company, and
that within at most six months after the publication of the final report
of the Higher Valuation Committee.
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6. The company shall rehabilitate and build -at the expenses of the
Lebanese Treasury- the roads and public squares and gardens of Beirut's
Central District. Those public areas will remain under state ownership.
The company is authorized to own the rest of the pre-1975 public areas.
However, the total area of the newly rehabilitated public property should
be at least equal to the area of public properties existing in Beirut's
Central District prior to 1975.
7. The company shall rehabilitate and build -at the expenses of the
Lebanese Treasury- the infrastructure of Beirut's Central District (water
and electricity supply networks, telecommunications networks, public
parkings and garages, etc..).
8. The Lebanese government could authorize the private operation by
the company of this newly rehabilitated infrastructure. This private
operation would be allowed for either a limited or unlimited period of
time. In the case of a private operation of the infrastructure of Beirut's
Central District, the Lebanese Treasury is exempted from any
rehabilitation and construction expenses associated with this
infrastructure and due to be paid to the real estate company.
A.3 Article Three
The rent and lease contracts of all property claimants in Beirut's Central
District are still considered valid, even if the property supporting rent or lease
contracts was completely destroyed as a result of the war operations occuring
in the area between the dates of February 16, 1975 and June 1, 1991.
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A.4 Article Four
The special decrees pertaining to the implementation phase of this
Decree No. 1273, shall be issued later by the Council of Ministers of the
Republic of Lebanon.
A.5 Article Five
This Decree No. 1273 will be published on June 1, 1991 in the Official
Journal of the Republic of Lebanon.
The President of the Republic of Lebanon,
His Excellence, Mr. Elias Hraoui
June 1, 1991
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